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As the new President of The Histories, I was extremely worried about upholding 
the high standards of my predecessor Lauren De Angelis. She helped me learn how to 
create this amazing journal, which is not an easy job! I would just like to thank her for 
being a mentor to me during her years at La Salle University from her undergraduate 
career through her masters (and her time as the department secretary).
I am proud to present this edition, where you, the reader, will find works that span 
all areas of history. From ancient China through a legal history of the Second 
Amendment and the right to bear arms, I am positive you will find the research of both 
the undergraduate and graduate students fascinating. In addition to a capstone honors 
project detailing the historical evolution of the Second Amendment through a 
hypothetical Supreme Court case, a senior seminar paper about the Hungarian Revolution 
is also included in this edition.
I would like to especially thank Dr. Michael Mclnneshin, the moderator of The 
Histories. He has always been available to listen and help me whenever I needed it. I 
would also like to thank Dr. Stuart Leibiger, the chair of the department. These two 
faculty members, along with the entire department, are integral in the creation of this 
publication because they taught these student writers how to research and write about 
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I
The “Real” Scientific Revolution; 14th Century England’s Contribution to Modern
Scientific Though
By Lauren De Angelis ‘12
At first glance, the fourteenth century truly appears to be calamitous. Famine, disease, 
war, and poor leadership plagued England to the point where one must wonder if anything 
positive emerged from this time period. These bleak descriptions, however, fail to depict society 
writ large because they ignore indisputable advancements and achievements in medieval society, 
arguably the most important being science.
Often, history asserts that the thinkers of the Renaissance, such as Galileo, Kepler, and 
Copernicus, are the forerunners of modern scientific inquiry because they used experimentation 
and mathematics to explain natural phenomena. However, M.A. Hoskin and A. G Molland 
argue, ““The Scientific Revolution” of the seventeenth century cannot adequately be assessed 
without an appreciation of the achievements and limitations of those.. .on whose shoulders 
Galileo and his contemporaries stood.”1 It is necessary then to study those natural philosophers 
that worked feverishly in the scientific field during the fourteenth century because it was then 
that the real birth of scientific thought occurred. Experimentation, mathematical formulae, and 
observational analyses were integral parts of an emerging scientific method from which later 
scientists worked. This paper will thus focus on the important legacy of scientific works 
introduced at Merton College, Oxford, which became a microcosm of scientific discovery that 
inaugurated the modem era of science.
The origins of scientific thought in Europe lay in the early twelfth century, when 
cathedral schools emerged as a predecessor to universities. It was in this environment that ideas 
emerged regarding the possibility of change explained by ‘“a common course of nature.’”'1 
Curiosity was evidently emerging across Europe as individuals sought to learn about the world, 
which stimulated the translations of ancient texts. There was difficulty doing so because most 
texts by figures such as Aristotle, Euclid, and Plato were only available in Arabic translations. 
Although these languages were lost in the West, universities that cropped up in Spain were 
centers of Arabic study. Thus scholars, such as Adelard of Bath, Plato of Tivoli, Robert of 
Chester, and Gerard of Cremona, traveled there and began to work with these texts and translate 
them into Latin."1 These translations provided a vital foundation for the rise of medieval 
universities.
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Universities became centers of learning in thirteenth century medieval Europe where 
scholars discussed and disputed newly translated ancient texts. Curricula 
used by Western universities, which led to the development of a Master of Arts, focused mainly 
on courses in logic, physics, astronomy, and mathematics. Translated works studied incorporated 
many of Aristotle’s logical and scientific works, including Physics, On the Heavens and World, 
Meteorology, and On Generation and Corruption. The study of mathematics mainly consisted of 
Euclid’s Element and Boethius’ Arithmetic" These texts inspired and influenced scholars to 
openly discuss whether or not the ancients were in fact correct. One can see their influence best 
at Oxford’s Merton College, a center of scientific thought in the fourteenth century.
The origins of Merton College arguably date to the eleventh century with the teaching 
and scholarship of Adelard of Bath, a man often described as “'the greatest name in English 
science before Robert Grosseteste and Roger Bacon.’”v Adelard’s historical significance lay in 
the fact that he was one of the few Western individuals to translate important classical works. 
One such work was Euclid’s Elements, which as previously stated, was a key text for the study 
of mathematics at medieval universities. This is merely one example of the substantial amount 
of translating he contributed to the academic advancement of rising universities.vi His 
translations also proved beneficial in his own writings, the most famous being his Questiones 
Naturales, which was a scientific work dealing with the natural sciences This work was a 
composite of the expanded knowledge he received from these translations.
Adelard was also a renowned teacher in England during the tenth century. He was an 
early forerunner to key figures that played an important role in the Mertonian scientific tradition. 
Although there is very little biographical information regarding Adelard’s life, one discovers his 
teaching career through fragmented notes in some of his contemporaries’ works. For example, a 
text used at Trinity College lists him as one of three major geometers in England.viii Charles 
Burnett states, “He was evidently the key figure at the beginning of a scientific movement that 
developed in England throughout the twelfth century and culminated in the work of Robert 
Grosseteste in the early thirteenth century.”IX He was truly an innovator during his time, and 
impacted how scholars in England viewed and understood the natural sciences.
Within Oxford University, Merton College emerged as a center for the scientific 
community that built on the work of Adelard and others. Walter de Merton, the founder of the 
college, intended to make “his College a foundation for encouraging learning amongst the 
secular clergy as distinct from the religious orders. He was raising up a rival to the monastic 
system.”x This mission caused a religious struggle at Oxford that led to a fringe group breaking 
off in order to study science. That religious group was the Grey Friars, a branch of the 
Franciscans who were named for their rough, grey robes. It would be these men who became 
extremely influential members in the field of science.
The general mission of the Franciscans was merely to imitate Christ in word and deed. 
Their founder, St. Francis of Assisi, never envisioned his followers as educators in any sense; 
however education was blossoming. It did not seem practical for the friars to remain uneducated 
and in jeopardy of lagging behind their lay counterparts. Robert Grosseteste, one of the prolific 
teachers of the Grey Friars even warned “them plainly that walking in ignorance meant walking 
in shame.”xi In order to achieve this secular education, the Grey Friars had to fight an ideological 
battle because they were only allowed to study theology; those that wanted a degree in the arts 
were viewed rebellious.
These radical friars moved away from strict theological study and instead toward 
practical study of natural science. One will see the great contributions they made to the scientific
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community thanks to the unique climate at the Merton School during the twelfth and thirteenth 
centuries.
Robert Grosseteste was an early forerunner who began scientific work at Oxford in 1214 
and lectured the infamous Franciscans studying at the University. Grosseteste wrote various 
commentaries on Aristotelian works, including the Posterior Analytics and Physics. Within these 
commentaries, Grosseteste declared that “The object of...science...was thus to discover and 
define the form or ‘universal’ or ‘nature’, in the sense of principle, origin, cause of behavior and 
source of understanding, which could become the start of demonstration."xii He accepted the 
opinion of Aristotle that universals could in fact be abstracted from particular instances; 
however, these instances produced, in Grosseteste’s opinion, a hierarchy of certainty on whether 
or not the universal could be known.
Grosseteste valued the study of science in order to understand nature and even divided 
science into three categories: physics, mathematics, and metaphysics. It should be noted that 
Grosseteste asserted that mathematics was the only certain science whereas others left room for 
error, misunderstanding, and confusion.xiii Despite the uncertainty inherent in two of the 
branches, he studied all three avidly and contributed many findings to the scientific community. 
His impact was evident in his creation of an early scientific method and his work with 
mathematics, and optics.
Grosseteste spent a significant amount of time establishing a proto-scientific method. In 
natural sciences Grosseteste held that “in order to distinguish the true causes from other possible 
causes, at the end of composition must come a process of experimental verification and 
falsification.”xiv Essentially one must rely on experiment, analysis, and experience in order to 
come to a conclusion. For Grosseteste it was important to eliminate any possible causes of a 
particular problem. His scientific method was based on two important arguments: the uniformity 
of nature and the principle of economy. The former basically held that all like things in nature 
will act the same. The latter assertion is based on Grosseteste’s statement that it “is better which 
is from fewer because it makes us know more quickly.”xv In simpler terms, his theory on 
economy asserts that which is the simple explanation is more appealing than one that is more 
complicated. These scientific principles proved quite influential to scientists, such as Roger 
Bacon and William of Ockham.
Before moving on to his students and followers, it is valuable for one to gain an 
understanding of the practical findings Grosseteste made with his scientific forethought. One 
area where he particularly shined was in optics. Prior to the thirteenth century, there was little 
knowledge or understanding of optics; Adelard of Bath did not even have access to important 
Greek and Arab works.XVI By the time Grosseteste was writing he did have crucial translations, 
including Euclid’s Optica and Aristotle’s Meterologica. Although modern-day scholars of optics 
and physics would scoff at Grosseteste’s incomprehensible descriptions of light, its value lay in 
the fact that understanding optics was approached from a mathematical point of view for the first 
time.xvii
Grosseteste asserted in Concerning Lines, Angles, and Figures that “all causes of natural 
effects must be expressed by means of lines, angles, and figures, tor otherwise it is impossible to 
grasp their explanation.”XViii For Grosseteste, these natural effects were essential to the study of 
optics. He believed that light was the first ‘corporeal form of original materials and was 
responsible for motion and causation, which had the power to act in the universe and affect 
change. He called this the “multiplication of species;” a simple way to explain this is through 
example. If light travels to something and illuminates it, then that light is multiplied and has
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moved through the body in intervals. The light is now what Grosseteste would call a “species” 
because it has emanated from the object and has multiplied. For him, this process formed the 
basis for studying optics because it is the visible reaction that can be examined.XIX
Grosseteste also attempted to understand the idea of refraction of light, which he then 
applied to his study on the rainbow. He explained refraction as:
the ray incident at unequal angles deviates from the rectilinear path that it had in the first 
substance, which would be maintained if the medium were uniform. And this deviation is 
called refraction of the ray.xx
This definition when applied to experimentation helped him argue against the Aristotelian 
opinion of the rainbow, which was based on reflection. In order to prove Aristotle’s theory 
wrong, Grosseteste explained the shape of the rainbow through observation. He declared:
“Nor can a rainbow be produced by the reflection of the rays of the sun.. .because if that 
were so the shape of all the rainbows would not be an arc.. .Therefore rainbows must be 
produced by the refraction of rays of the sun in the mist of a convex cloud"xxi
According to Grosseteste, the convex cloud had multiple layers in it, which would allow the light 
to be refracted multiple times, thus producing the shape of a spectrum of colors.xxii He explained 
that if it were reflection, then the rainbow would appear bigger and higher when the sun was 
higher in the sky. Similarly, it would be smaller and lower when the sun was closer to Earth. He 
observed the changes in the rainbow at different times of day to justify his claim relying solely 
on experience and experimentation. He noticed that if the sun was rising or setting, the rainbow 
would be semicircular and larger. At any other point in the day, however, it appeared only part of 
a semicircle and much smaller.xxiii
Grosseteste also established a theory of color, which would explain why there were 
variations of color in the rainbow. He asserted that it was due to the amount of rays of light; the 
more rays present allowed for brighter colors, whereas fewer rays displayed only the darker 
colors on the light spectrum. Although his theory regarding the rainbow was not wholly correct 
because he ignored reflection altogether and attributed the shape of the bow to the denser clouds, 
he nevertheless tried to methodically explain phenomena, which was a great scientific 
improvement. He reduced the problem down to simple terms and then experimented using math 
and observation. This set the stage for Grosseteste’s followers, namely Roger Bacon.
Roger Bacon was a member of the fringe group of Franciscan friars at Oxford, and a 
student of Robert Grosseteste; thus, it is unsurprising that he understood science in a similar way. 
He pursued his education with great intensity and was suspected of heresy for the new ideas he 
had concluded during his studies. Eventually, Pope Clement IV commanded Bacon to write 
down his ideas in what became his most famous work, the Opus Maiusxxiv The discussion on 
Roger Bacon will mainly focus on his scientific findings in the Opus Maius because it is 
arguably his most prolific scientific work.
Bacon had two aims when writing the Opus Maius: to show how philosophy could be 
practically utilized and to reform how those in the thirteenth century learned based on the 
relative importance of the sciences.xxv In this treatise, he presented his work in almost an 
encyclopedic format whereby he broke down different subjects into parts. The most applicable 
sections to this paper are Part IV and V, which discuss the importance of mathematical 
knowledge and how to apply mathematical principles to the study of astronomy, optics, and even
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motion. One will see in his work that he valued experimental science and above all mathematics 
to explain phenomena present in the world.
In Part IV, Bacon wasted no time in establishing the preeminence of mathematics above 
all the sciences. He opens with the following statement:
Of these sciences the gate and key is mathematics.. .Neglect of this branch now.. .has 
destroyed the whole system of study of the Latins.. .he who is ignorant of this cannot 
know the other sciences nor the affairs of the world.xxvi
He believed that this area science was of utmost importance to study for many reasons, including 
an individual’s innate capability to understand its logic and the ease that one can comprehend it. 
According to Bacon, it is most important because “we are able to arrive at truth without 
error. . .since in this subject demonstration by means of a proper and necessary cause can be 
given. ”xxvii Mathematics allows one to work out problems and access their validity through trial 
and error. The ability to do so was crucial to Bacon because he valued these methods as the basis 
of arriving at true knowledge. This understanding of thirteenth century science was extremely 
similar to his teacher, Robert Grosseteste, who likely imparted the value of experiment and 
observation to his student.
Bacon’s math is extremely difficult to understand, but his findings are not. Therefore, one 
must concentrate on his scientific conclusions, and not the math behind them, in order to truly 
appreciate his great accomplishments. For example, in the area of optics, he attempted to explain 
vision and optics to a greater extent than his predecessors had. He explained sight using the 
multiplication of species theory, which is reminiscent of Grosseteste. He declared, “lines along 
which multiplication of species occurs do not have length alone.. .but all of them also have width 
and depth,” which provides for visibility of an object; If something lacks width, depth, or length, 
then it cannot be seen.xxviii He explained that these objects, however, could only be seen through 
intromitted rays coupled with visual rays from an individual’s eyes.xxix He essentially 
synthesized and built off of what other scientists, such as Aristotle and Alhazen, had already 
said; however, he believed his explanation was correct after examining all materials and 
knowledge available to him.
Another interesting endeavor presented in Bacon’s Opus Maius was his attempt to plot 
places using longitude and latitude. He was able to do so by overcoming some of the difficulties 
that occurred when representing the earth on a flat plane.xxx He tried to describe the shape of the 
world through the use of diagrams. He first explained that the habitable world from east to west 
was “much more than half the circumference of the Earth, and more than the revolution of one 
half of the heavens.XXXI From this mathematical supposition, he thus introduced his idea of 
longitude and latitude. His method essentially entailed drawing a line parallel to the equator and 
reading off its value on the colore, which are the celestial circles that pass through the both 
equinoxes and solstices. He then plotted longitude using a meridian that went through a 
particular city and then used that meridian to compare its location at the equator.xxxii
This method allowed for him to use arcs and circles to better describe coordinates on a 
flat map. Although there were issues and complications that Bacon did not take into 
consideration because of the lack of technology and knowledge on the subject, his attempt was 
significant because he was one of the first individuals who used math to try and create a world 
coordinate system centuries before it was correctly used. The use of coordinates to plot not only
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land, but also celestial regions was examined in the fourteenth century by Richard Wallingford 
and later by Galileo during the Renaissance.
Finally, Part V of Bacon’s work dealt with the issue of whether or not a vacuum exists. 
Aristotle previously asserted that a vacuum could not possibly occur for various reasons because 
the laws that govern the natural world would not apply. One of his most prominent arguments 
against a void lay in the fact that bodies that weighed different amounts would, in the absence of 
resistance, fall at the same time; this simply was not logical to Aristotle.xxxiii Bacon, however, 
tried to refute this Aristotelian argument. In his Opus Maius, Bacon understood the possibility of 
a vacuum in mathematical terms. He claimed, “For a vacuum rightly conceived of is merely a 
mathematical quantity extended in the three dimensions, existing per se without heat and cold, 
soft and hard.. .and without any natural quality.”xxxiv Bacon did not prove the existence of a 
vacuum, but merely the possibility of that existence, which Aristotle denied. Bacon’s work 
would later inspire Dumbleton to discuss the idea of a vacuum.
Prior to moving on to the fourteenth century Mertonian scholars known as the Oxford 
Calculators, one final figure must be noted. That figure is William of Ockham whose 
“importance in the history of science comes partly from... improvements he introduced into the 
theory of induction, but much more from the attack he made on contemporary physics and 
metaphysics.”xxxv His ideas regarding induction were based on two ideas. The first explained 
that only certain things in the world could be gained through the senses, which he called 
substances. Ockham called this “intuitive knowledge.”XXXVi Everything else not included in 
intuitive knowledge was not real and represented concepts or qualities.
The second idea is one that he is most famous for: Ockham’s razor. Simply put, the best 
explanation is the simplest because it removes any superfluous information that impedes 
knowing what is real.xxxvii Ockham’s razor was not an original thought, but actually echoes 
Grosseteste’s theory of economy. Using these two ideas, Ockham proposed that “in most cases a 
singular contingent proposition cannot be known evidently without many apprehensions of 
single instances.”xxxviii It was possible, however, to arrive at the best possible answer by 
removing all false suppositions. Ockham applied these aforementioned ideas when he analyzed 
the physics of motion.
In his Treatise on Motion, Ockham asserted, “that no other thing is required in addition to 
body and place,” which explained the basis of his understanding of motion. XXXIX His definition 
essentially asserted an object’s motion was ite continuous existence from one instant to the next 
of a permanent body. This understanding of motion actually led to a primitive definition of 
inertia, which he explained as:
The moving thing in such a motion (i.e projectile motion), after the separation of 
the moving body from the prime projector, is the very thing moved according to itself and 
not by any separate power, for this moving thing and the motion cannot be distinguished.
xl
This definition was the foundation from which future scientists, such as Jean Buridan and later 
Isaac Newton, formed their definitions of impressed force. Also, one sees Ockham’s influence in 
the work of the Oxford Calculators explained the physics of motion using mathematical 
principles.
Tracing the research and work of earlier scientific figures in England and more 
specifically at Oxford illustrates that as early as the twelfth century strides were being made to
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explain the world using reason, logic, and of course mathematics. It was thus a transitional 
period whereby these men took the philosophical explanations of ancient writers and tried to 
either prove or disprove them using experimentation and observation. The strides these natural 
philosophers made in science did not halt in this generation; rather they set the example for 
future scholars who utilized their scientific approaches, and actually expanded on them by 
mathematically analyzing natural phenomena using more complex mathematical formulae. The 
work of the Mertonian scholars in the fourteenth century evidently shows this advancement, and 
also serves to support that there was indeed growth during this turbulent time.
The first prominent Mertonian of the fourteenth century was Thomas Bradwardine who 
became a fellow at Merton College in 1323 and stayed in residence there until 1335. One of his 
first works written at Merton College was the Geometria speculativa, which was a compilation 
of Aristotle’s works on geometry. Although this treatise was used as a textbook for students, and 
held no original findings, it nevertheless is an important text in Bradwardine’s scholarship. 
Through the analysis and compilation of Aristotelian texts, he was able to form his own opinion 
on proportions, which he understood to be based on a logical division of ratios.xli This analysis 
formed the basis of his most influential work, Tractatus de Proportionibus, which was an 
original discourse that attempted to resolve the problems he saw in how Aristotle related 
velocity, force, and resistance.
Bradwardine’s Tractatus de Proportionibus “performed a crucial service to the 
development of mechanics, for in it we find the juncture of two important traditions of 
mechanics, the philosophical and mathematical.” When writing this work, Bradwardine sought 
to discover a mathematical function that would explain Aristotle’s law of motion that “velocity 
was proportional to the power of the mover divided by the resistance of the medium.”xliii There 
was an issue, however, that “if the power was smaller than the resistance it might fail to move 
the body at all.”xliv Aristotle never explained that problem; however, later writers reasoned that 
the velocity was proportional only to the excess of power when compared to resistance. When 
the power was greater than one, motion would occur.xlv Reason was not enough for 
Bradwardine, which led to his mathematical treatise.
In order to explain Aristotle’s principle mathematically without any discrepancies, he 
first detailed all necessary mathematical definitions, properties, and types of proportions. For 
instance, he focused on explaining rational and irrational proportions and how each applied to 
the different branches of mathematics.xlvi He even went as far as breaking down all possible 
structures for proportions. He then used these mathematical principles to explain correctly how 
change in velocity correlates to the force and resistance. The resulting theory is as follows: “The 
proportion of the speeds of motions varies in accordance with the proportion of motive to 
resistive forces, and conversely... This is to be understood in the sense of geometric 
proportionality.”xlvii Using this proportional explanation, Bradwardine improved on the 
Aristotelian theory by avoiding its inherent pit falls. If force is greater than resistance, then 
motion occurs; if resistance is equal to or greater than the force, movement is not possible. Thus, 
Bradwardine’s principle remained in line with the discourse of the day, but branched out using 
mathematical analysis to avoid any intellectual attacks on his work.xlviii
The mathematical and scientific jargon used in Bradwardine’s treatise is not easily 
appreciated by the modern scholar; however, it proved instrumental to other natural philosophers 
who sought to “reduce all motion to local motion and to explain their variation according to the 
Bradwardine function.” The Mertonian scholars, which included William Heytesbury, John 
Dumbleton, and Richard Swineshead, indeed did extensive work using Bradwardine’s theory,
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resulting in the revolutionizing of the study of dynamics and kinematics. Each man contributed 
greatly to this revolution; however, the scholarship is conflicted on the chronology of their 
works. Therefore, this paper will analyze individually the contributions of each scholar in the 
following order: William Heytesbury, John Dumbleton, and Richard Swineshead.
William Heytesbury was affiliated with Oxford beginning in 1330. His main work, Rules 
for Solving Sophisms, used proportions to explain degrees of qualities and how they applied to 
motion. The idea that qualities could be understood quantitatively was not a novel idea, but 
actually dated back to the time of Aristotle. Heytesbury understood this concept by viewing an 
object as individual parts that made up the whole. It is evident in his writings, as well as in his 
fellow Mertonian’s, that the Aristotelian understanding of quality and quantity could be 
mathematically applied to acceleration and velocity, thereby explaining different types of 
motion.xlix Heytesbury’s Rules for Solving Sophisms was one of the first works that used this 
application, which his contemporaries later referenced and improved upon.
In his treatise, Heytesbury made it clear that he was working with premises that could be 
described and explained using only logic and math. He first differentiated between uniform and 
non-uniform motion. He stated uniform motion occurs when “an equal distance is continuously 
traversed with equal velocity in an equal part of time” whereas non-uniform motion can “be 
varied in an infinite number of ways, both in respect to the magnitude, and with respect to time.”
1 Using these definitions, he formed various sophisms whereby he tried to show how velocity and 
acceleration altered each type of motion. These explanations are extremely difficult to follow, 
therefore, one needs only to note his most famous case, “The Mean Speed Theorem,” which 
elucidates how uniformly difform motion occurs.
In order to understand the aforementioned theory, one must grasp the concept of uniform 
acceleration first. Heytesbury defined this idea as an equal extension of velocity gained in an 
equal amount of time. He then applied this definition, along with that of instantaneous velocity, 
and arrived at “The Mean Speed Theorem.” Heytesbury explained that:
when any mobile body is uniformly accelerated from rest to some given degree [of 
velocity], it will in that time traverse one-half the distance that it would traverse if, in that 
same time, it were moved uniformly at the degree [of velocity] terminating that latitude. 
For that motion, as a whole, will correspond to the mean degree of that latitude, which is 
precisely one-half that degree which is its terminal velocity.
In simpler terms, Heytesbury asserted that an object that is uniformly accelerated would travel 
the same distance as one that has the same degree of velocity, as long as it is half of the final 
velocity of the accelerated object.lii Although Heytesbury’s assertion offered the true nature of 
local motion, he was not able to completely prove it. Other scholars at Merton however worked 
with this definition and attempted to arrive at a clearer conception of how to explain an object’s 
motion. Thus, one will see that the “Mean Speed Theorem was a collaborative work that is 
attributed to all Oxford Calculators.
John Dumbleton was Heytesbury’s contemporary, but his work is not often valued as 
highly because he lacked the mathematical genius for which the Oxford Calculators were 
famous; often his arguments would be weakly supported or nonexistent. This statement does not 
insinuate however that he is less important within the Mertonian tradition because his most 
famous work The Summa o f  Logical and Natural Things extensively discussed the intension and
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remission of qualities, also called latitude, and how it applies to motion. Thus, his scholarship is 
worth mentioning in this narrative on scientific discourse of the fourteenth century.
The Summa is a large compilation of treatises that are divided into ten parts; part one 
concentrates on logic and parts two through ten handle different aspects of the natural sciences. 
His greatest focus, however, was on the problems the Mertonian scholars were grappling with 
during that time, namely the function of motion and how to explain it logically.1iii Dumbleton 
explained the intension and remission of qualities through the Bradwardian understanding of 
proportionality, concluding that velocity and acceleration adhere to geometric proportionality. 
Understanding the variables of motion in such a way provided him with the basis for his 
conclusion on the measurement of local motion.liv
Part III Chapter ten of Dumbleton’s work explains, albeit convolutedly, how to measure 
local motion. He purported:
It is proved that a latitude [velocity] corresponds to its mean degree [of velocity]. It is 
demonstrated in the first place, however, that if some latitude of velocity terminated at 
rest [and uniformly acquired] is equivalent to a degree [of velocity] greater than its mean, 
then it is refuted that the less half of the latitude terminated at rest corresponds to [a 
degree of velocity] less than the mean of the same half.lv
This definition is similar to that of Heytesbury’s, but the ways in which he confirmed its validity 
differed substantially. Heytesbury used sophisms to explain the “Mean Speed Theorem,” 
whereas Dumbleton relied more on geometrical diagrams and proofs. For example, he stated, “If 
C is greater than B, then R is greater than D.”lvi Each letter represented a different part of motion, 
such as acceleration and velocity; this is merely one example of the type of math used by 
Dumbleton, which was quite complicated and extensive. Although Dumbleton made an effort to 
use geometrical proofs correctly, he never definitively arrived at the end result of the proof, 
which left his treatise substantially vulnerable to attacks. It would thus be the work of Richard 
Swineshead, perhaps the greatest of all the Oxford Calculators, that remedied the flaws of both 
Dumbleton and Heytesbury, thus producing the most advanced explanation of the “Mean Speed 
Theorem.”
Prior to moving on to Swineshead, one final unique topic of Dumbleton’s scholarship 
should be discussed: the possibility of the existence of a void. As previously mentioned, Aristotle 
denied the possibility of a void because it was against the laws of nature. Bacon, however, 
confronted Aristotle’s belief with a theoretical proposition that it could be explained 
mathematically. Dumbleton too worked to disprove the Aristotelian understanding like his 
forbear had. He used the movement of celestial bodies to explain his argument. Dumbleton 
stated, “to maintain contact celestial bodies would, if necessary, abandon their natural circular 
motions as particular bodies and follow their universal nature or ‘corporeity’, even though this 
involved an unnatural rectilinear movement.”lvii" Dumbleton understood the planets as needing 
one another, so if an instance occurred that broke with the laws of Aristotle, then an unnatural 
motion would occur that could not be explained by Aristotelian logic. The planets would 
necessarily cause a void in order to follow their internal nature. Dumbleton obviously never 
observed an unnatural occurrence of the planets, but it nevertheless illustrates that this 
conundrum of “nature abhors a vacuum” was still debated in the fourteenth century.lviii
The final Oxford Calculator to be discussed is Richard Swineshead who is often cited as 
the Calculator because of his treatises known as the Liber calculationum, a work that corrected
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much of the ambiguity present in Dumbleton’s Summa.lix David Lindberg writes, “Swineshead 
set down what clearly seems to be both the most brilliant application and the most brilliant 
development of Bradwardine’s function that the Middle Ages was to see.”lx Swineshead great 
achievement centers on the examination of falling bodies towards the center of the Earth, which 
proved that a body acts as a single entity and not as separate parts.
He declared in his treatise On Falling Bodies, “When an earthy body is in such a position 
that part of it is on the other side of the Centre, it is reasonable to enquire whether that part will 
resist the descent either of the whole or of the part on this side of the Centre.”lxi In this 
statement, he essentially said that once a body passes the center it becomes its own resistance, 
which would impede its motion. This resistance is contingent upon, however, whether the part 
below the center of the world is a separate entity altogether. Swineshead applied Bradwardine’s 
theory through complicated and convoluted propositions, which resulted in the conclusion that if 
the body does act as separate parts of the whole, its center could never overlap with the center of 
the world; this he declared is impossible.1xiiInstead, he purported:
the whole and the part have the same natural place and both desire it.. .the part desires the 
same place when it is part of something as it does when it is by itself.. .the part beyond 
the Centre will naturally recede from the Centre, because it is part of a while and its 
desire is part of the total desire.1xiii
Swineshead’s innovation thus clarified many of the debates his contemporaries were having 
about the motion of objects.
On Falling Bodies was not Swineshead’s only major contribution to the scientific 
disputations of the time. He also wrote extensively on the intention and remission of qualities. 
This topic had already been discussed and analyzed by the other Mertonian scholars; however, 
Swineshead’s explanation in Intension and Remission o f Qualities, Remission o f Forms, is 
arguably the clearest and proves how qualities could be understood quantitatively. He offered 
various opinions describing intension and remission, but rejected many of the one’s already in 
existence. The one he most favored however asserted that “the intension of any quality is 
measured by the proximity to the most intense degree of its latitude. Remission in this position is 
measured by he distance from the most intense degree.”lxiv Although he favored this premise, it 
was not the best explanation of the function of intension and remission, which thus drove him to 
find the answer on his own.
Swineshead extensively wrote out various propositions to show how difficult it was to 
illustrate the measurements of intension and remission; however, the three main propositions 
that best serve his purpose are as follows:
1. Whether uniform acquisition of intention follows from uniform loss of remission
2. Whether remission is increased equally proportionally and with equal velocity as 
intension is decreased
3. Whether two things which begin from zero degree of remission to acquire remission 
equally fast continue to remain equally remiss.lxv
Although he ultimately tried to negate each of these premises, he came to the conclusion that 
they were mostly correct, save one component of proposition number two. The issue that arises 
in the second premise derived from the fact that intension and remission are not the same, and
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thus cannot be proportionally compared. Swineshead provided the soundest argument that 
qualities could in fact be treated quantitatively.Ixvi
All of the Oxford Calculator’s greatly impacted the scientific community in the 
fourteenth century, which was mainly theoretically based. Therefore, much of their work did not 
contribute to many of the pragmatic problems facing those in the fourteenth century. There were 
other natural philosophers, however, associated with Merton who used scientific inquiry and 
mathematical knowledge to address practical issues and created instruments that led to 
advancement in society. One such individual was Richard Wallingford who was affiliated with 
Oxford in the early fourteenth century. The value of his work lay in his invention of the 
mechanical clock and the alboin, devices that greatly improved the study of astronomy.
Wallingford was an abbot of St. Albans, and it was in this role that he gained the 
opportunity to create the mechanical clock. He actually spent so much money on his invention 
that King Edward III complained he did not put enough resources into the church. Wallingford 
responded by frankly stating, “there would be many abbots after him who could build churches 
but none who could complete the clock.”lxvii He believed that he was the only person who could 
accomplish such a feat because he had an extensive background in mathematics and astronomy, 
fields that many religious felt threatening to their beliefs. Wallingford, however, used his 
knowledge to create many scientific works that aided him in his mechanical endeavors.
His most famous writings, Quadripartitum and Exafrenon pronosticacionum temporis, 
both demonstrate the importance of applying trigonometry when studying astronomy. He used 
this math to calculate many coordinates of stars and planets, which he then represented in his 
inventions. His clock, for instance, had the ability to track the seasons, stars, planets, and of 
course time.lxvii His device was without known precedence because it used an astrolabe-type 
design that worked in reverse of contemporary astrolabe arrangements.Ixix His other major 
invention that used theories of mathematics was the alboin, a device that plotted celestial 
coordinates; this instrument served in replacing more laborious, manual calculations. It is evident 
that Wallingford’s practical applications of math actually revolutionized how individuals 
examined the celestial region.
All of the aforementioned Mertonian scholars impacted scientific thought in substantial 
ways throughout the fourteenth century. Their work with dynamics and kinematics arguably was 
their greatest contribution because it revolutionized how natural philosophers measured and 
calculated speed. Although these men are famous for their scientific endeavors during such a 
turbulent time in history, they were not the only individuals experimenting; there were also men 
in Paris working in the area of dynamics. The two most influential natural philosophers in Paris 
were Jean Buridan and Nicole Oresme. One will see that these two individuals worked with 
similar ideas as the Mertonian scholars and left their own legacy that set the stage for the 
scientific revolution in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.
John Buridan was affiliated with the University of Paris and is often sited as the founder 
of the school of mechanics there.Ixxi His major contributions to this niche were his theory of 
impetus as it relates to projectile motion and his explanation on a body s acceleration in free fall. 
His elucidation on the theory of impetus built off o f  the already existing work presented in 
Ockham’s Treatise on Motion. Ockham’s work had not led to substantial work until Buridan 
because his contemporaries did not agree with him. Buridan however sought to answer the 
question of “whether a projectile after leaving the hand o f  the projector is moved by the air, or by 
what it is moved.”lxxii He believed Ockham’s premise was in fact correct, and thus tried to prove 
it using his own theories.
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Buridan falsifies each theory held by his contemporaries, such as air could propel a 
moving object, through the use of logic. He instead asserted that the mover imparted force on the 
object moved, called persistent impetus, which would cause the object to move with the same 
velocity until acted upon by an external force. A projectile, for instance, was slowed through air 
resistance and the force of gravity downward. If there were no resistance, then the object would 
theoretically project forever.
Buridan then related the quantity of matter to how far a particular object would project. 
He asserted:
I can throw a stone farther than a feather... [because] all forms and natural dispositions is 
in matter and by reason of matter. Hence, the greater quantity of matter a body contains 
the more impetus it can receive and the greater the intensity with which it can receive
Ixxiii
The more matter an object has allows for it to retain a greater amount of impetus, thus resulting 
in a greater distance traveled. His association of quantity of matter, which would later be called 
mass, with that of force explained the deviations in amount of space traversed by a falling object. 
This idea was the foundational basis used by Galileo in his law of inertia, which he purported 
during the Scientific Revolution in the seventeenth century.
Buridan made use of the impetus theory in his own time by applying it to the explanation 
of a falling body’s acceleration. Prior to Buridan, the rate at which a body accelerates during a 
fall was wholly ignored; often the fall was merely examined in regards only to an object’s 
weight. Buridan saw these explanations as weak, which led him to equate the weight to the 
amount of impetus gained and retained in the falling body.lxxiv He declared, “a heavy body not 
only acquires motion unto itself from its principal mover, i.e. its gravity, but that it also acquires 
unto itself a certain impetus with that motion.” lxxv Through this acquisition of impetus, the object 
actually moves faster because the fall is now caused by its own weight and the motion 
downward. Until some sort of resistance acts upon it, the body will continually increase its 
acceleration. Buridan’s genius in the area of dynamics rivals that of the Oxford Calculator’s of 
the time, and shows that even on the continent advancement was in fact occurring.
Oresme was Buridan’s successor at the University of Paris and worked with many of the 
same principles. He actually altered the argument put forward by Buridan regarding the nature of 
impetus. For Oresme, impetus derived from the initial acceleration, which then allows the object 
to increase its speed. He stated in Book II of De caelo, “Because it is accelerated in the 
beginning, it acquires such an impetus and this impetus is a coassister for producing movement. 
Thus with other things equal, the movement is faster. ”lxxvi One sees an evident difference 
between Oresme’s proposition and Buridan’s because Oresme’s explanation relies on both 
velocity and acceleration to create impetus.lxxvii
Oresme also left a lasting mark in other areas of natural philosophy. For example, he tried 
to extend the application of Bradwardine’s Function using a series of proofs to work with ratios 
and proportions. He also extensively contributed to the field of cosmology through his work on 
the possibility of a vacuum. He discussed the vacuum in “The Possibility of a Plurality of 
Worlds,” and came to the conclusion that “if two worlds existed, one outside the other, there 
would have to be a vacuum between them for they would be spherical in shape.”lxxvii Essentially, 
Oresme asserted that their motion was individual in nature and thus did not rely on the other to 
move. Therefore, there had to be some type of space between them in order to prevent them from
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acting on one another. His work with voids eventually led scientists such as Newton and Samuel 
Clarke to work with the plausibility of voids in the seventeenth century.
During the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, an evident scientific revolution occurred, 
which led to advancements in the fields of mathematics, physics, astronomy, kinematics, and 
dynamics. The origins of this revolution are found in the rise of universities, which caused men 
to congregate and dispute the ideas of the great minds of the past. These institutions became the 
centers of scientific thought during this time. The greatest example was in fact Merton College, 
which proved to be controversial place during the thirteenth century because it emphasized the 
importance of studying the natural sciences in order to explain the world. Men early associated 
with this place, including Grosseteste, Bacon, and Ockham, paved the way for future scientific 
thought by illustrating the importance that observation and experimentation played in one’s 
understanding the world. Collectively they helped established a new mindset whereby one needs 
more than sheer logic to explain natural phenomena. The stage was thus set for the natural 
philosophers in the fourteenth century to build off of these ideas and work toward a new body of 
knowledge based on scientific inquiry.
Modem scientific inquiry inarguably began in the fourteenth century, which has been 
made evident in this paper. Each natural philosopher’s contributions have been examined in 
order to show how substantial their work was for future scientists. Though many of their 
propositions and findings have since been disproved, they are nevertheless important to 
understand. Without the introduction of certain ideas, such as the intension and remission of 
qualities, “The Mean Speed Theorem,” and the theory of inertia, scientists who came later would 
have had no foundation on which to stand. The work of fourteenth century scholars is often 
forgotten when compared with the great minds of Galileo, Kepler, and Copernicus who are 
idolized in history. It should be remembered, however, that their work relied on their scientific 
forebears who started to look at the world through a new lens. Thus, men like Bradwardine, 
Heytesbury, Dumbleton, and Swineshead deserve to be remembered in history as the fathers of 
modem science because without their genius and drive, later scientific thought would have been 
significantly impeded.
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II
The Dramas of Wang Zhaoiun 
By Lauren Nelson ‘14
The legend of Wang Zhaojun is one of the most infamous and beloved stories in pre­
modern Chinese history. Tales of her great beauty and courageous heart have been passed down 
from generation to generation. With the many various adaptations and retellings of her story the 
line between fiction and truth has blurred together but by looking at each individual telling of the 
story we can see the influences and attitudes of the Chinese people during the time period the 
adaptation was written. Chinese drama, written works, such as poetry, epics, and plays, and oral 
traditions have become one of the most reliable ways to get a sense of what the society and 
culture was like during specific periods of time. The different interpretations of the Wang 
Zhaojun legend are a perfect example of how the culture of the time shines through the story.
It was during the time of the Han dynasty that the story of Wang Zhaojun originates. The 
Han Dynasty, a dynasty that last from 206 BCE to around 220 CE, had replaced the Qin Dynasty 
after the people’s dislike of the harsh government system had created unrest in the empire. After 
facing a devastating civil war, the Han Empire was in a state of weakness which gave Xingu, a 
nomadic people from the Steppe, the opportunity to attack. After much destruction and fighting, 
the Han Empire began to negotiate with the Xiongnu in the hopes of keeping them from taking 
over completely. The Hans began the practice of sending princesses to the leader of the Xiongnu 
in the hopes he would take them for brides. The Hans saw having to do this as humiliating and 
after sixty years ended the practice when the empire was strong enough to resist the attacks. 1 In 
order to keep good political ties with the Xiongnu, the Han resumed the practice using women 
from the common class because “...exchange of gifts, including Chinese royal brides, ensured 
periodic peace and trade around the gates of the Great Wall.
Wang Zhaojun was a member of an important family that lived in the south part of Nan 
County, which was located in the western part of the Han Empire. Wang Zhaojun was said to be 
exquisitely beautiful and was known to be a talented musician. When she became old enough her 
family sent her to live in the harem of Emperor Yuandi, where she served as a lady in waiting, in 
the hopes what she would one day become his bride. Wang Zhaojun lived in the harem for a 
number of years where she was never called upon by the Emperor and became rather depressed. 
During diplomatic trip to the Han Empire, the Xiongnu leader Huhanye asked Emperor Yuandi
1 Xinro Liu, The Silk Road in World History (USA: Oxford University Press, 2010), 4-5.
2 Ibid.
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for a Han princess to make his bride as a way of strengthening the alliance between the two 
empires. Yuandi refused to give the Xiongnu leader a princess, but instead offered to give him 
five women from his harem. The Xiongnu chief agreed and five women were selected, one of 
them being Wang Zhaojun. It is said that the Xiongnu chief was captivated by Wang Zhaojun’s 
beauty and married her almost immediately after his return to the steepe. Together they had a 
number of children but only one son is believed to have survived into adulthood. Huhanye died a 
few years after his marriage to Wang Zhaojun leaving the kingdom to his oldest son, one born of 
one of his first wives, who took Wang Zhaojun as his wife and produced two daughters.3 Both 
the Han and the Xiongnu people fell in love with Wang Zhaojun because of her beauty, courage 
to live in a foreign land, and her unending devotion to the Han people even after her marriage to 
the Xiongnu leader. After her death the built a number of temples and monuments in her honor 
along the Silk Road and immortalized her forever in the form of songs, art, and literature.4
By looking at the different works about Wang Zhaojun’s life we can decipher the beliefs, 
customs, and social culture of the time period for which is was written for. The first telling to be 
examined comes from a song the second century CE, whose composer is unknown, which has a 
different take on how things happened after the death of the Xiongnu leader who originally 
brought Wang Zhaojun to the steppe. In this version after the death of her husband Wang 
Zhaojun’s oldest son Shiwei becomes leader and asks to marry her, his mother. Before she gives 
him an answer she asks him if he believes himself to be Xiongnu or Chinese. When her son 
answers Xiongnu Wang commits suicide and after her burial the grass that lies on top of her 
grave never dies.5
In this version of Wang Zhaojun’s life the main themes for the story are national pride 
and complete devotion to ones country. By asking her son this question Wang Zhaojun is testing 
to see where her son’s loyalties lie and when he answers that he considers himself to be Xiongnu 
she believes that it would be the greatest dishonor to her people to marry him. She sees suicide as 
the only option that will show her devotion to her country. By depicting her this way the author 
is showing us that in his society honor and national pride are consider of the utmost. By also 
writing the grass on her grave never dies shows that they have beliefs in metaphysical and 
spiritual sense. He also has a messenger from Xiongnu say “.. .our women are ugly and inferior 
to Chinese Women” 6 which, again shows pride in their country but also shows feelings of 
superiority over other countries.
The next version is a drama titled Hangong qui, written in the thirteenth century by 
author Ma Zhiyuan. In this adaptation a crooked politician convinces Emperor Yuandi to take a 
bride and the Emperor orders him to paint a picture of every available girl. All of the girls bribe 
the politician to make their pictures beautiful, all except Wang Zhaojun, whose portrait is 
disfigured in anger. The Emperor looks past Wang sending her to the harem, where ten years 
later he hears her playing her lute and is captivated by her beauty. They fall in love and the 
Emperor banishes the politician who flees to Xiongnu where he shows the chief Wang’s portrait. 
He falls in love with her demanding her hand in marriage and the Emperor is forced to comply to
3 Susan F. Henssonow, Lambert M. Surhone, and Mariam T. Tennoe, Wang Zhaojun, (Betascript Publishing, 2010)
4 Xinro, The Silk Road in World History, 6.
5 Daphne Pi-Wei Lei, “Wang Zhaojun on the Border: Gender and Intercultural Conflicts in Premodem Chinese 
Drama” , (Asian Theatre Journal, 1996) 4.
6 Ibid.
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keep the peace. Wang says goodbye to the Emperor and on her way to the Xiongnu throws 
herself in the river.7
This version of the story was written during the Mongol rule of China, where the Chinese 
people were considered to be the lower class. Her suicide shows how frustrated the people were 
being under Mongol control, who they believed to be barbaric and uneducated. The Chinese 
were at a point of weakness and the “Chinese cultural and moral superiority over the barbaric 
neighbor tribes has to be reinvented and reaffirmed whenever China is militarily weak.” 8 
Meaning when they are at their weakest they must finds ways to show they are superior to the 
ones holding them down. Her suicide represents her courage in standing alone and fighting 
against the enemy, showing an independence and strength not normally associated with women 
during this time.
During the time that Wang Zhaojun would have lived women were not very highly 
regarded in society. They were seen only as property to their husbands or fathers and were only 
worth how pretty they were. Women live in an “a subordinate position in the family” and their 
day to day chores around the house were seen as “unimportant when compared to those of their 
ancestors or their husbands”. 9 The way Wang Zhaojun has been remembered and regarded 
shows a change in how society viewed women. By hearing Wang’s story and seeing the love and 
support she received from the Chinese people, women of pre-modem had someone be inspired 
by. They began to see that women were not as inferior as society told them they were and realize 
they are capable of doing anything they want to. Wang helped a country begin to move forward 
towards equality and provided millions of people with hope, entertainment, and a way of 
expressing themselves.
9 Deng Xiaonan, “Women in Turfan during the Sixth to Eighth Centuries: A Look at Their Activities Outside the 
Home”, (Association for Asian Studies, 1999), 89.
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III
Soviet Security and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 
By Mike McCabe ‘12
“No event in recent history has been so much lied about, distorted, and besmirched as the
Hungarian Revolution.”1
World War II marked a decisive end to a very sad chapter of history. Fascist leaders of 
two European countries were defeated as the Allied powers achieved victory in both the Atlantic 
and Pacific theatres. Unfortunately, the conclusion of global conflict did not come with 
international peace. Two global, rival superpowers emerged and rather than dig physical trenches 
as in wartime, the world became a battleground of ideology. Whether it was seen as democracy 
against authoritarianism or capitalism versus communism, nearly every country around the world 
was impacted by ideological warfare of the Cold War.
As the Soviet Union began to consolidate its Warsaw pact states, all located in the Soviet 
Bloc of Eastern Europe, it grew ever fearful of the United States and her allies in NATO. The 
battlegrounds in Europe between these two opposing ideologies, as it happened to turn out, 
would all be located inside the former Axis powers. Berlin would be a consistent problem in 
U.S.—Soviet relations. Vienna, Austria was to be partitioned off between the victorious powers 
much like Berlin. Hungary would be a different case. The Hungarians were subject solely to a 
Soviet puppet government; there would be no other Western powers to oversee control of 
Budapest. Although Hungarians would never fully support any version of Soviet occupation, 
Hungary would still be incredibly important in the Soviet Union’s grand scheme for defense 
against outside threats. In the past two centuries Russia had been invaded by the formerly great 
European powers of France and Germany. For the Soviets after World War II, a precarious 
situation would have developed should Hungary have joined the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization. Understanding that, the Revolution of 1956 in Hungary became not merely a 
struggle over one nation’s freedom—but rather, a chance for the West to gain a significant upper 
hand in security operations in Europe; a chance that Moscow could not allow to come to fruition. 
The Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was a substantial event in the Soviet Government’s 
consolidation of power at the beginning of the Cold War. For twelve days Hungarian rebels,
1 Quote from American Journalist Leslie B. Bain, as it appears in Paul Lendvai’s, One Day That Shook the 
Communist World: The 1956 Hungarian Uprising and Its Legacy, Princeton. Princeton University Press, 2008, 1.
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mostly students and writers, fought against the communist puppet government. The Soviet Union 
was forced to make a drastic decision: allow the revolution to take place and risk losing Hungary 
as a satellite state or order the Red Army into Budapest to crush the opposition. The free world 
looked on as the Kremlin decided on the latter.
The events that unfolded in 1956 are very unique in terms of a revolution. First, it began 
as a peaceful protest of students and writers. Unlike the Russian Revolution of February, 1917, 
there was no food shortage, labor problems, or socialist discontent.2 It came from the 
intellectuals—many of whom were very well paid, but discontented with the Soviet Occupation 
and the Stalinist Hungarian leader, Erno Gero.3 Therefore, the story of the Hungarian 
Revolution cannot be told like the other revolutions of history. A second unique circumstance 
was that (for the most part) the revolt was contained inside the capital city of Budapest. If the 
ideals of the revolution spread into the countryside, the will to fight did not. For the Soviets to 
restore communistic order they had to defeat a group of lightly armed, militarily untrained 
intellectuals.
Given the unique circumstances of Budapest, 1956, the question of whether it was really 
a revolution must be addressed—a revolution being distinct from a rebellion. The answer is yes.4 
The Hungarians resorted to violence in 1956 because of their desire for a multi-party democracy. 
The freedom fighters would not have been satisfied merely with Gero’s abdication, they wanted 
an end to the Soviet occupation—a Hungary ruled by the Hungarians (Magyars). These young 
intellectuals were engaged in a full social revolution. At the very least, those fighters who were 
communists were rejecting the corruption of Marx caused by the Soviet imperial dogma.
Revolutions rarely follow a blueprint.5 Doctrines may influence the politics of those 
involved; however, the operations are often sporadic.. The only driving factor behind the 
revolution was the Hungarian people’s thirst for freedom. The short-lived uprising changed 
everything—from how Hungarians saw themselves under communist rule to how the other Bloc 
countries perceived their political situation. Most importantly, for a short time it appeared that 
Hungary would be a free nation.6
The Soviet regime had to face the reality of the situation. They were caught off-guard by 
the seeming incompetence of the Hungarian leaders, coupled with the quick organization of the 
freedom fighters into militias. There would be no negotiating with the freedom fighters. They 
quickly dismantled all relics of Soviet Occupation—from statues of Lenin and Stalin to 
Communist Party headquarters and buildings. The situation would end in a free Hungary or a 
further repressed one, and as history will tell, the Soviet Union ordered the Red Army into 
Budapest to destroy any elements of resistance to the occupation. The Soviet Union acted in its 
own best security interests in crushing the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
This paper will attempt to show that the Soviet Union could not allow a free Hungary if it 
was to remain a threat against American hegemony. If the Bloc states began to crumble and 
revolt, the collapse of the Soviet Union would have surely been escalated—not only by the loss
2 For more details surrounding the Russian Revolution of 1917 see Orlando Figes. A People’s Tragedy: The Russian
Revolution 1891-1924. New York: Penguin Books, 1998.
’ Noel Barber, Seven Days o f Freedom: The Hungarian Uprising, 1956, New York: Stein and Day, 1975, 31.
4 The uprising of 1956 was a revolution; however for the sake of prose the Hungarian people’s plight against the
Soviet imperialists will be referred to as a rebellion, revolution, and uprising throughout the paper; however, the 
word choice does not change this stance.
5 Ibid, 30.
6 Victor Sebestyen, Twelve Days: The Story o f the 1956 Hungarian Revolution, New York: Random House, 2006, 
xxiv.
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of economic territory, but by the assured strengthening of the NATO alliance. This thesis will 
not attempt to apologize for the brutality of the Russian forces or any of the decisions made in 
the Kremlin. As the Hungarians suffered immensely against the Russians, the human element of 
the revolution should not be forgotten. If nothing else, the uprising in Hungary of 1956 
represents one of the greatest tragedies of 20th Century history. A group of people unified by 
their hatred for civil, political, and social repression fought in a David versus Goliath battle for 
their freedom. This time, David lost.
The Iron Curtain Descends
By the time of the Revolution in 1956, Hungary was an established communist nation, 
having been under Soviet domination for almost a decade. A common historical misconception 
is that control of Hungary was given to Stalin in Yalta in 1945; however, there were several 
preexisting factors determined by the Allies that allowed for a Russian dominated Hungary 
following the conclusion of the war.7 Churchill, with Roosevelt’s begrudging acquiescence, 
agreed in 1943 to hold zones of influence with Stalin; however, the most important factor in 
determining the fate of post-war Hungary was the geographical positioning of the Allied 
powers.8 It would be the Soviet Red Army who would ‘liberate’ (certainly not a liberation if one 
were to ask a victim of the violence of 1956) Hungary from Nazi Germany mostly due to 
Hungary’s location in Eastern Europe, but make no mistake—the Allies had no intention of 
willingly subjecting Eastern Europe to another repressive regime so quickly after the defeat of 
another.9
One of the first viewpoints to emerge from the West regarding the Soviet Union’s 
domination of Eastern Europe in the post-World War II era was the bloc nations needed Russia 
to support them. These western intellectuals argued that without support from Moscow these 
fragile states would collapse without Soviet military and secret police forces.10 The truth was 
much more complicated than that sweeping, generalized statement (as it is with much of Soviet 
history). Initially it appears that Stalin acted both out of fear for the West and a desire to recreate 
the Russian Empire as the Soviet Bloc developed in the years after the war. As Stalin moved to 
consolidate power, there began to emerge a less publicized, but very important conception of the 
communist system. At the onset of the Cold War Western politicians, writers, and intellectuals 
thought that the Soviet Union was indestructible from the inside—to them only exterior pressure 
would threaten Soviet hegemony.11 The Hungarian Revolution, even though it failed, would test 
this theory. For Khrushchev’s government it was a zero-sum game—to fail in Hungary meant 
that the other Bloc states would come to understand interior revolution could collapse the Soviet 
imperialism.
The Hungarian communist experiment was not unique. Hungary’s experience paralleled 
the other Eastern European bloc states. After Stalin and the Red Army defeated Nazi Germany, 
Stalin rapidly consolidated power in Budapest. The new communist puppet regime quickly
7 Miklos Molnar, A Concise History o f Hungary, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001, 295.
8 Ibid.
9 According to the Michael Charlton in The Eagle and the Small Birds: Crisis in the Soviet Empire: From Yalta to 
Solidarity, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984 , 13 Stalin allegedly said that he would not subject a larger
powers decisions, no matter the subject, to the approval of a lesser power.
10 Agnes Heller & Ferenc Feher, From Yalta to Glasnost: The Dismantling o f Stalin' s Empire, Cambridge (MA): 
Basil Blackwell, 1991, 37.
11 Ibid.
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liquidated all non-communist political parties, nationalized the economy with a focus on heavy 
industry, and began to arrest (and execute) both real and imagined political opponents.12 
Logically then, the question arises, why did revolution break out on the streets of Budapest in 
October, 1956? Moreover, why was Hungary so important? Could the Soviet Union have simply 
let Hungary out of its bloc—perhaps Khrushchev could have tested the theory that without 
Moscow’s support these Eastern European states would have collapsed. To pursue that course of 
action would have proved too risky for the Kremlin. The Hungarian Revolution had to be put 
down with force if the Soviet Union were to remain a power in Europe. To answer the 
remaining questions, Hungary’s history from the beginning of the Cold War until 1956 and the 
relationship between Budapest and Moscow must be examined further.
The Soviet Union had been a power player in global politics far before 1956 when 
international attention quickly diverted to the cause of a group of young intellectual Hungarians. 
The Soviet Union, despite any critics who would say otherwise, saw itself as a primarily 
European power. For Stalin, the bloc states were areas of great strategic importance. After the 
war it became clear that once the mutual threat of Nazi Germany was defeated, the Soviet Union 
and the United States would no longer be able to cooperate as allies. Stalin had a justifiable, and 
logical, fear of the new NATO alliance. Moscow saw any of the Border States in the bloc as 
potential targets for the U.S. and its allies to engage the threat of communism.
American politicians saw the Soviet Union as the main cause of the Cold War; however, 
a non-partisan assessment could see that the Soviet Union felt just as slighted by the United 
States. The Soviet Union—especially the ever distrustful Joseph Stalin—believed that the 
United States had left the Soviet Union to fight a separate war during their alliance. From 
Stalin’s perspective it was only the Red Army’s successes at Stalingrad and Kursk that sped up 
the opening of a second front in France—something Stalin had been lobbying for long before 
June 1944.13 In addition, Moscow felt that the United States was continually pursuing a policy 
after the defeat of Hitler that went against Soviet interests. The U.S. tolerated many 
governments in exile inside America (particularly the Baltic States), but the U.S. would not let 
the Soviet Union occupy Japan (despite the Allies sharing both Berlin and Vienna). Additionally, 
it was clear to the Kremlin that the Marshall Plan was a direct threat to the wall of communism 
that the Red Army had fought for.14 All of these decisions by the United States significantly 
contributed to the Soviet Union’s inferiority complex when it came to politics in the European 
Theatre of the Cold War. It is the next logical step to suggest that the policy of the United States 
directly contributed to Moscow’s decision to brutally repress the Hungarian Revolution.
Without a fear of NATO support for Hungary, perhaps the Soviet Union would have been 
infinitely more willing to open negotiations for reform, even potential freedom for a Hungarian 
state.
Russian history played an important part in the patriotic storm Stalin created around the 
civilian and military war effort against Hitler and the Third Reich. Stalin and the Bolshevik 
leaders who would follow him would not soon forget the heroics of the Russian people in beating 
back the Germans. Looking back over the last 150 years, Russia had been engulfed in a 
European war three times, and all three times the invasion of the Motherland had come through 
Eastern and Central Europe. In the first 25 years of the Soviet Union’s existence, there was a
12 Lendvai, 25.
13 Klaus Von Beyme, The Soviet Union in World Politics, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1987, 36.
14 Ibid, 36-37.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 31
noticeable absence of Russian influence in the bloc states.15 It is a safe assumption to presume 
that the Soviet Union would not let a lack of regional presence in Eastern Europe cause another 
conflict—big or small.
It becomes clear that Hungary was a piece of an intricate security network that the Soviet 
Union established throughout Eastern and Central Europe; however, the unique conditions that 
made Hungary a boiling pot for revolution well before any other Soviet dominated country still 
needs to be established. Hungary’s World War II history is unique among many of the other 
bloc states. Hungary fought on the Axis side and did not attempt to switch to the Allied cause. 
Hungary was seen as a defeated nation—unlike Poland, Romania, or Czechoslovakia, who were, 
in the eyes of the world, seen as victorious (the extent of their “victory” is a topic for another 
paper, but they were all fighting against Nazi Germany by 1945).16 Hungary lost a significant 
amount of territory after the war and had to bear the shame of being referred to as “Hitler’s last 
satellite.”17
Besides the partitioning of Poland no other European nation has been treated with such 
malfeasance by the Great Powers.18 Throughout the Modern Era Hungary has been on the 
defeated side of several European conflicts. After each rout a large amount of territory had been 
stripped from Hungary—their influence both in political power and geographical dominance had 
been decreased significantly. Just as the Soviet Union’s inferiority complex led Moscow to 
pursue a policy that at all costs would prevent NATO expansion in Eastern and Central Europe, 
Hungary’s people possessed an inferiority complex due to their constantly subjugated position in 
European geopolitics. Psychological factors can be powerful motivational apparatuses, even if it 
is an unconscious awareness. Young, educated Hungarians rebelling—with little chance of 
success—against a repressive Soviet occupation becomes easier to understand given Hungary’s 
recent embarrassments in European politics.
History, culture, and heritage have always been compelling factors in nationalistic 
struggles, which is ultimately what the Hungarian Revolution was—a nationalistic rebellion. It 
is easier to appreciate Hungarian nationalism once the heritage of the Hungarian people is 
understood. Inside the Soviet bloc, Hungary did not share the cultural heritage that Bulgaria, 
Romania, and even Yugoslavia had with their Russian overlords. The Hungarians are not a 
Slavic people. Their cultural heritage can be linked to the Magyars. The Hungarian name for 
their language is Magyar—linked most closely to Finnish and other languages to flow out of the 
nomadic steppes in early history.19 Culturally, Hungary is much more closely linked to Germany 
and Austria. Historically, Hungary was part of the Hapsburg Dynasty and Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Both Austria and Hungary would fight alongside of Germany in both of the World 
Wars. The Hungarian cultural history is an important reason the Magyar people were not willing 
to submit to a Slavic overlord.
Hungary was the outlier in the Soviet Bloc—in culture and politics. However, Hungary’s 
post-World War Two government was an eager participant in Stalin s bloody version of 
communism. Understanding the Hungarian communist party and their affair with Stalinism is 
crucial to understanding one of the driving factors toward revolution. First, Stalinism was the
15 Hugh Seton-Watson, “Eastern Europe,” in The Soviet Union in World Politics, edited by Kurt London, Boulder: 
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communist system under Stalin that consisted of all parts of life. Stalin and his cult declared that 
there was only one way to achieve a perfect communist society—through dedication to the 
Bolshevik party.20 Stalinism penetrated every aspect of Soviet life—the economy was centrally 
planned with a dedication to heavy industry.21 The best way to explain Stalinism is that “the 
party controlled the state, the state controlled society and these two, together with the now 
transformed social institutions, controlled the individual.”22 Perhaps the most significant 
characteristic of Stalinism was the terror. According to the memoirs of Nikita Khrushchev, 
Stalin’s government had a considerable distrust of what Khrushchev terms, the bourgeois 
intelligentsia.23 This suspicion was manifested in Stalin’s numerous purges of all elements of 
society, eliminating any and all potential opponents of the Revolution.24
In Hungary, the post-war dictatorship was headed by Matyas Rakosi, who was a 
dedicated Stalinist. Rakosi would be responsible for the largest and bloodiest purges in any of the 
Eastern Bloc states before and after Stalin’s death.25 Rakosi was a cold, calculating politician 
who described himself as “Stalin’s most apt pupil.”26 Rakosi was more than willing to push 
Stalinism’s political purges on all aspects of Hungarian society, starting with Hungary’s 
communist party. He had a simple message: “if the powerful officials of the communist 
dictatorship can vanish from one day to another, how much more defenseless a simple citizen 
must be.”27
The purges under Rakosi began with the party; however, their impact was felt in all the 
elements of Hungarian society. Perhaps the greatest institution affected was the Roman Catholic 
Church. The Church held the unenviable position as being the last independent institution in 
Stalinist Hungary. Starting in 1949 Rakosi began using what he termed ‘salami tactics,’ meaning 
a slice-by-slice disposal of political opponents.28 In the early weeks of that same year the Rakosi 
regime had already arrested 225 members of the Catholic clergy and organized show trials in the 
famous Stalinist procedure for Cardinal Jozsef Mindszenty and Archbishop Grosz.29 The 
Catholic Church served as an indication that no person or institution would be safe from Rakosi, 
who was always eager to prove himself as Stalin’s henchman. In a two-year span starting in 
1950, over 100,000 middle-class Hungarians, primarily residents of Budapest, were either 
deported or placed in appalling internment camps. Overall, between 1948 and the year of the 
Revolution, over 350,000 Hungarians suffered from the Rakosi purges.30 
One of the great ironies of the Rakosi regime is that the feeling of admiration was never 
reciprocated by Stalin. In fact, Stalin hated Rakosi—the self-proclaimed greatest of Stalin’s
20 G. Shopflin, “Hungary after the Second War,” In The Hungarian Revolution o f  1956: Reform, Revolt and 
Repression 1953-1963, Edited by Gyorgy Litvan, translated by Janos M. Bak and Lyman H. Legters, London: 
Longman, 1996, 15.
21 For more on Stalin’s centrally planned heavy industry and his pre-war Five Year Plans see Stephen Kotkin’s
Magnetic Mountain: Stalinism as Civilization, Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1997.
23
Shopflin, 16.
Nikita Khrushchev, Memoirs o f Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 2, Reformer 1945-1964, edited by Sergei 
Khrushchev, translated by George Shriver, Providence: Brown University Press, 2004, 128.
24 In Stalinist terms everyone who opposed the party and Stalin’s control was a counterrevolutionary and had to be 
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hangman. Rakosi was a Jew—an immediate source of distrust from Stalin.31 Additionally, 
Rakosi was one of the only members in the hierarchy of the Hungarian government who spoke 
English, and Stalin used a photo of Rakosi laughing with Harry Truman as a delusional source of 
proof that Rakosi was an American spy.32 Rakosi, as twisted as he was, acted in a way almost 
like a son whose father never gives approval would—always eager to prove his allegiance and 
dedication to the cult of the bloody dictator.
The Rakosi regime and its purges would be one of the leading factors in causing the 
massive discontent of the Hungarian people that would lead to the turbulence in October, 1956. 
Stalinism, and the subsequent denouncement of it by Nikita Khrushchev, would be influential in 
the events to play out in the fall of 1956. Rakosi’s counter on the liberal side of the Hungarian 
communist party was Imre Nagy. Nagy would become a cause of concern for the Soviet 
leadership. Nagy’s calls for reform would start the path toward an armed insurrection against the 
communist government. The stage for the Revolution became set due to all of these factors early 
in the Soviet occupation of Hungary; however, one event would perhaps be the most influential 
in leading the citizens of Budapest to revolt. In 1953, Joseph Stalin died somewhat suddenly 
from an apparent stroke. A power vacuum opened in the Kremlin, and the future of the Soviet 
Union seemed uncertain for a short time.
The “Liberals” Rise: Khrushchev and Nagy
With the death of Stalin also brought about the end of Stalinism. This departure meant 
greater emphasis was placed on the political and cultural side of Soviet life than on the 
economic. Collectivized agriculture would no longer be implemented; however, focus on heavy 
industry would be a token of the Soviet Union until its collapse in 1991. Despite the 
denouncement of Stalin’s policies in regards to Hungary, most of the damage Stalinism had 
inflicted seemed irreversible. The Stalinist model of collectivized industry had encumbered 
Hungary with a high operating cost and a simultaneous decrease in industrial structure and 
standard of living. 3 The resulting economic decline, along with problems arising from 
Stalinism’s insistence on collectivized agriculture, hit the intelligentsia the hardest. Stalinism’s 
ultimate (and only) truth lay in the communist party leaving little, if any, room for intellectual 
freedom. The intelligentsia found themselves in a constant struggle with the government’s drive 
for total control.34 The revolution that would occur only three years later would be started by the 
students and the writers—members of the intelligentsia that Stalin’s regime had repressed. Their 
discontent in 1953 began to create the situation in which a revolution from below could gain 
traction.
As the situation in Hungary reached a critical stage, there remained a looming question of 
who would come to lead the Soviet Union after the death of the Stalin—who had ruled for 
almost thirty years. Books have been written about the political game played around the power 
vacuum created by Stalin’s death; however, for this thesis it is not important to delve into the 
details. In the end only one of Stalin’s cabinet could assume his role as General Secretary.
Nikita Khrushchev was thrust onto the international stage. He won the power battle over long­
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lead the Soviet Union on a very different course than the vision Stalin for the nation. While 
much of Khrushchev’s legacy remains in question by historians of the Soviet Union, most of that 
debate includes superfluous details to include in this paper. One important idea to keep in the 
forefront of any discussion of Khrushchev’s succession of Stalin is that while Nikita Khrushchev 
never identified himself as a Stalinist, he was a product of the Soviet system and remained 
trapped within the confines of the very same structure.35
Unfortunately, the trappings of the Soviet state would factor into Khrushchev’s eventual 
decision to use military force to end the Hungarian Revolution. During the Stalin years, the 
Soviet Union underwent a significant transformation in international identity. He radically 
departed from Lenin and his 1917 Revolution (though Stalin would never publically admit it), 
which brought along with concept of a communist upheaval spread throughout Europe. Stalin 
was a man of many faces, but above all else he was a political realist. He saw that an 
international revolution was not going to occur and he decided to create a socialist utopia inside 
the confines of the Soviet Union’s borders.36 While this chimerical idealism brought a focus on 
heavy industry, class-based terror, and collectivized agriculture, it was also accompanied by a 
passionate defense of the ever-expanding border of the Soviet Union.37 For Khrushchev in the 
mid-1950’s—now dealing with the newly built NATO alliance—defense of socialism inside the 
Soviet Union remained a prima facie issue. To allow a free and independent Hungary would 
send a message to any other discontented communist state, most notably Poland, that a 
revolution from below would be successful.
Was Khrushchev a liberal? In the true definition of the word, probably not. Khrushchev 
had been appointed to head the Ukrainian reconstruction project by Stalin and during the Stalin 
years continued to serve the dictator faithfully.38 To mistake Khrushchev as a man not capable of 
violence would be a terrible misunderstanding. Khrushchev’s record inside the communist party 
would prove that he possessed the ability to order and execute incredibly violent acts. He had 
been bloodthirsty during the Terror of 1937-1938 and engaged in Stalin-like political violence 
while reclaiming Western Ukraine after the Great Patriotic War.39 Unlike his predecessor, 
Khrushchev understood that the Soviet Union needed to be taken in a different direction—the 
War had exposed far too many Soviet citizens to the Western World and complete Soviet 
isolation was no longer a viable policy option. When addressing Hungary in 1956, Khrushchev 
was at a cross-road of his early years in office. Without a doubt, Khrushchev was certainly more 
than capable, and willing, to order the Red Army into Hungary, but there would be no massive 
blood purges—at least, nothing close to the political violence committed by Stalin and his 
omnipresent NKVD officers.40 Khrushchev’s years in power were a series of contradictions, and 
there existed a constant tension between reform and repression; however, compared to his 
predecessor, Stalin, Khrushchev was significantly more open to the idea of reform—and for 
Soviet internal politics that fact is what really mattered.
In February of 1956, Khrushchev appeared before the 20th Party Congress and gave a 
report titled On the Personality Cult and Its Consequences—more commonly referred to as his 
“secret speech.” This address has been named the defining moment of Khrushchev’s political
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career by many historians and can be seen as a critical turning point in Soviet history.41 Despite 
being nearly three years after the death of Joseph Stalin, this meeting would be the first time the 
Party Congress had been convened since the dictator’s death. By Khrushchev’s own admission 
in his memoirs, the secret speech had a profound impact on the situation in Hungary which had 
already reached a critical point.42
The lengthy speech consisted of a systematic and methodical deconstructing of the Stalin 
era, denouncing the genocidal dictator for the creation of a personality cult. Just over 10 years 
prior Stalin led the celebration of the Soviet Union’s victory in the Great Patriotic War over Nazi 
Germany; however, Khrushchev criticized Stalin for a lack of preparation and for his disbelief at 
the outbreak of the conflict. Most importantly for the Soviet Bloc nations, Khrushchev took 
Stalin to task for his consistent breach of Soviet rule of law in dealing with political opponents:
Facts prove that many abuses were made on Stalin’s orders without reckoning with any 
norms of Party and Soviet legality. Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly 
suspicious...This sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even with eminent 
party workers whom he had known for many years. Everywhere and in everything he saw 
enemies, “two-facers,” and spies.” Possessing unlimited power, he indulged in a great 
willfulness and choked a person morally and physically. A situation was created where 
one could not express one’s own will.43
Although meant to be secret, foreign journalists were allowed access to the speech 
material, ensuring that the entire world would hear of Khrushchev’s new anti-Stalin stance. For 
the Hungarian intelligentsia Khrushchev’s speech had several implications. First, even though 
Khrushchev had not specifically denounced the Rakosi regime in his speech (or any other 
communistic leaders beside Stalin) he had criticized the Stalinist purges that Rakosi employed to 
consolidate power. For the Hungarian people there was little distinction between Rakosi and 
Stalin—both had broken Soviet legality under Khrushchev’s interpretation. Additionally, both 
men had created a personality cult (though a drastically larger one in Stalin’s case) and removed 
political opponents. Again in Rakosi’s case the purging of the Catholic Church in Hungary was 
the biggest example. Finally, Rakosi had followed Stalin’s lead and created conditions in 
Hungary where it had become impossible to “express one’s own will.” Khrushchev’s critique of 
Stalin’s removal of intellectual expression was seen by the writers and university students as a 
call for a free press—something Moscow could not allow if Hungary was to remain a loyal 
Soviet satellite. Khrushchev’s “secret speech” had profound effects in being the final catalyst 
from Moscow in the Hungarian Revolution and Khrushchev’s contradiction of his own words 
was what brought the revolutionary upheaval to an abrupt end. The situation and main players in 
Moscow have been set up; however, to understand why the Hungarian people rebelled and why 
they may have been misled, the situation in Hungary after Stalin’s death must be examined 
further.
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Nearly 2,000 kilometers away from Moscow in Budapest the post-Stalin thaw had begun 
to take place. Imre Nagy, a little know member of the Politburo, was promoted to prime minister 
replacing Matyas Rakosi.44 The order for Nagy’s promotion came directly from Moscow, but 
the official reasoning behind the choice is still unclear. Nagy was relatively young did not 
belong in the core group of leaders in the Hungarian communist party because he had fallen onto 
bad terms with the party due to his opposition to collectivization.45 From the leaders in the 
Kremlin, there were several reasons to prefer Nagy to Rakosi and his henchman. First, Nagy 
was not a Jew. Even so shortly after the Western World had become aware of the Holocaust, 
Anti-Semitism still had an influence on Soviet party decisions. Second, Nagy’s popularity with 
the Hungarian people continued to rise because of his work on implementing a successful land 
reform as Minister of Agriculture.46 Perhaps the party bosses thought that Nagy could find 
common ground between the gap that still existed between the communist party and the 
agricultural peasantry.
Nagy’s appointment made one thing clear: Moscow was not happy with the Hungarian 
party’s leadership. In a party memo from Moscow, the Rakosi regime was heavily criticized for 
the decreased standard of living for the Magyar working class and for seeing industrialization as 
an end in itself, not as a means to provide economic security for the working socialist citizens.47 
Nagy’s opposition to collectivization put him at odds with the Hungarian communists; however, 
his anti-Stalinist policies seemed to have endeared him with the party heads in Moscow.
Inside the party memo it is clear that the rapidly deteriorating social situation in Budapest was 
known to those in the Kremlin. The memo notes that in 850,000 cases the Hungarian AVH (or 
secret police, the Hungarian version of Stalin’s omnipresent and feared NKVD) imposed 
“penalties.” One is left to guess what these penalties might have included; however, given the 
number of Hungarians purged under Rakosi, certainly some of the 850,000 suffered the worst 
possible fate. Moscow’s insistence that Rakosi resign and their appointment of Nagy at least 
tacitly shows their acknowledgement of the precarious situation that was beginning to develop in 
Hungary, 1953.
The situation in Hungary following Stalin’s death was unique. In no other Eastern Bloc 
country did a communist leader suggest that the socialist system was open to reform and 
humanization.49 The Hungarian Revolution would occur over a decade before the Prague Spring. 
If nothing else, Imre Nagy and his failed attempt at reform points to the fact that there was a 
significant gap between what the party said and what the policy would be. Moscow could not 
allow a liberal Hungary because once concessions had been made, the people would only want 
more. Surely the leaders in Moscow were familiar with Tsar Nicholas II’s attempted liberal 
reforms following the squashing of the 1905 Revolution and when those same reforms were 
never realized the February, 1917, Revolution became inevitable.
Nagy’s reformist policies became known as the ‘New Course.’ It would become the liberal fore­
runner to the Prague Spring of 1968 and Mikhail Gorbachev’s Glasnost and Perestroika in the 
1980’s.50 A liberal agenda and certainly a reformist one, Nagy had no intention of breaking
44 Charles Gati, Failed Illusions: Moscow, Washington, Budapest, and the 1956 Hungarian Revolt, Washington: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2006, 24.
45 Molnar, 306.
46 Lendvai, 38.




The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 37
Hungary out of the Soviet Union. Nagy’s belief in socialism never wavered; he merely wanted 
to implement a better version, one that broke away from the economic woes that Stalinism had 
brought after the end of the Second World War. It appeared that Moscow had appointed a man 
who could lead Hungary out of the economic depression that it faced, while keeping the Magyar 
people dedicated servants of the Soviet Empire. Unfortunately for Khrushchev and his advisors, 
Nagy’s plans would never be implemented fully.
Books could be written detailing the failures of the pre-Revolution Nagy-led government; 
however, the blame should not be placed solely on Nagy. Three reasons exist for the failure of 
the liberal reforms and the continued intellectual discontent on the party of the Hungarian 
intelligentsia. First, after the death of Stalin, there were a series of riots in Eastern Germany that 
began when the East Berlin construction workers went on strike. The riots had a profound effect 
on Hungary (as well as the other Bloc states). It is important to remember that the Bloc states 
did not operate inside a vacuum. When a crisis arose in one state, Moscow then had to decide 
how that situation might affect other Soviet dominated countries. The Red Army was quickly 
sent in to violently crush the revolt. Coming after a short period of relaxation by the central 
party following Stalin’s death, the Red Army’s military triumph over a group of non-centralized, 
liberal revolutionaries would serve as a blueprint for Soviet imperialism three years later in 
Hungary.51 For Soviet interests, East Germany could not allowed to be a free country. 
Khrushchev saw that allowing East Germany to be free would allow the United States to gain a 
further foothold in Germany and potentially reunite Germany as one nation.52 The same logic 
would be applied to Hungary and the NATO alliance.
Second, Nagy’s freedom to govern as he chose would be limited after Berlin, 1953. The 
party always came before the national government in Soviet politics.53 Nagy was a dedicated 
socialist; however, he was still primarily a Hungarian—not in a militarist or nationalist sense, but 
as a politician who would look after the interests of the Hungarian people. It became impossible 
for him to operate in the government when the government apparatus still obeyed Rakosi and his 
Stalinist clique.54 There was a clash of ideals inside the Hungarian communist party, and the 
party structure made it impossible for Nagy to be victorious.
The third reason was that Nagy lacked liberal allies inside the government. Just as 
Rakosi still controlled the AVH and other state-controlled organizations, Nagy did not have the 
support from any powerful groups for his proposed reforms.55 The final result would be to make 
Nagy a martyr to the liberal Hungarian intelligentsia.56 Nagy may have been idolized by the 
liberal elite in Hungarian society, but their dedication to him was not enough to appease their 
desire for freedom. The liberal elite that formed a pseudo-coalition group around Nagy became 
the first significant anti-Stalinist reform movement in any of the Bloc countries. Their 
organization unmasked the Hungarian Stalinists and helped the Hungarian people ready 
themselves for revolution.57
In terms of the Hungarian Revolution, perhaps the biggest shortcoming of Nagy’s first 
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undertaking by the Rakosi regime.58 Nagy’s shortcomings in liberalizing the economic, social, 
and cultural situation in Hungary become understandable after examining the situation in the 
Hungarian political party; however, had Nagy been able to open the files on many of the political 
trials, even restore some of the Catholic Church’s power in Hungary, there could have been a 
chance that Nagy could have successfully began the process of liberalizing Hungary. In those 
purged by Rakosi, Nagy would have found allies. Perhaps for that very reason Nagy’s enemies 
blocked any chance of reversing the show-trial’s decisions.
The situation in Hungary would become incredibly fluid over the next three years and 
Moscow had a difficult time dealing with the crisis leading up to the Revolution. The party 
bosses in Moscow were stuck between choosing a liberal reformer, who in some ways they 
feared, and a Stalinist, in Rakosi—that they wanted purged from the party—but had too many 
allies in Budapest. It would be Khrushchev’s speech to the 20th Party Congress that would 
formally end Rakosi’s political career. The removal of Rakosi after his ‘secret speech’ would 
symbolize a common occurrence during the Khrushchev era.
Nikita Khrushchev’s eleven years as head of the communist party was marked by broad 
contradictions.59 He called for domestic reform and peaceful coexistence with the capitalist 
world; however, he treated the Bloc states as tools to buffer against his perception of NATO’s 
imperialist agenda. Khrushchev responded to NATO’s skepticism of the new Soviet doctrine by 
distrusting the West’s intentions—thus dooming any significant change in international relations. 
Unfortunately for the Hungarian people, Khrushchev would respond with military force to their 
revolution—-just as he did in Berlin in 1953. For a politician who marked his career with the 
liberal thaw and a period of de-Stalinization, Khrushchev appeared to respond to crisis situations 
by following the model of the preceding party dictator. Khrushchev was a man marked by 
internal conflict and so too was the story of the Hungarian Revolution of 1956—one that was full 
of contradictions, misguided allusions, and violence.
1956: The Communist Experiment Hangs in the Balance
Nikita Khrushchev stated after the Hungarian Revolution took place, “If ten or so 
Hungarian writers had been shot at the right moments, the revolution would never have 
occurred.”60 Khrushchev’s quote signifies how unique the Hungarian Revolution of 1956 was in 
comparison to other armed rebellions. It began with a small group of writers and university 
students and spilled over to a twelve-day struggle of Hungarian nationals fighting against an 
organized military force, superior in both quality and quantity of troops. The Red Army had 
proven itself in both conventional and guerrilla warfare. During World War II, Operation 
Bagration swept through Germany advances, and within one year from its launch date, Soviet 
forces reached Berlin. Combating guerrilla and partisan forces in Berlin, 1953, the Red Army 
successfully, and brutally, restored order.
For the Hungarian liberals, the Nagy prime minister experiment lasted only two short 
years as he was forced out by changes in Moscow. Nagy was forced to resign from his position 
as prime minister and was expelled from the communist party. His replacement, Andras
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Hegedus, would reinstitute the policies of the Rakosi regime.61 Before his exit Nagy correctly 
predicted that reinstating Rakosi and Stalin’s policies (or further roll-back of the Hungarian 
people’s liberty) could not be the alternative to reform. According to Nagy, should the 
Hungarian people be left to decide between Stalinism and revolution, they would choose the 
latter:
Today, probably a return to the policy of the New Course and the application of June 
[1953] principles to the economic, political, and social life of the nation could still check 
the growing crisis and avert catastrophe. But it is doubtful whether a return to the June 
principles would suffice as a solution tomorrow.. .there is a danger that the masses, 
having lost their faith, will reject both the June way and the Communist Party, and it will 
become necessary to make a much greater retreat in order to keep the situation under 
control.62 
Neither the Communist Party in Budapest nor Moscow would heed Nagy’s warning. The country 
was set on a path for revolution that would begin on the streets of the Hungarian capital city on 
the evening of October 23, 1956.
The beginnings of the Hungarian Revolution echo the start of the Russian Revolution in 
1917—a series of peaceful protests, as a result of continued decreases in the quality of life, 
exploded into violence after an initial response by the military. In the Hungarian case, the large 
group of writers and university students were gathering in the streets of Budapest as the AVH 
gathered on the rooftops above them. After a series of blanks were fired to disperse the crowd, a 
single can of tear gas was hurled into the crowd. Panic ensued in the streets of the Hungarian 
capital city as the young, unorganized intelligentsia scrambled for cover from the secret police. 
Thus began the Hungarian Revolution of 1956.
The revolution possessed no organization; it was simultaneously spontaneous and 
inevitable. Had the AVH allowed the students to protest down the streets of Budapest, the 
fighting likely would not have occurred in the night of October 23rd; however, referring back to 
Nagy’s prediction, the Hungarian intelligentsia would not abide by the one party communist 
system. The Hungarian people proved for twelve days that they possessed the will to fight for a 
multi-party government. Despite his expulsion from the communist party Nagy would return to 
attempt to lead the Hungarian people through the crisis of the Revolution. Had the freedom 
fighters ultimately won their independence from the Soviet Union, more than likely Nagy would 
have been the head of the new multi-party Hungarian government.
Before covering the details of the Revolution and the decision from Moscow to ultimately crush 
the will of the Hungarian people with a major offensive, some facts have to be addressed. One 
of Khrushchev’s motivating factors in using military force to end the Hungarian Revolution was 
the threat that an independent Hungary and NATO posed to the Soviet Union; however, there is 
no evidence to suggest that the Hungarian people desired to be a member of the NATO alliance. 
The revolution was mostly contained within the city borders of Budapest and only around 15,000 
Hungarian men and women took up arms against their Soviet occupiers. It was a nationalistic 
and patriotic revolution, but not an antisocialist one.6 However, to prove the necessity of
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Moscow’s actions, the desires of the Hungarian people do not matter—only Moscow’s 
perception of their wishes. Khrushchev thought that NATO would immediately enter Hungary 
forcing Capitalism on the Magyar people regardless of whether the Hungarian freedom fighters 
desired to be a member of the United States alliance.65 Contrary to the Kremlin’s belief, the 
Hungarian people who fought for their freedom did so solely because they wanted a government 
for the Hungarian people by the Hungarian people. They did not want Moscow to continue to 
dictate the life of the Magyars.
Second, Moscow did not engage in a trigger happy defense of their empire. New 
evidence suggests that Khrushchev would have been willing to listen to Nagy’s demands had he 
given a centralized list of what the Hungarian people desired and how those requests would have 
benefited the overall Union of Socialist Republics.66 Ultimately Moscow did decide that a 
military option was preferential to any peaceful negotiations so there should not be too much 
weight put into this claim. While Khrushchev mulled the decision to use force for nearly a week, 
his decision was necessary for the Soviet Union’s continued status as a major European power. It 
is unfortunate for the Hungarian people that the lack of leadership in the Revolution (and Nagy’s 
inability to centralize the people’s demands into a clear policy) forced Khrushchev into ordering 
direct military action.
Third, Washington was completely taken by surprise by the outbreak of the Revolution, 
proving how spontaneous it was.67 The CIA possessed no Hungarian-speaking official on the 
entire European continent.68 The United States had few options given the short timeframe of the 
Revolution. Although the United States was caught off guard by the outbreak of the Revolution, 
they should share some culpability of the blame for the failure of the Hungarian freedom 
fighters. Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, failed the Hungarian people in what amounted to 
one of the lowest moments of his term in office.69 Dulles had called for insurrection against the 
Soviet occupation of the bloc states; however, at the outbreak of the Revolution he did nothing to 
aid the freedom fighters. Dulles did not attempt to open a dialogue with the Soviet governments, 
instead choosing to focus on the crisis over the Suez Canal.70 Additionally, the United States 
found itself in a ‘Catch-22.’ A free Hungary was in its interests, but to openly aid the Hungarian 
freedom fighters, either economically or militarily would have risked turning the Cold War into a 
hot one. Given the assets available at the time and the logistical realities of the situation, the 
United States’ only option was to sit on the sidelines and hope for a successful Hungarian 
victory. Only eleven years after World War II, Eisenhower—ever fearful of war and the military 
industrial complex—surely did not want to risk the third global conflict of the 20th Century.
It is a common misperception by American Cold War politicians that the Soviet Union 
looked to engage or provoke the West into another global conflict. In a document published nine 
months before the Hungarian Revolution, the Soviet Foreign Ministry outlines the Soviet 
Union’s desire to maintain peace inside the Bloc. Should any of the Bloc states be granted their 
freedom, there was a legitimate fear in Moscow that those states (at the time most likely Poland
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or Hungary) would appeal for NATO support.71 The Soviet logic flows from the realistic fact 
that the United States and its allies would have insisted that the Bloc countries be given the right 
of self determination because foreign occupiers could be seen as substantial causes to both of the 
20th Century’s global conflicts. Granted, NATO operated under the assumption that given a 
choice between democracy and communism Eastern and Central Europe would also choose the 
former because communism was an oppressive exterior government. However, Khrushchev 
responded to such a claim in his memoirs. Khrushchev acknowledged that the Soviet Union 
established communist governments inside the Bloc; however, he argued that the United States 
did the same with capitalism in Western Europe, citing a capitalist inspired civil war in Greece.72 
The truth behind such a claim can surely be debated, but it is not the facts in this case that matter, 
merely Khrushchev and Moscow’s perception of the West. This line of logic naturally leads to 
the question: so was the Soviet Union’s fear of the West really unfounded or did it have basis in 
reality?
From Moscow’s point of view, the Soviet Union had just as good a claim to fear the 
NATO as the western alliance was scared of the USSR. As the Soviet Foreign Ministry pointed 
out, the United States and Great Britain had authorized the rearmament of West Germany and 
granted its status as a member of NATO.73 Washington and its allies had the ability to strike the 
heart of the Soviet Union with much greater ease than vice versa. Although the Soviet Union had 
successfully tested its nuclear program, the USSR remained far behind the United States in 
nuclear capacity at the beginning of 1956. Additionally, the Soviet Union lacked any long range 
strike at the United States. A consistent problem in United States-Soviet relationship during the 
Cold War began with missile defense. The United States had military bases spread throughout 
Europe, meaning that America possessed a greater capacity for first strike potential against 
Moscow. If the Soviet Union were to lose any more territory in Central Europe, it would have 
marked disaster for the security status of the entire Bloc.74
Again, in early 1956 the Soviet Foreign Ministry was open to improving relations with 
the Western Capitalist world, except that this enhancement predicated on two stipulations. First, 
the geographical boundaries of the Soviet Union (of 1956) remain completely intact. Second, 
there would be no further encroachment on the Soviet Union’s security network. A western 
political scientist or politician could easily dismiss the Soviet Union’s insistence on Eastern 
European domination as tyrannical and imperial; however, from the perspective of the politicians 
inside the Kremlin it can be seen that there was a legitimate fear of the West. It should not be 
too far a stretch to think that the Soviet politicians realized what had happened to Japan in 1945 
and feared the United States might use nuclear weapons against major Russian cities. Granted, 
given that mutually assured destruction ensured that scenario would never play out, Soviet 
politicians feared the United States as much as the politicians of the U.S. were scared of the 
Soviets. Khrushchev would eventually see the situation in Hungary as being inspired by the 
Capitalist countries of the West—similar to his allegation of the West’s agitation of the Greek 
Civil War.
71 Soviet Foreign Ministry, “Notes from Mid USSR Concerning Questions of Foreign Policy,” in The 1956
Hungarian Revolution: A History in Documents, edited Csaba Bekes, Malcolm Byrne, and Janos Rainer, Budapest:
Central European University Press, 2002, 108.
72 Khrushchev, Memoirs o f  Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964, 645.
73 Soviet Foreign Ministry, 108.
74 Central Europe is a vague term whose limits can be debated; however, or this thesis Hungary will be included in 
“Central Europe.” Without a doubt had Hungary joined a NATO alliance and had a U S. military base been 
established in Hungary it would have posed a significant security risk for the Soviet Union.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 42
The United States knew that the “political, military and economic power of the Soviet 
Union” was greatly augmented by the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe.75 It is clear that 
both sides of the Cold War knew of the importance of the Bloc states. The Hungarian 
Revolution stood in direct opposition to the Soviet concept of security. Unbeknownst to the 
Hungarian intelligentsia, this game of international power politics was the context of the 1956 
Revolution. As the Hungarian AVO began to fire on the peaceful protesters in Budapest, 
Moscow began to scramble—unsure what the extent of the protest would amount to, or if for the 
second time since the death of Stalin, the Red Army would have to be utilized to subdue an 
unruly Bloc nation.
It should be noted that the Soviet Union began to build up its military presence in 
Hungary three months before the Revolution. This military deployment constituted a blatant 
violation of the terms of the Warsaw Pact. Although it was easy for Moscow to disregard the 
terms of the treaty without rapprochement, the action should be indicative of Moscow’s 
awareness as to how the situation in Hungary had already developed. Nonetheless, the military 
buildup should not indicate Moscow’s eagerness to crush any opposition with the force of the 
Red Army. Had that been the case surely there would have been Stalin-like purges following the 
conclusion of Hungarian resistance, but Khrushchev did not resort to such measures. In fact, the 
few executions were mostly undertaken by the Hungarian communist party, one was the 
execution of Nagy—understandable, but not justified, given his assumption as the leader of the 
freedom fighters. Again, Moscow’s use of force should not (and will not, by this paper) be 
excused or justified from a humanitarian perspective, however, in international security an 
unfortunate truth exists—the moral compass and the direction of a state’s best interest often point 
in two separate directions.
In Hungary the fighting escalated quickly as hundreds of thousands met on the streets of 
Budapest. Although the students, writers, and other Hungarian nationalists had no central 
organization, there were two reasons for why violent protest spread rapidly. First, in the early 
weeks of October, 1956 there were a series of mass demonstrations at various points around 
Budapest—the discontent was visible, it was not as if thousands of Hungarians randomly poured 
onto the streets of Budapest.76 Second, although there was no central organization, a central 
motive existed, which was Hungarian independence. In no less than twelve hours since the 
outbreak of the rebellion, before the morning of October 24, the radio station—a symbol of 
Soviet propaganda—had been set ablaze. The writers were behind the arson; however, as they 
took to the streets at the beginning of the night they had possessed no plans for violence.77 The 
radio station had refused to broadcast a patriotic message written by the writers and as the 
students joined them on the streets, pandemonium ensued as discontent turned to anger and anger 
to bloodshed.78 Moscow’s initial reaction was to do nothing—their troops were stationed on 
alert; however, a similar situation in Poland had recently been put down without violence. The 
Kremlin hoped for the identical result in Hungary—after a night of rioting, peace would return to 
the streets of Budapest. Hoping for such a fairy tale ending showed that even though Moscow 
had begun to take measures to counteract a Hungarian revolt, the Soviet politicians were 
desperately out of touch with the reality of the situation in Budapest.
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Nikita Khrushchev’s decision to call in military support was not one that he made lightly. 
Why did Khrushchev decide that an independent Hungary was not in the best interest of the 
Union of Soviet Socialist Republics? The internal debate that Khrushchev experienced before 
deciding the fate of Hungary should not be mistaken for compassion. Khrushchev showed little 
concern for the fate of the Hungarian freedom fighters, but rather he needed to determine what 
the best course of action was for the Soviet Union. Granting Hungary a semi-independent status 
would have been a risky endeavor for several reasons.
First, Yugoslavia and Tito had been granted that same position and had been a constant 
tension point in Soviet-Bloc relations. Tito consistently dissented from Moscow’s party line, 
leading to the question of whether Tito was a nationalist or a communist first. It is often difficult 
to separate the two (in Tito’s case) in order to make a clear distinction. In post-World War II, 
Soviet relations between Belgrade and Moscow were constantly strained over the planned 
economy. According to Khrushchev, Tito and members of the Yugoslavian government refused 
to have their economy subject to the bureaucratic red-tape of the Soviet Union.79 Most 
importantly, Yugoslavia did not just ask for independent status in international relations, Tito 
actively campaigned for all socialist countries to share this status.80 For reasons still unclear, 
Khrushchev allowed the dissent from Tito, and Moscow granted Yugoslavia the right to export 
its products to capitalist markets. However, due to Tito’s campaigning for an alliance of 
independent socialist states, a free Hungary would be dangerous. It seems under Khrushchev’s 
logic one country makes an exception, two makes a norm. It seemed that only Tito would receive 
a special status from Moscow—Khrushchev could not allow an independent Hungary.
Additionally for Khrushchev, in 1956 a situation developed in Poland that required the 
attention of Moscow. Poland, much like Hungary, suffered from imposed Stalinism after World 
War II and shared an equal if not more extreme hatred of the Russians stemming from the 
constant Polish subjugation to Russia’s will throughout history.81 While the tension in Poland 
was long standing, the spark in 1956 was a shortage of food. The significant difference in the 
Polish case was that a liberal communist, Wladyslaw Gomulka, exerted enough influence over 
the Polish rebels to ensure an end to the protests. Khrushchev was ready to order in Soviet 
troops; however, assurances made by Gomulka successfully backed Khrushchev down.82 This 
strategy would be almost identically similar to Khrushchev’s initial stance on the Hungarian 
crisis (he wanted to allow Nagy to negotiate a peace between the communist party and the 
freedom fighters); however, Khrushchev could not continually appear weak in the Soviet satellite 
states before protests turned into a full-scale revolution.
The Polish issue had a direct link with Hungary—the two states shared in their hatred of 
their Russian overlord. The demonstration that began on October 23, 1956, in Budapest was 
inspired to show solidarity with the events occurring in Poland in October.83 Likewise as the 
Polish people protested for bread and freedom, several demonstrators clamored under the tagline 
‘Warsaw-Budapest-Belgrade.’84 Khrushchev began to lose control of the Bloc states. He first 
ordered the Soviet Army into Warsaw and after a bloody day of fighting, order was restored to
79 Khrushchev, Memoirs o f Nikita Khrushchev: Volume 3: Statesman, 1953-1964, 545.
80 Milan Sahovic, “Yugoslav Diplomacy and the Hungarian Revolution of 1956, in 1956: The Hungarian 
Revolution and War for Independence, 178.
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the Polish capital city. In contrast to the Hungarian freedom fighters, the Poles were organized, 
but possessed little to no military equipment in order to resist the Red Army. Khrushchev had 
hoped for a similar result in Hungary after the protests became widespread because Moscow 
could not allow the crisis in Eastern and Central Europe to escalate further. To do so would have 
meant a substantial decrease in Soviet hegemony in the area, and as a byproduct, the 
strengthening of the NATO alliance.
Again, the issue of NATO cannot be overstated. Khrushchev was keenly aware that the 
United States and its allies were closely watching the communist Bloc, especially the border 
states that were prime for rebellion. The NATO alliance established a diplomatic and military 
alliance between the Capitalist powers in Western Europe and North America. While the 
alliance’s charter primarily dealt with defensive agreements should any of the signatory nations 
come under armed attack, it did much more than that. It became the bulwark of anti-communist 
nations that were constantly watching for holes in the Warsaw Pact (or in the Soviet Russia’s 
domination of the remainder of Communist Europe). Against these background issues, as the 
situation in Hungary began to deteriorate further and it became clear no peaceful negotiation or 
reform would occur, Khrushchev was forced to consider a military option for the continued ' 
existence of Soviet hegemony.
Soviet troops first entered Budapest on Wednesday, the 24th of October—a full day after 
the fighting had broken out. By this point the freedom fighters had seized several (including the 
largest) ammunition depots in Budapest and two of the city’s finest military academies had 
joined the cause of the Revolution.85 The AVO had lost control of the city due to the growing 
numbers, and growing military supplies, of the freedom fighters. The Red Army entered the city 
with 6,000 men and 700 tanks with another 20,000 infantry men and 1,100 tanks placed on high 
alert; however, the Soviet army expected to perform a routine military police operation and crush 
rioting students—very similar to their experience in Berlin three years prior.86 Perhaps if the 
story of the Hungarian Revolution ended there, it would not have been worth telling. If only a 
group of rowdy students had been dispersed and protests banned, it would only be an underscore 
to the entire Cold War—of course, that is not the case. The freedom fighters fought the 
occupying Soviet army viciously, beginning on the morning of the 24th of October. The 
Hungarian citizens were desperately struggling for their freedom, but unfortunately for the 
Magyar people it was a battle they had no chance of winning.
Even before the Moscow ordered its own troops to crush the freedom fighters, the West 
began to see the hopelessness of the situation. A British memorandum, authored by Thomas 
Brimelow, dated October 25, 1956—eleven days before the Red Army marched triumphantly 
through Budapest—details the West’s attitude toward the Hungarian Revolution.
This is full of pitfalls. We must be careful not to say anything which might encourage 
hotheads in Budapest to further useless rioting. We might express our disapproval of the 
intervention of Soviet forces, but the Russians are forearmed with the answer that they 
went in by invitation. We could criticize Mr. Nagy for calling the Russians in and for 
suppressing the riots with such brutality. But it may be to our interest to have Mr. Nagy
85 Sebestyen, 123.
86 Ibid, 126.
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in power. At the moment he seems to offer the best prospects for a more liberal
Communist regime in Hungary...I recommend that we should say as little as possible.87
Even though at the time of the outbreak of the Revolution, Khrushchev had only been in 
power for three years, he was no beginner when it came to international relations and Soviet 
politics. When the Soviet troops began to march into Budapest, Moscow released a statement 
condemning the violence in Hungary as counter-revolutionary (to the Russian Revolution nearly 
40 years prior). Additionally, Khrushchev’s government placed NATO in a difficult position— 
Moscow’s statement disclosed that the Hungarian people’s government had asked for the Red 
Army to restore peace under the terms of the Warsaw Pact.88 Surely NATO could see through 
the facade that the Soviet Union had placed around Hungary; however, under international law 
there was nothing they could do. Additionally, any resolution brought before the United Nations 
to order a ceasefire or a peace-keeping operation in Hungary would have, without a doubt, been 
vetoed by the Soviet Union, a fellow Security Council member. Khrushchev had skillfully 
negated any potential that the West could intervene in Soviet internal affairs in Hungary.
Khrushchev did not anticipate how important his skillful political game would become 
regarding the Hungarian Revolution. He shared in the Soviet military’s preconceived notion that 
order would be quickly restored in Hungary through the superior training, weaponry, and man­
power of the Red Army. It was nearly midnight when an emergency cabinet meeting shared the 
bad news with Khrushchev: there had been 60 Russian casualties, in addition to four tanks and 
four armored vehicles being destroyed.89 Quickly Khrushchev began to lose total faith in any 
non-violent, political solution repairing the problem in Hungary. The Premier sent a message to 
Tito stating “The West and anti-Soviet elements in Hungary have taken up arms against the 
Socialist camp and the Soviet Union. The West is seeking a revision of the results of World War 
II. It has started in Hungary, and will then go on to crush each socialist state in Europe one by 
one.”90 It is unclear if Khrushchev believed his words or, in a more sinister manner, wanted Tito 
to believe them—so that Tito would approve of military action against the Hungarian people. 
Regardless, it is clear that Khrushchev remained a devout communist throughout the entirety of 
his reign. To allow a free Hungary would be a significant back-track in the goals of a global 
communist revolution and to the status of Soviet security in Europe.
Once Khrushchev understood that Russia was dealing with a much greater threat than a 
large group of disgruntled intellectuals, due to the Revolution spreading to Hungarian nationals 
and nearly all other members of Hungarian society he began to realize that there could be no 
middle ground in Hungary—no negotiations and no compromise. He saw the situation in classic 
Bolshevik terminology. The freedom fighters were counter-revolutionary elements and the 
Soviet Union was aiding the Hungarian working class to realize the ideals of communism.91 His 
memoir would have one believe that he had known this fact from the outset; however, it is clear 
that is not true. It took almost a week of debate in the Kremlin, before Moscow offered an 
official policy on Hungary. On the night of October 30, (as usual during the Hungarian crisis) 
Khrushchev tossed around, unable to sleep. He initially had approved a plan granting Hungary
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the status of a semi-autonomous independent nation on par with the likes of Austria, Yugoslavia, 
and Finland.92 The story of Khrushchev’s decision had already been printed for the morning 
headlines of Pravda. During Khrushchev’s sleepless night he unsurprisingly decided to reverse 
his initial plan. Had Khrushchev’s original arrangement been implemented it would have 
changed the course of history in Eastern Europe. Certainly it would have removed a substantial 
cause of the cold war from the American perspective, which was Soviet domination of Eastern 
and Central Europe.93 One of the motivating factors in Khrushchev’s decision was self- 
preservation. He feared (rightfully so) that his rivals in Moscow would pounce should he give 
proof of his willingness to cooperate with the Capitalist powers through his seeming 
acquiescence on the Hungarian issue.94
The decision was then made that the Hungarian issue would be resolved with the might 
of the Red Army. The United States and its NATO alliance had been effectively neutralized by 
the statements of the Soviet government detailing Hungary’s begging for military action to 
restore order. Eisenhower would address the nation condemning the violence of the Soviet 
military and refuting the claim that Hungary needed the assistance of the Russians—“after World 
War II, the Soviet Union used military force to impose on the nations of Eastern Europe 
governments of Soviet choice—servants of Moscow.”95 Eisenhower’s impassioned speech 
would amount to little. The Hungarian people were left alone to fight one of the greatest military 
forces of the 20th Century. What could Eisenhower have done? Khrushchev absolutely would 
have been willing to go to war over the issue of Soviet power projection in Eastern Europe.
Under this framework, Khrushchev ordered the commencement of Operation “Vertex” on the 
morning of November 1, 1956.
Up to this point, a pseudo-cease fire had been in effect and Soviet forces were pulling out 
of Hungary. Early on the first morning of November, Nagy received a report that the largest 
Russian force yet, backed by 850 tanks, had reentered Hungary. Nagy’s days as prime-minister 
were numbered—the Soviet Army had begun its full invasion of Hungary.96 Operation “Vertex” 
fully restored the ‘national-democratic’ government in Hungary by November 4; twelve days 
after the fighting had broken out.97 Nagy was arrested and later executed. He would be replaced 
by Janos Kadar. Kadar was willing to comply with Moscow’s demands thus ending any threat of 
a free Hungary. Kadar remained subservient to the Kremlin; however, he showed his brutal side 
in his execution of Nagy and several of Nagy’s allies in a brilliantly designed trap after Nagy 
attempted to seek refuge in Yugoslavia.98 Almost a decade of uneasy Soviet-Hungarian relations 
was decided in twelve bloody days with a devastating Soviet victory.
Legacy
The Hungarian Revolution was dismissed from serious academic study for quite some 
time for two reasons. First, serious studies of Soviet history were limited until the collapse of the 
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Hungarian Revolution international attention quickly shifted to the crisis in the Suez Canal that 
had the potential to cause another global conflict. The Hungarian Revolution became an 
afterthought as foreign media covered the Suez crisis with much greater zeal. For many years, 
the unfortunate deaths of the Hungarian freedom fighters and reformist leaders were completely 
forgotten—one of the biggest tragedies of the entire affair. Regardless, the success of Operation 
“Vertex” marked a return to ‘normalcy’ in the Soviet Bloc. The Red Army made an example of 
the Hungarian people to show the entire Bloc what would happen should they follow the 
Hungarian path.
Leading up to the events of the Hungarian Revolution, Poland and Hungary were de-facto 
allies inside the Bloc given their status as problem states for the Russians. The new Polish 
government, under the leadership of Wladyslaw Gomulka followed the day-to-day events of the 
Hungarian Revolution very closely. While the Kremlin did its best to prevent information from 
leaking out of Budapest, Poland used its embassy in Hungary to gain as much intelligence as 
possible." Once it became clear that the Hungarian cause was lost, Gomulka officially 
condemned Nagy’s revolutionary government, and by 1958 the Polish communist party had fully 
accepted Kadar’s ordered execution of Imre Nagy—no matter how uncomfortable it made the 
Polish leaders.100 The Polish people, once united in cause, gave up on their Hungarian freedom- 
desiring brethren. A sense of complacency began to dawn over the entire Soviet Bloc—for it 
seemed better to acquiescence to Moscow’s demands then to suffer that fate of Hungary in 1956.
Khrushchev established a precedent in his ordering of the Red Army into Budapest on 
November 1st. In his memoirs Khrushchev showed no regrets in his decision to crush the 
freedom fighters in Operation “Vertex.” In fact, Khrushchev argued that the use of force was 
completely justified for two reasons. Since Hungary was a member of the Warsaw Pact and of 
the Soviet Union it was Khrushchev’s obligation to maintain order—especially in one of the 
capital cities.101 Additionally, Khrushchev argued that the use of force became morally 
justifiable.102 Khrushchev’s concept of morality (deriving from communism’s atheistic belief) 
certainly would have been different from Western notions of morality; however, from the 
perspective of Moscow Khrushchev’s argument did hold weight. From Moscow’s perspective, 
the Hungarian Revolution exhibited an explicit danger to the Hungarian workers and inspired 
counterrevolutionary zeal in Budapest—neither of which could be morally tolerated under Soviet 
doctrine.
Khrushchev made sure that his order of force did not fall upon deaf ears. He 
intentionally visited with nearly every single communist Bloc leader to inform them of his 
decision to authorize military action. His memoirs would have one believe that he wanted to 
ensure that no further dissent broke out over the Red Army’s actions.103 It is clear, however, that 
Khrushchev had a more sinister purpose for traveling to each European communist capital city. 
Khrushchev wanted to inform each of the party leaders of his decision so that they would have 
no thoughts to aid or follow Hungary.104 While the Hungarian Revolution would be the first 
major uprising against Soviet imperialism it would not be the last. Certainly Khrushchev’s 
decision had a direct impact on his successor, Leonid Brezhnev s decision to invade
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Czechoslovakia during the Prague Spring of August 1968. Ultimately the Hungarian Revolution 
failed at creating an independent and free Hungarian state; however, the rebellion can be seen as 
the starting point for the decline of the Soviet Union because “it gave the Soviets a jolt from 
which they never entirely recovered.”105 Khrushchev’s decision had ramifications in the entire 
Soviet society; however, it remains the correct one in terms of a rational state protecting its 
interests—Khrushchev cannot be held responsible for the economic, social, and political 
shortcomings of his successors Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov, and Konstantin Chernenko.
The ramifications of the Soviet decision to invade Hungary in 1956 were never fully 
manifested in Soviet-NATO relations. The Suez crisis and subsequent negotiations displaced the 
tension that the Hungarian issue had created and formed another crisis point in Soviet relations to 
the West. For the United States the Soviet crackdown on Hungary was an unfortunate and 
shocking setback; however, it provided additional opportunities. 106 The United States was able to 
portray the Soviet Union as reformist in dialogue only—despite Khrushchev’s ascension to 
power, the USSR was still an inherently evil nation-state.107 *While the United States failed to 
help the Hungarian freedom fighters, and in some cases misled them, the United States redeemed 
itself slightly. Over 50,000 refugees from Hungary fled the Soviet violence and successfully 
sought asylum in the United States and the government set up several relief organizations for the 
newest immigrants to America.
“Temetni tudunk!” This Hungarian expression best translates to English as ‘what we are 
really good at is burying people.109 Over a fifteen-year span, Hungary saw some of the worst 
foreign state-sponsored bloodshed in modem European history between the Nazi Germany 
occupation beginning in 1944 and the immediate Soviet ‘liberation.’ Against this context the 
legacy of the Hungarian Revolution remains to this day an incredibly tense issue in Hungary.
The Hungarians never forgot that the first anti-Soviet revolution ended in bloodshed; however, it 
immediately became a source of national pride for the Magyar people. This act of rebellion 
demonstrated for the first time that totalitarianism was not destined to control Hungary, Eastern 
Europe, or any nation in this world for centuries.110 This was Hungary’s victory in defeat. For 
current residents of Budapest there are sights around the city that serve to remind them that their 
ancestors proudly stood up to the imperialism of Nikita Khrushchev and the entire Soviet Union. 
Even Khrushchev recognized that the Hungarian people would have no love for their Russian 
occupiers—a hatred that continues today.111
Conclusion
The year 1956 belongs to no one group of people. There are many different sides of the 
same story. The Hungarian people hoped and fought for their independence. The United States 
had no deployable assets in the area to respond effectively or supply aid to the freedom fighters. 
Additionally, if the United States had supported the rebels, a potential global conflict could have 
started with the streets of Budapest serving as the front-lines. The Soviet Union saw a situation 
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three stories are both separate and intertwined; however, this paper attempts to retell the 
motivating factors in Khrushchev’s decision to authorize Operation “Vertex.”
The Soviet Union acted in its best interest with its decision to crush the Hungarian 
Revolution of 1956. The Soviet Union, and its leader Nikita Khrushchev, were ever fearful of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Despite there being no evidence that the Hungarian 
freedom fighters desired to be a signatory nation to the treaty, it is a logical thought that the 
United States would intervene and force Hungary’s compliance. It would not have been the first 
or the last time in the Cold War that the United States undertook questionable methods in the 
name of anti-communism.
The situation in Poland and Yugoslavia certainly (and for Soviet hegemony, rightfully) 
influenced Khrushchev’s decision to order the invasion of Hungary. For Soviet security, 
Khrushchev needed Nagy out of power and installed a ‘yes-man,’ Janos Kadar, in his place. The 
Bloc nations received the message of Operation “Vertex” and their relative obedience to 
Moscow continued without major incident until the Prague Spring nearly twelve years after the 
Hungarian Revolution. In hindsight, Khrushchev’s decision played a substantial role in the 
return of the party-line in all of Eastern and Central Europe. Additionally, Khrushchev tightened 
his grip on power—which he would hold until being forced out by political rivals in 1964 after a 
series of embarrassments at the hands of the West (the Cuban Missile Crisis).
The Hungarian Revolution remains one of the greatest tragedies in the entirety of the 
Cold War period of modem history. A group of guerrilla freedom fighters fought for their 
nation’s independence from their Soviet overlords and for twelve days had one of the largest 
land-based empires of the modem world on the ropes. Khrushchev was one restless night away 
from granting a semi-autonomous declaration to Hungary—instead he swiftly reversed course 
and ordered the complete annihilation of the counter-revolutionary forces in Hungary. In this 
battle, Goliath bested David in a bloodbath. The Soviet actions were reprehensible and cannot 
be justified on a moral basis. Khrushchev deserves no apologies. The Hungarian people suffered 
immensely as a result of 1956; however, the story of the Hungarian Revolution is an incredibly 
inspiring one. One small, unique European nation taking on the Soviet Union’s oppression is a 
story that deserves to live on through the annals of history—no matter if Khrushchev made a 
rational policy decision.
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V
The Second Amendment: In Defense of Self or State?
By T.J. McCarrick ‘12
The recent assassination attempt on the life of life of Representative Gabrielle Giffords 
has once again forced questions concerning gun regulation to the forefront of the American 
political conscience. With its 2008 decision in District o f Columbia v. Heller and its 2010 
decision in McDonald v. Chicago, the Supreme Court has, for the first time, established the core 
protestation of the Second Amendment as individual keeping and bearing of arms for self 
defense in the home and that this right is incorporated against the States by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. And still, the debate between individual rights advocates and collective rights 
advocates continues. Caroline Kennedy and Ellen Alderman effectively describe both sides of 
the debate, writing, “Individual-right advocates argue that the Framers intended to protect a 
personal right to bear arms when they wrote the Bill o f  Rights because such a right was widely 
accepted in the eighteenth century ... Gun control proponents respond that the common law right 
to keep and bear arms was not an individual right to keep weapons, but primarily existed for the 
defense of the state and community.”1 With the lack of any clear test to assess the legitimacy of 
government regulation which seeks to curtail aspects of the Second Amendment guarantee, 
lower courts have been placed in a position of chaos, making ad hoc rulings concerning a host of 
gun regulations. As such, this paper will proceed in the form of a Supreme Court majority 
opinion ruling on the circumstances provided by a hypothetical, fictional test-case.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
MORRIS, ET AL., PETITIONERS v. CITY OF MIAMI
_____________ ON W RIT OF CERTIO RARI TO THE UNITED STATES CO U RT OF APPEALS FOR TH E ELEVENTH CIRCU IT
April 28, 2011
Justice McCarrick delivered the opinion of the Court.
We consider whether a Miami gun ordinance violates the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution. Through analyzing the text, history, and jurisprudence of the Second Amendment 
we answer the following questions: (1) What is the core substance of the Second Amendment’s 
guarantee? (2) What is the bright line test to determine the constitutionality of legislation 
restricting that right? (3) Is this right incorporated against the States through the Fourteenth 
Amendment of the United States Constitution?
I
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The city of Miami generally prohibits the possession of firearms. A City ordinance 
provides that it is a crime for any person to possess a firearm for which they do not hold a valid 
registration certificate. The code goes on to forbid the registration of handguns, shotguns, long 
guns, rifles, assault weapons, and military-grade weaponry, effectually banning private 
possession of any weapons by almost all citizens residing in the City. That very same ordinance 
also holds that residents keep any lawfully owned firearms stored in a locked container, bound 
by a trigger-lock, or unloaded and disassembled. The final relevant piece of the City’s ordinance 
is its restriction on concealed carrying of weapons.
When studying such gun regulations, it is important to bear in mind that Miami is a city 
historically plagued by above average crime rates. With a Crime Risk Index of 346, Miami ranks 
as the seventh most dangerous city in the United States according to U.S. News and World 
Report}  Despite recent reductions in Miami’s violent crime rate, that figure still ranks well 
above the national average “with 680 [violent crimes] per 100,000 people, compared to the 
national figure of 429.”3 Included in this figure are the troubling statistics revealed by the 2003 
report of the Miami-Dade County Violent Injury Statistics System. Of the 155 homicides 
committed in 2003, 76 percent were committed using a firearm. Of those cases in which the 
particular type of firearm was identified (80 percent), 21 percent were committed using a 9mm 
semi-automatic handgun, 13 percent involved a .38 caliber revolver, 7 percent involved assault 
rifles, and 3 percent involved shotguns.4
Given these statistics, petitioners have been subject to zealous enforcement of the above- 
described ordinance. Each contends that, in one way or another, the Miami gun ordinance 
violates the Second and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. Linda Morris, 
an elderly homeowner in her mid-sixties living in a high crime neighborhood, applied for and 
was denied a registration certificate for a handgun she wished to keep at home for self-defense 
purposes; Steven Patton, a world-renowned crocodile hunter, applied for and was denied 
registration certifications for two rifles and two shotguns he wished to keep at home for hunting 
and sport; John Prendergast, an off-duty Drug Enforcement Agency officer subjected to 
numerous threats by local drug cartels, desires a concealed-carrying permit for his handgun; 
Michael McCabe, a videogame enthusiast, sought and was denied a permit for an assault rifle, a 
Famas, he wished to keep in his home as homage for the best-selling videogame, Call o f Duty; 
finally, Michael Dillon, a member of the National Guard, was denied a registration certificate for 
a military-issue bazooka he sought to privately own. The District Court rejected petitioner’s 
challenge, noting that the right guaranteed under the Second Amendment is restricted to keeping 
and bearing arms when in active service of a militia and that naturally, such a collective right 
designed to protect State sovereignty would not be incorporated against the States by the 
Fourteenth Amendment. The Eleventh Circuit affirmed. We granted certiorari.
II
A
In interpreting the text of an organic document, such as the Second Amendment to the 
Constitution, our analysis is informed by the principle that the text was written in such a manner 
that the words and phrases employed were to be understood by the voters, by “the People” 
identified in the Constitution’s preamble. This principle finds support in the advocacy of the 
Antifederalists, a group instrumental in securing the existence of a bill of rights to provide
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protection against federal encroachment. The Federal Farmer, in his sixteenth letter concerning a 
codification of a bill of rights, writes, “we ought to establish it [a right] generally; - instead of 
the clause of forty or fifty words relative to this subject, why not use the language that has 
always been used in this country...These [rights] may be secured by general words...5 Thus, any 
genuine effort to identify the salient features of a right must be informed, but not shackled, by 
the founding generation’s conception of that right. As the legal maxim states: Verba aequivoca, 
si per commune usum loquendi in intellectu certo sumuntur, talis intellectus praeferendus est.6
Although particular concerns of the founding generation may constitute the impetus for 
the codification of a given right, such as the Second Amendment, time and generation-sensitive 
concerns cannot be construed to limit the entire scope of the right. Former Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, in his law review article, The Notion o f a Living Constitution, writes, “The framers of 
the Constitution wisely spoke in general language and left to succeeding generations the task of 
applying that language to the unceasingly changing environment in which they would live.. .they 
have given latitude to those who would later interpret the instrument to make that language 
applicable to cases that the framers might not have foreseen.”7 Given this, it is easy to be held 
captive by the illusion that the meaning of the Constitution changes and expands with time and 
circumstance. Rehnquist, however, is not and to the extent, that is true, it does not suggest that 
the understanding of the language employed and understood at the time of the founding is 
meaningless. The founding language bears upon, informs, and even limits current constructions 
and applications of that language.
Acknowledging the above doesn’t require that idiomatic meanings of certain words and 
phrases be excluded from constitutional interpretation. Indeed, idiomatic understanding of 
constitutional language is demanded and necessitated in instances where such language was of 
common usage and understanding at the time. The question, therefore, revolves around what 
exactly the founding generation understood to be the outstanding features of the Second 
Amendment.
It is natural, then, to present the words of the Second Amendment which provide: “A well 
regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”8 Structured as such, the amendment is clearly and 
naturally divided into two distinct parts: a prefatory clause and an operative clause. What is less 
clear is the scope and relation between the two. But to engage in lengthy commentary and 
argument here, before any understanding of the relevant words of the Second Amendment has 
been demonstrated, would be premature. It would be tantamount to putting the rabbit in the hat 
and waiting to declare “Voila!”, as if the outcome were the surprising result of unbiased analysis 
instead of a rigging of a preordained result. As such, the Second Amendment will be scrutinized 
in the natural order in which it is read — the prefatory clause first, and the operative clause 
second.
1. A well-regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State
In assessing the above prefatory clause, its primary object is clear — Militia.” When we 
conceive of the militia today, we are guided by the 1903 Militia Act, which defines membership 
to include all able-bodied males between ages 17 and 45, excepting a few very narrow classes of 
persons. In short, the militia is currently comprised of those persons eligible for a draft. Indeed, 
“militia” meant very much the same thing to persons of the founding generation An early
definition offered by Webster provides, “ th e  m i l i t i a  o f  a  c o u n t r y  a re  th e  a b le  b o d ie d  m e n  
organized into companies, regiments and brigades...and require by law to attend military
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exercises on certain days.”9 Because of the great similarity between the above two definitions, it 
is possible to locate them under the slightly broader definitional umbrella such that their implicit 
assumptions may be made more clear. Black's Law Dictionary defines “militia” as “A body of 
citizens armed and trained, esp. by a state, for military service apart from the regular armed 
forces.”10 In analyzing the subtle, but crucial, distinctions made here in light of the remaining 
words of the prefatory clause, their relevance and function become all the more apparent.
If “militia” is the primary object contemplated by the prefatory clause, it is natural to 
proceed with an analysis of the words qualifying that object -  “well-regulated.” That adjective 
holds no hypertechincal meaning, instead referring to what it plainly suggests -  the imposition of 
proper training and discipline. This conclusion is supported by countless founding era 
documents, and, though a deeper historical analysis will be conducted later, I will employ one 
instance here to illustrate the general point. During the debates over the framing and ratification 
of the Constitution, the framers thought uniform regulation and discipline as key to the ultimate 
success of the militia. James Madison, recounting statements made at the constitutional debates 
writes:
MR. MASON moved as an additional power ‘to make laws for the 
regulation an discipline of the militia of the several States reserving to the States 
the appointment of officers.’ He considered uniformity as necessary in the 
regulation of the Militia throughout the Union.
GEN. PINCKNEY mentioned a case during the war in which a 
dissimilarity in the militia of different States had produced the most serious 
mischiefs. Uniformity was essential.11
The only means to achieve such uniformity of discipline and training was to provide that 
the militia be well-regulated, a power granted to national government in Article I, Section 8 of 
the Constitution.
As to what purpose this “well-regulated Militia” is to be directed, we now proceed to the 
remainder of the prefatory clause. The framers were quite direct in their identification of the 
militia’s necessity; the ultimate end contemplated is “the security of a free State.” This phrase 
means nothing more than the overall security of a free polity or nation-state, in short, the 
common defense. St. George Tucker, in his View o f the Constitution o f the United States with 
Selected Writings (1803), explains:
The.. .want of uniformity of organization, and of discipline, among the 
several corps of the militia drawn together from the several states, together with 
the uncertainty and variety of the periods of service, for which those corps were 
severally embodied, produced a very large portion of those disgraces, which 
attended the militia of almost every state, during the revolutionary way.. .By 
authorizing the federal government to provide for all these cases, we may 
reasonable hope, that they are the most safe, as well as most natural defense of a 
free state.12
This quotation is particularly helpful in illustrating the argument that “the security of a 
free State” is distinctly security-related and national in character. Through demonstrating the 
critical importance offederal discipline and organization of state militias, Tucker shows the
The Histories. Volume 10, Number 2 65
defense to be provided by those militias as national defense. In other terms, only a federally 
“well-regulated Militia” could provide the necessary “security of a free State.”
Historical evidence from the time of the founding confirms the notion that “the security 
of a free State” was an 18th century term of art concerned with the common defense of a free 
polity, as evidenced by similar variations in wording used in a militia-centric context. In No. 29 
of the Federalist Papers, Alexander Hamilton, a key framer of the Constitution, makes the very 
same connection as made by St. Tucker above, in illustrating the dynamic relationship between 
proper regulation and national defense. He writes, “If a well-regulated militia be the most natural 
defense of a free country, it ought certainly to be under the regulation and at the disposal of that 
body which is constituted the guardian of national security (italics added).”13 Similarly, James 
Madison’s original drafting of the Second Amendment confirms the above notion, stating, “The 
right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed and well regulated 
militia being the best security of a free country... (italics added).”14
And with good reason. The immediate post-Revolutionary period was one of prolonged 
crisis. From Indians to pirates to internal rebellions, the fledgling republic was pitted against a 
seemingly endless list of adversaries, both foreign and domestic. Regarding the case of Indians, 
especially at the outer reaches of the States’ borders, the union formed under the Articles of 
Confederation was ill equipped to respond. Pauline Maier in her encyclopedic work Ratification: 
The People Debate the Constitution writes that the United States’ “army had shrunk to some 625 
unpaid, poorly equipped men, mostly in Western Pennsylvania -  too few to prevent squatters 
from moving onto Indian land, which threatened to provoke war at several points along the 
western frontier.”15 Such a pathetic, ragtag group was unlikely to provide the security needed to 
protect the Confederation’s citizens residing in the west, especially as they increasingly engaged 
in skirmishes with Indians over territory. As such, personal possession of firearms was viewed as 
critical among the colonists in case of confrontation.
Similarly, it was unlikely that such an uncoordinated group would serve as an effective 
deterrent against evermore hostile policies enacted by rival European powers. From British 
blockades of American imports to Spain’s closing of the Mississippi to American shippers, the 
Confederation Congress was utterly powerless to institute any policy or orchestrate a show of 
force to prompt change. Perhaps most troubling was the continued presence of British outposts. 
Pauline Maier explains, “In late 1785, the British formally refused to evacuate their posts in the 
northwest, arguing that they were not obliged to honor the peace treaty while the Americans 
violated it.”16 It comes as no surprise, therefore, that the founders sought to project an image of 
military capability. As Maier writes, “All governments, including the Confederation, had to 
‘maintain the appearance of strength’ even in times of tranquility, and the exercise of military 
power was safe ‘under the control and with the restrictions which the new constitution 
provides.’”17 In this vein, the militia was viewed as the proper vehicle to strike a balance 
between the demands of national security on the one hand, and fears of standing armies on the 
other.
A final dagger pointed at the heart o f the young republic was internal instability. In 
addition to financial problems caused by currency difficulties and a lack o f clearly defined taxing 
powers, the outbreak o f  numerous insurrections posed an existential threat to the survival and 
workability o f  the Confederation government. Whether prompted by unpaid debts to soldiers o f  
the Continental Army as in the case o f  Shay’s Rebellion in Massachusetts or by dissatisfaction 
with taxation policies as in the case o f  the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania, substantial 
groups o f  armed men banded together to oppose government, government which was powerless
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to stop them. Pauline Maier writes, “A sense of helplessness made a bad situation almost 
unbearable. Congress could only call troops for Massachusetts by pretending they would be used 
against Indians: the Articles of Confederation did not give it a clear and indisputable power to 
suppress domestic insurrections. The states were equally powerless...The state treasurer couldn’t 
even borrow money to supply a volunteer army.”18 It is no wonder, then, that the institution of 
the militia was at the forefront of the founder’s minds.
The ultimate conclusion was that individual states, left to their own devices, would be 
reluctant to properly address these pressing security matters. Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist 
No. 25 explained that:
The territories of Britain, Spain, and of the Indian nations in our 
neighborhood do not border on particular States, but encircle the Union from 
Maine to Georgia. The danger, though in different degrees, is therefore 
common.. .The States, to whose lot it might fall to support the necessary 
establishments, would be as little able as willing, for a consider time to come, to 
bear the burden of competent provisions. The security of all would thus be 
subjected to the parsimony, improvidence, or inability of a part.19
It was with these concerns in mind that the federal Congress was granted powers to 
regulate the militia, found in Article I, Section 8, a topic which will be considered later.
But before we proceed to the operative clause, there is another, less likely yet critically 
important, interpretation of the phrase “being necessary to the security of a free State” meriting 
attention. Instead of referring to the defense of a free polity, some suggest the above phrase is 
intended to protect the security of the individual sovereignty of the several states. It is true that 
the framers of the Constitution had deep-felt concerns over the threat posed to liberty by standing 
armies. In the ratification debates, Elbridge Gerry noted, “The clause as it stands [referring to 
Article I, Section 8’s provision for an army] implies that there is to be a standing army, which is 
unnecessary even for so great an extent of country as this, and dangerous to liberty.”20 However, 
supposing that this and other similar quotations are pieces of silver bullet evidence confirming 
the existence of a federalism concern on the part of framers for state sovereignty in the context of 
the Second Amendment’s preamble is foolish. Such an interpretation reads into the above 
statements an explicit concern that simply is not there. The historical record is silent on this 
matter, as there exists no known source explicitly connecting concerns over standing armies and 
individual state sovereignty.
Proponents of the federalism reading of the Second Amendment counter the preceding 
argument by noting the deliberate use of the word “State” in the amendment’s text. It is true that 
elsewhere in the Constitution, the term state “State” clearly refers to the individual states. It is 
also true, as Justice Scalia explains, that many of these “other instances... are typically 
accompanied by modifiers making clear that the reference is to the several States -  “each state,” 
“several states,” “any state,” “that state,” “particular state,” “one state,” “no state.”21 As such, 
when a word in a document such as the Constitution clearly possesses more than one meaning, 
context becomes critical. And given the previously discussed historical context and textual 
analogues linking militia-related concerns with the national security of a country, a federalism 
interpretation of “security of a free State” is fundamentally untenable. This conclusion is borne 
out by similar uses of the term “free State” in a non-militia, but rights related context. For 
example, in 1797 A Defence o f the Constitutions o f Government o f the United States o f America,
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John Adams writes, “there can be no constitutional liberty, no free state, no right constitution of 
a commonwealth, where the people are excluded from the government.”22 That statement is 
about qualities critical to ensuring a nondespotic form of government, not a statement concerning 
protecting of States’ rights from federal encroachment.
Furthermore, a federalism reading of the Second Amendment makes very little 
organizational sense. It would seem rather strange for the framers to have interjected a States’ 
rights protection in the midst of seven other individual rights protections -  free speech, free 
press, trial by jury, prohibitions on quartering of soldiers and cruel and unusual punishment, and 
the like. This is not to say that there were no serious misgivings over federal control of the 
military; there were. James Madison, again in the ratification debates, explained this point, 
saying, “As the greatest danger is that of disunion of the States, it is necessary to guard against it 
by sufficient powers to the Common Government and as the greatest danger to liberty is from 
large standing armies, it is best to prevent them, by an effectual provision of a good Militia.”23 
However, the body of evidence, historical and otherwise, tends to support the conclusion that the 
framers dealt with concerns over control of the militia elsewhere, namely, in Article I, Section 8 
and the Tenth Amendment.
For example, in the ratification debates, John Dickinson expressed concern over total 
state abdication of control over the militia. James Madison recounts Mr. Dickinson’s opinion as 
follows: “We are now come to a most important matter, that of the sword. His [Dickinson’s] 
opinion was that the States never would nor ought to give up all authority over the Militia.” 4 As 
such, compromises were sought. George Mason, for example, attempted to strike a balance 
between federal and state authority over the militia. James Madison recounts Mr. Mason as 
saying, “Power should be granted the general government to make laws for regulating and 
disciplining the militia, not exceeding one tenth part in any one year, reserving the appointment 
of officers to the states. A select militia is as much as the general government can 
advantageously be charged with. By granting greater authority, insuperable objections will be 
created.”25
To that end, authority over the militia was divided in Article I, Section 8 of the 
Constitution which reads that Congress shall have the power to, “provide for organizing, arming, 
and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them may be employed in the 
Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the 
Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by 
Congress.”26 It is this clause, not the preamble of the Second Amendment, which ensures divided 
authority over the respective state militia. To suggest that it is the preamble of the Second 
Amendment that secures divided sovereignty would fundamentally change the substance of the 
right. First, it would suggest that militias are reliant upon the Second Amendment for their 
existence. This Court is aware of no evidence tending to support the claim that militias are 
dependent upon that instrument for their being. Second, instead of being a privilege exercised at 
the discretion of the individual, keeping and bearing arms would essentially turn into an 
affirmative obligation upon on citizens since a well-regulated militia would be a necessary 
precondition to a free State.
Concerns over where to lodge authority over the militia do, however, furnish a final 
argument undercutting a federalism misreading of the Second Amendment. The record of the 
ratification debates over Article I, Section 8 reveals that the primary concern at the heart of 
militia-related matters was that of government disarming its citizens. Elbridge Gerry, a delegate 
to the Constitutional Convention, noted that, “Less power over the militia should be vested in the
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general government. The states will be only drill-sergeants. The citizens of Massachusetts might 
as well be disarmed as to have command taken from the states and given to the general 
Legislature. It will be regarded as a system of despotism.”27 This quotation reveals the 
fundamental, underlying, and paramount concern of the framers concerning the populace’s 
possession and use of arms -  widespread disarming of the citizenry. Seen in this light, the 
Second Amendment’s primary concern is for an individual exercise of the right to keep and bear 
arms, not a collective right to participate in the militia. This notion will be further explored in the 
following section.
2. The right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed
In analyzing the above operative clause of the Second Amendment, we begin with the 
possessor of the right -  “the people.” The phrase “right of the people” appears two other times in 
the Bill of Rights -  once in the First Amendment’s petition and assembly clause and once in the 
Fourth Amendment’s search and seizure clause. Similarly, the people’s retention of 
unenumerated rights in the Ninth Amendment is a very close analogue. The salient feature of all 
of these instances is the codification of an individual right. Again, the words of the 
Antifederalists regarding the necessity of establishing a Bill of Rights are instructive. The 
Federal Farmer, again in his sixteenth letter, writes, “perhaps it would be better to enumerate the 
particular essential rights the people are entitled to ... these rights are ... established, or enjoyed 
but in few countries: they are stipulated rights almost peculiar to British and American laws. In 
the execution of those laws, individuals, by long custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c. 
have become entitled to them.”28 Clearly, then, it was understood at the time of the framing that 
those liberties secured in the Bill of Rights were intended to be held by individuals.
As Justice Scalia explains, “All three of these instances unambiguously refer to 
individual rights, not ‘collective’ rights, or rights that may be exercised only through 
participation in some corporate body.”29 Though assembly, and to some extent petition appear 
more collective in nature, the right to engage in that collective action may only be secured 
through the protection of individual rights. As such, any question of protection of collective 
rights that may or may not be contemplated by the amendments to the Constitution always 
devolves into an affirmation of a guarantee of individual liberty as the avenue through which one 
may exercise corporate action. Further case law supports the interpretation of “the people” to 
refer to individual rights. The Court in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez states that:
‘The people’ seems to have been a term of art employed in select portions 
of the Constitution... [Its uses] sugges[t] that ‘the people’ protected by the Fourth 
Amendment, and by the First and Second Amendments, and to whom rights and 
powers are reserved in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, refers to a class of 
persons who are part of a national community30
The implication, therefore, is clear: the people protected in the Second Amendment have 
an individual right to keep and bear arms.
However, before turning to an analysis of the substantive right of the operative clause, it 
is important to address the alternate interpretation of the words “right of the people,” the 
collective rights interpretation. It is argued that like the petition and assembly clause of the First 
Amendment, the Second Amendment’s use of “the people” contemplates collective action. This 
distinction is bolstered by the absence of the term “the people” as a qualifier for other First
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Amendment rights. In his dissent in District o f Columbia v. Heller, Justice Stevens explains, “In 
the First Amendment, no words define the class of individuals entitled to speak, to publish, or to 
worship; in that Amendment it is only the right peaceably to assemble, and to petition the 
Government for a redress of grievances, that is described as a right of “the people.” These rights 
contemplate collective action.”31 So too, the argument goes, does the Second Amendment, where 
“the people” described in the operative clause reference the “Militia” announced in the prefatory 
clause. Therefore, the use of the words “the people” in the operative clause does not expand the 
right to keep and bear arms beyond the context of membership in a militia. As the Court held in 
United States v. Miller, “In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of 
a “shotgun having a barrel of less than eight inches in length” at this time has some reasonable 
relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the 
Second Amendment guarantees the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”32
Such an interpretation, however, is simply untenable. First, basic logic would seem to 
dictate that any exercise of a collective 8 be conditioned on the preexistence and maintenance of 
an individual right. For example, had I no individual right to peaceably assemble, I could never 
do so in concert with others. Furthermore, textually speaking, it makes little sense that a textual 
provision guaranteeing a right of “the people” would effectually only protect a subset of those 
people. Holding that only able-bodied men between the ages of 17 and 45 possessed a right to 
keep and bear arms, and only insofar as they were actively associated with a militia, is to imply 
that many of the very framers of the Amendment, in effect, codified a right they did not 
themselves possess. And to suggest that John Dickinson or Benjamin Franklin could believe such 
a thing strains credulity. Not a single other amendment, even the guarantees of petition and 
assembly, require involvement in some corporate body to be maintained. The entire point of 
establishing a right is to make it of stronger stuff such that it might be unconditioned, free to 
everyone, of course with reasonable exceptions.
It is now critical to elucidate the substance of the right enshrined in the Second 
Amendment -  “to keep and bear arms.” As with the prefatory clause, it is fitting to begin any 
analysis with contemplation of the primary object of the operative clause -  “Arms.” The 18th 
century meaning of the word differs very little from contemporary understanding. Justice Scalia 
explains that “The 1773 edition of Samuel Johnson’s dictionary defined ‘arms’ as ‘weapons of 
offence, or armour of defense’... Timothy Cunningham’s important 1771 legal dictionary defined 
‘arms’ as ‘any thing that a man wears for his defence, or takes into his hands, or useth in wrath to 
cast at or strike another.’”33 From these definitions, it becomes clear that the word “Arms” at the 
time of the founding, as today, applied to weapons not exclusively designed for military use.
We proceed, then, to the phrases “keep arms” and “bear arms.” The same edition of 
Johnson’s dictionary defined “keep” as, “to reain; not to lose...and to have in custody.”34 Again, 
the founders’ understanding parallels our own. Merriam-Webster s dictionary defines “keep” as, 
“to retain in one’s possession or power.”35 Similarly, Black s Law Dictionary defines the “right 
to bear arms” as, “the constitutional right of persons to own firearms.’ Though such a 
definition would be more coherent had the word “keep been used in place of “bear”, the point is 
clear, namely, substance of the right enshrined in the Second Amendment is believed by many 
contemporary Americans to be a protection of an individual right to possess a firearm. Seen as 
such, the appropriate reading of “keep Arms” in the context of the Second Amendment is “to 
have weapons.” Though there is scant historical evidence containing the employment of the term 
“keep Arms,” what examples there are seem to confirm the above reading of the Second 
Amendment. The example of Sir William Blackstone is instructive. A key influence on the
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thinking of the founding generation, Blackstone writes in his Commentaries on the Laws o f 
England that Catholics convicted of not observing the Mass of the Church of England must, 
among other things, “not keep arms in their houses.”37 Similarly, Justice Scalia cites a colonial 
law of Virginia clearly providing for the keeping of arms outside of a military context. It read, 
“Free Negros, Mulattos or Indians, and Owners of Slaves, seated at Frontier Plantations, may 
obtain License from a Justice of Peace, for keeping Arms, &c.”38 This evidence does not negate 
the body of evidence in which “keep Arms” was employed in a militia-related context. It simply 
and convincingly suggests that the right was conceived and understood as a general protection 
for everyone not solely militiamen.
This interpretation of the Second Amendment is confirmed by the both modem and 18th 
century understandings of the term “bear Arms.” In Muscarello v. United States, Justice 
Ginsburg writes that, “surely a most familiar meaning is, as the Constitution’s Second 
Amendment.. .indicate[s]: ‘wear, bear, or carry.. .upon the person or in the clothing or in a 
pocket, for the purpose.. .of being armed and ready for offensive or defensive action in a case of 
conflict with another person.’”39 Such an interpretation captures the natural meaning of the 
phrase “bear Arms” as carrying a weapon for the purpose of confrontation. Again, founding era 
dictionaries including Johnson and Webster define “bear” as meaning “to carry.”40 As such, it is 
clear that the words “bear Arms” did not have an exclusive military connotation. For example, 
four years before the first draft of the Bill of Rights was presented, the framers employed the 
phrase “bear arms” in an explicit nonmilitary context. James Madison submitted a Bill for the 
Preservation of Deer, drafted by Thomas Jefferson, before the Virginia General Assembly which 
read, “And, if, within twelve months after the date of the recognizance he shall bear a gun out of 
his inclosed ground, unless whilst performing military duty, it shall be deemed a breach of the 
recognizance, and be good cause to bind him a new, and every such bearing a gun shall be a 
breach of the new recognizance and cause to bind him again.(italics added)”41 Here, the phrase 
“bear a gun” can be understood in no other context than a nonmilitary one, as the act clearly 
exempts military related carrying of weapons from the general prohibition. Clearly then, 
Madison, and many if not all of the framers, would have possessed an understanding of the 
phrase “bear arms” that was not uniquely militant in nature and could easily encompass uses of 
weapons for hunting and self defense.
Despite this fact, there is some evidence to support the notion that “bear Arms” bore a 
military-specific connotation. Justice Stevens, quoting the Oxford English Dictionary in his 
dissent in District o f Columbia v. Heller, writes, “The term ‘bear arms’ is a familiar idiom; when 
used unadorned by additional words, its meaning is ‘to serve as a soldier, do military service, 
fight.”42 One pre-ratification example of this interpretation is found in the Declaration of 
Independence. Objecting to the tyrannical policies of King George, it reads, “He has constrained 
our fellow Citizens taken Captive on the high Seas to bear Arms against their country.”43 
Another such example is found in the words of the Providence Gazette of 1775 which state, “By 
the common estimate of three millions of people in America, allowing one in five to bear arms, 
there will be found 600,000 fighting men.”44 Given this evidence, it is not wholly unreasonable 
to suggest that the phrase “bear Arms,” unadorned by any identification of protected nonmilitary 
purposes, naturally refers to a military-related right.
Very similarly, there exists evidence that the word “keep,” as used in the Amendment, 
also connotes a military meaning. Again Justice Stevens in his dissent points to a number of 
militia laws enacted around the time of the founding which use the term “keep” in a particular 
military context. He offers the example of a Virginia military law which held that, “every one of
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the said officers, noncommissioned officers, and privates shall constantly keep the aforesaid 
arms, accoutrements, and ammunition, ready to be produced whenever called for by his 
commanding officer.”45 Such an interpretation very clearly contextualizes and embodies the 
identified militia-related concern of the preamble and protects the unitary ability to possess and 
use arms in connection with such a militia. As Justice Stevens puts it, “the single right that [the 
Second Amendment] does describe is both a duty and a right to have arms available and ready 
for military service and of use them for military purposes when necessary.”46
Unfortunately the military-centric interpretation of the Second Amendment fails 
to grasp the fundamental point. The right guaranteed by the Second Amendment is not to secure 
the right to participate in a militia. And to continuously point to the repeated militia-related 
contexts surrounding the Amendment is no answer. It is both unsurprising and unremarkable that 
the terms “keep arms” and “bear arms” were most often used in a military context. Founding era 
sources would have few other occasions to employ such terms outside concerns of national 
security and standing armies. So, to assign Second Amendment language an exclusive meaning 
borders on ridiculous. Justice Scalia explains “This is rather like saying that, since there are 
many statutes that authorize aggrieved employees to ‘file complaints’ with federal agencies, the 
phrase ‘file complaints’ has an employment-related connotation.”47 Such a reading is especially 
ridiculous given the previously proffered examples of founders using the phrases “keep arms” 
and “bear arms” is evidently non-military contexts. This fact is underscored by the absence of 
any dictionary definition qualifying the possession or use of arms as exclusively related to 
service in a militia.
Proponents of a collective -right interpretation counter the above argument by pointing to 
James Madison’s early drafts of the Second Amendment, and particularly, the inclusion of a 
conscientious-objector clause. The proposal of Madison’s Virginia’s Ratifying Convention read, 
“The right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed; a well armed, and well- 
regulated militia being the best security of a free country; but no person religiously scrupulous of 
bearing arms, shall be compelled to render military service in person.”48 From this and other 
similar conscientious-objector clauses, Justice Stevens concludes that the Amendment possesses 
a distinctly military context as compulsory militia service would be the sole situation in which 
such a provision could be invoked. As such, because Madison and the framers did not insist on 
the inclusion of language explicitly protecting nonmilitary uses of arms, “bear Arms” means the 
very same thing in the substantive portion of the Amendment (IE-the protection from 
infringement) as it does in the conscientious-objector portion.
Such an analysis is faulty, however, and cripples collective-rights advocates’ arguments 
in contradiction. First, it is always dubious to draw conclusions concerning the meaning of an 
amendment from proposals rejected during the drafting process. It is rather bizarre to derive what 
Justice Stevens calls “the central meaning” of the Second Amendment from a provision not even 
included in the final product. Similarly, any conclusion based on an omitted proposal is 
guesswork at best, as there is no possible way to know with any degree of certainty what 
Madison meant by the initial inclusion and eventual exclusion of the conscientious-objector 
clause. Allow me to concede for a moment what Justice Stevens would have us believe, namely, 
that Madison included protections for religiously scrupulous persons against compulsory military 
service to contextualize the military-related nature of the right. Wouldn' t the logical consequence 
of accepting that argument, given Madison’s subsequent elimination of that provision, yield the 
very opposite reading of the Amendment that Justice Stevens intends? Given Madison’s 
previously referenced uses of the term “bear Arms” in civilian contexts, it would be entirely
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reasonable to speculate that the elimination of the conscientious-objector clause was intended to 
broaden the protection of the Amendment to civilian uses. But, this conclusion, like Justice 
Stevens’, is conjecture at best.
Second, this piece of historical evidence clearly confirms the previously disputed position 
that “security of a free State” refers to a national polity. A federalism reading of the Second 
Amendment makes logical sense only if “security of a free State” refers to the protection of the 
individual sovereignty and political autonomy of the respective states of the Union. The above 
proposal by James Madison represents a clear denial of that reading. The deliberate attempt by 
proponents of a federalism reading of the Second Amendment to ignore the deliberate use of the 
word “country” and its analogue “State,” which remain in the Amendment, while highlighting 
and privileging its excluded conscientious-objector provisions represents hypocrisy and political 
opportunism of the worst kind. It demonstrates the commitment of collective-rights not to 
fidelity to the Constitution, but to their previously held conceptions of appropriate gun policy in 
America.
Finally, Justice Stevens’ analysis of initial drafts of the Second Amendment ignores 
elementary grammatical construction. Like many other amendments, it is quite possible and 
indeed likely that initial drafts of the Amendment sought to protect multiple related rights.
Justice Scalia cites the example of the First Amendment, writing, “[it] protects the ‘right of the 
people to peaceably assemble, and to petition Government for a redress of grievances.”49 These 
are found in the very same Amendment which protects freedom of the press and religion. So too, 
early drafts of the Second Amendment sought to protect related but distinct freedoms, an 
argument which also effectively counters any assertion that the Second Amendment guarantees a 
unitary right. The use of semicolons in Madison’s initial draft is telling. Separating related, but 
distinct guarantees, they demonstrate that though connected, the Amendment was directed 
towards multiple ends. Such a view is confirmed by the precursor to Madison’s initial draft, the 
proposals sent by the Virginia Ratifying Convention. They read:
17th, That the people have a right to keep and bear arms; that a well 
regulated Militia composed of the body of people trained to arms is the proper, 
natural and safe defence of a free State. That standing armies are dangerous to 
liberty, and therefore ought to be avoided, as far as the circumstances and 
protections of the Community will admit and that in all cases the military should 
be under strict subordination to and be governed by the civil power...
19th, That any person religiously scrupulous of bearing arms ought to be 
exempted, upon payment of an equivalent to employ another to bear arms in his 
stead.50
Here, the Second Amendment analogue and conscientious-objector protection are split 
between two different guarantees. Though both employ the phrase “bear arms,” the use of this 
term in the 17th proposal is substantively different than that in the 19th. While the latter expressly 
possesses a military context, and indeed could only be invoked in a military context, the former 
stands alone. Unadorned with specific purpose and set off from militia-related clauses by a 
semicolon, it would be imprudent to arbitrarily assume an exclusively military context to the 
right.
The final piece of the operative clause maintains that the guaranteed right to keep and 
bear arms “shall not be infringed.” This language is instructive in that the right protected, like the
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First and Fourth Amendments, is a preexisting right. As the Court explained in United States v. 
Cruikshank, “The right there specified is that o f  'bearing arms for a lawful purpose.' This is not a 
right granted by the Constitution. Neither is it in any manner dependent upon that instrument for 
its existence. The Second Amendment declares that it shall not be infringed...”51 Thus, the 
Second Amendment is really just a formal recognition of the right’s common law legacy in the 
Anglo-American tradition of rights and jurisprudence. As such, that history, as we will soon see 
is instructive.
3. Relationship between Prefatory Clause and Operative Clause
To adequately identify the substance of the right protected by the Second Amendment, 
we must identify the proper relation between the prefatory clause and the operative clause. 
Reason requires that there be an identifiable connection between the purpose announced in the 
preamble of the Amendment and its substantive guarantee and effect as illustrated in the 
operative provision. Absent such a relationship, the Amendment would be incongruous. Justice 
Scalia illustrates, “The Second Amendment would be nonsensical if it read: ‘A well-regulated 
Militia, being necessary to the security of a free state, the right of the people to petition for 
redress of grievances shall not be infringed.”’52 Therefore, it is wholly unsurprising that an 
important connection exists between the prefatory and operative clauses. The question, however, 
is what is the proper relation between the two. Does the former contextualize and fundamentally 
limit the latter? Or, does the former announce a nonexclusive purpose or reason for codifying the 
latter?
Let us assume, for the sake of argument, that the prefatory clause qualifies and defines 
the scope of the right guaranteed in the operative clause. Such an interpretive model is justified 
by precepts enshrined in the common law legacy of Sir Edward Coke. Two of his maxims for 
statutorial interpretation hold: Generalis clausula non porrigitur ad ea quae specialiter sunt 
comprehensa53 and Verba posteriora propter certitudinem addita adpriora quae certitudine 
indigent sunt referenda.54 As such, the general grants or rights are contextualized, limited, and 
defined by surrounding clarifying language. Justice Stevens further explains this point through 
the use of Sir William Blackstone, writing:
the fairest and most rational method to interpret the will of the legislator is 
by exploring his intentions at the time when the law was made by signs the most 
natural and probable... if words happen to still be dubious, we may establish their 
meaning from the context; with which it may be of singular use to compare a 
word, or a sentence, whenever they are ambiguous, equivocal, or intricate. Thus, 
the proeme, or preamble, is often called in to help the construction of an act of 
parliament.55
Thus, only by privileging the words of the prefatory clause can the Court truly stand with 
Chief Justice John Marshall in saying, “it cannot be presumed that any clause in the constitution 
is intended to be without effect.” 56
Under such a view, the Second Amendment only protects the keeping and bearing 
of arms in connection with service in a militia. As the Court held in United States v. Miller.
In the absence of any evidence tending to show that the possession or use 
of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of less than eighteen inches in length at this time 
has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or efficiency of a well 
regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the light
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to keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that 
this weapon is any part of the ordinary military equipment, or that its use could 
contribute to the common defense.57
Hence, only those belonging to the militia in possession of weaponry commonly 
employed by contemporary militia are protected under the Second Amendment. In this fashion, 
bans on the ownership or possession of handguns, shotguns, and many semi-automatic weapons 
would be entirely permissible.
And yet this interpretation remains problematic. First, it seems strange for collective- 
rights advocates to cling to interpretive models which privilege a prefatory clause while 
simultaneously suggesting that the meaning of the operative clause is clear. Remember above, 
that Justice Stevens and many others submit that the phrase “keep and bear Arms” possesses a 
distinctly military context unless explicitly referring to nonmilitary activity. Perhaps, then, the 
privileged-preamble mode of interpretation betrays an understanding on the part of such 
proponents that the meaning of the operative clause is clear indeed in its protection of 
nonmilitary uses. Applying the prefatory clause restrictively is simply another means to achieve 
the preordained goal of justifying severe gun regulation.
Second, and perhaps more importantly, a federalism reading of the Second Amendment 
would have serious implications in terms of what exactly the right is, and who would possess it. 
Certainly a ban on handguns and other sorts of small arms will stand under a federalism reading 
of the Second Amendment. However, other gun regulations, particularly restrictions on 
automatic and semiautomatic weapons will crumble. Technological innovation has made the 
tools of war all the more deadly. Instead of muskets, we have machine guns; instead of bayonets, 
we have bazookas. In colonial times, weapons of war and self-defense were one in the same. 
Today, they are wholly separate and pose unique risks. As Justice Breyer argues, “at least six 
States and Puerto Rico impose general bans on certain types of weapons, in particular assault 
weapons or semiautomatic weapons...These bans suggest...there may be no substitute to an 
outright prohibition in cases where a governmental body has deemed a particular type of weapon 
especially dangerous.”58 Ironically, then, what is guaranteed by collective-rights reading of the 
Second Amendment is the very opposite of what gun regulation proponents seek -  private 
possession of highly dangerous weapons.
Equally troublesome is who would possess the right. As previously mentioned, all able 
bodied men between the ages of 18 and 45 must register for the Selective Service and are 
statutorily considered members of the Reserve Militia. Therefore, continuing to apply the Court’s 
holding in Miller is to guarantee only all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 45 the 
right to personally own and stow M-16s and other weapons of warfare. As such, some of the 
most vulnerable members of society -  women and the elderly -  will be denied any such 
protection. Unlike virtually every other right guaranteed by the United States Constitution, this 
right will not be held by all people, but by a particular subgroup. Such an extreme, dangerous, 
and restrictive reading of the Second Amendment simply cannot stand.
Instead, we should be guided by traditional principles of statutory and 
constitutional interpretation which recognize the fundamental and inherent limitations upon the 
significance of prefatory clauses. Jabez Sutherland, in his renowned treatise on statutory 
construction explains, “The preamble in a statute is a prefatory statement or explanation...It is 
not part of the law, in a legislative sense, and hence... cannot of itself confer any power.”59 
Sutherland continues, noting that that there is, of course, an important relationship between a
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prefatory clause and operative clause, in that the former often identifies a critical concern to be 
addressed by the latter. However, that does not give judges license to restrict the actual substance 
of the enactment. He explains:
A clear and explicit enactment is not cut down by a more limited preamble 
or recital, even though the enacting clause is in general words and the preamble 
particular. Strong words in the enacting part of a statute may extend beyond it 
beyond the preamble.. .Sometimes the legislature, having a particular mischief in 
view, to prevent which was the first and immediate object of the statute, recites 
that in the preamble, and then goes on in the body of the act to provide a remedy 
for general mischiefs of the same nature but of different species, not expressed in 
the preamble nor perhaps then in contemplation.60
The legislative reference is of particular help here. In construing a congressional statute, 
the “Whereas” clauses are really just a series of prefatory clauses. Though useful in identifying 
the envisioned harmed to be addressed by the resolution, such statements are not law and do not 
restrict the scope of the actual policy action. Seen in this way, the Second Amendment could 
easily be envisioned as reading, “Whereas a well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of 
a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed,” or “Because a 
well-regulated militia is necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep 
and bear arms shall not be infringed.” Any other mode of interpreting the Second Amendment 
would require the resolution of constitutional questions turn on matter of purpose rather than 
effect. And though the Amendment clearly identifies a profound concern of the framers, it, like 
the other concerns which acted as catalysts for other constitutional protections, ebbs, flows, and 
evolves with time.
The prefatory clause to the Second Amendment embodies a concern, a purpose, but not a 
sole concern or sole focus. This Court’s interest lies in finding, elucidating, and safeguarding the 
core of the right at issue, an interest shared by the founders. Again, The Federal Farmer explains 
that regarding the codification of rights:
these same rights, being established by the state constitutions, and secured 
to the people, our recognizing them now, implies, that the people thought them 
insecure by state establishments, and extinguished or put afloat by the new 
arrangement of the social system unless reestablished... the little different 
appendages and modifications tacked to it in the different states, are no more than 
a drop in the ocean.. .it is the substance we would save, not the little articles of 
form.61
Applying this mode of analysis to the Second Amendment, the protection guaranteed in 
the operative clause is clearly located as the core of the right, unrestricted by the addition of any 
preamble.
B
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We now turn to the substantive guarantee of the Second Amendment. As previously 
demonstrated, numerous founding-era documents reveal the intent of the framers to incorporate 
civilian uses of firearms under the umbrella of the Amendment. However, these statutory 
distinctions are of a fundamental different nature than a constitutional guarantee. It is instructive, 
therefore, to study guarantees made in various state constitutions. While it may be true that, in a 
number of areas, state constitutions lacked the same scope of protection as federal guarantees, it 
seems highly unlikely in the case of the Second Amendment, where there is considerable 
similarity between the federal protection and various state guarantees. Indeed, the advocacy of 
the Antifederalists seems to confirm this hypothesis. The Federal Farmer writes:
There are certain unalienable and fundamental rights, which in forming 
the social compact, ought to be explicitly ascertained and fixed ... These rights 
should be made the basis of every constitutions ... I never thought the people of 
these states differed essentially in these respects; they having derived all these 
rights from one common source, the British systems; and having in the formation 
of their state constitutions discovered that their ideas relative to these rights are 
very similar.62
Thus, united in the British common law heritage, the various state arms-bearing 
protections are of identical nature to the federal guarantee.
Between the period of independence and the early 19th century, nine states chose to adopt 
arms-bearing protections which explicitly refer to nonmilitary use of weapons. Of the four 
choosing to adopt Second Amendment analogues immediately following independence, it 
important to note that two of them -  Pennsylvania and Vermont -  explicitly protected the natural 
law of self preservation for individuals. Pennsylvania’s Constitution, adopted in 1776 read, “That 
the people have a right to bear arms for the defence of themselves and the state.”63 Vermont’s, 
adopted in 1786 identically holds, “That the people have a right to bear arms, for the defence of 
themselves and the State.”64 Similarly, New Hampshire, though not explicitly protecting a 
natural right of self defense, clearly sought to protect an individual’s right to bear arms 
unconnected with service in a militia by recommending the following change to the Constitution: 
“Congress shall never disarm any citizen unless such as are or have been in actual rebellion.”65 
Similar proposals were offered by Samuel Adams of Massachusetts and the Pennsylvania 
minority proposal, the latter which read, “That the people have a right to bear arms for the 
defence of themselves and their own state, or the United States, or for the purpose of killing 
game; no law shall be passed for disarming the people or any of them, unless for crimes 
committed, or real danger of public injury from individuals...”66 Finally, between the ratification 
of the Constitution and 1820, nine states chose to adopt Second Amendment analogues. Of these, 
“Four of them -  Kentucky, Ohio, Indiana, and Missouri -  referred to the right of the people to 
‘bear arms in defence of themselves and the State.’ Another three States -  Mississippi, 
Connecticut, and Alabama -  used the even more individualistic phrasing that each citizen has the 
‘right to bear arms in defence of himself and the State.’”67 Taken together with the position of 
the Anti federalists that there was little substantive difference between analogous state and federal 
protections, the above examples confirm the historical record that the Second Amendment 
protected civilian uses of arms, particularly and centrally, a natural right of self defense.
Further evidence locating a natural law of self defense at the heart of arms-bearing 
guarantees is seen in America’s inheritance of Britain’s common law legacy. Remarking on the
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origins of many of the rights to be secured, the Federal Farmer notes, “These rights are not 
necessarily reserved, they are established, or enjoyed but in a few countries: they are stipulated 
rights almost peculiar to British and American laws. In the execution of those laws, individuals, 
by long custom, by magna charta, bills of rights &c. have become entitled to them.”68 One such 
right is that to bear arms for self defense. Justice James Wilson, a founder of considerable 
influence, writes, “Homicide is enjoined, when it is necessary for the defence of one’s person or 
house. With regard to the first, it is the great natural law of self preservation, which, as we have 
seen, cannot be repealed, superseded, or suspended by any human institution. This law, however, 
is expressly recognised in the constitution of Pennsylvania.. .This is one of our many renewals of 
the Saxon regulations.”69 Therefore, any comprehensive understanding of the Second 
Amendment right or its various state analogues must be informed by an analysis of its British 
origins.
One key source of the British tradition is found in the all encompassing work of Sir 
William Blackstone, particularly his Commentaries on the Laws o f England. Blackstone, a 
profound legal scholar and expositor of common law rights retained by British subjects was well 
known to and incredibly influential upon the framers. And it is with this profound familiarity and 
affection for a uniquely British conception of certain rights in view that the substance of the 
Second Amendment must be understood. Regarding citizens ownership and use of arms, 
Blackstone held, “In these several articles consist the rights, or, as they are frequently termed, the 
liberties of Englishmen... we have seen that these rights consist, primarily, in the free enjoyment 
of personal security, of personal liberty, and of private property.. .To vindicate these rights.. .the 
subjects of England are entitled...to the right of having and using arms for self-preservation and 
defence.”70 To be clear, lest a keen-eyed collectivist hijack the above language to fit their needs, 
Blackstone locates the right as an individual one, writing, “The defence of one’s self, or the 
mutual and reciprocal defence of such as stand in the relations of husband and wife, parent and 
child, master and servant. In these cases, if the party himself, or any of these relations be forcibly 
attacked in his person or property, it is lawful for him to repel force by force, (italics added)”71 
Thusly, as in England, where the natural right of self-preservation was understood as central to 
the Lockean pursuit of security, liberty, and property, the Second Amendment’s guarantee ought 
be envisioned to encompass the very same substance, such that it may be located as central to the 
Jeffersonian pursuit of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. Though not contained textually 
in the Constitution, it can hardly be contested that the principles of life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness are bedrock principles of our nation, principles the Constitution is directed towards 
preserving.
The historical events in England leading up to the formal recognition of a right to bear 
arms are found in the period between the Restoration and 1688 Revolution in which many of the 
Stuart monarchs sought to disarm political opponents through the use of private militia forces.
As a result, English subjects became wary of attempts to disarm the jealous population as the 
first in a series of steps to establish a monopoly of force in the hands of the Crown which, 
inevitably, would be turned upon the population. Therefore, with William and Mary’s victory in 
the Glorious Revolution came a guarantee in the English Bill of Rights, hold, “that the subjects 
which are Protestants may have arms for their defence suitable to their conditions and as allowed 
by law.”72 Though restricted to Protestants, the lesson is clear -Englishmen considered the 
individual possession and use of arms as a fundamental liberty unconnected with service in any 
organized military force. Indeed, even after the establishment of that arms-bearing guarantee,
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attempts were made to restrict individual arms-bearing protections. St. George Tucker comments 
that:
In England, the people have disarmed, generally, under the specious 
pretext of preserving the game: a never failing lure to bring over the landed 
aristocracy to support any measure, under the mask, though calculated for very 
different purposes. True it is, their bill of rights seems at first view to counteract 
this policy: but the right of bearing arms is confined to protestants, and the words 
suitable to their condition and degree, have been interpreted to authorize the 
prohibition of keeping a gun or other engine for the destruction of game, to any 
farmer, or inferior tradesman, or other person not qualified to kill game. So that 
not one man in five hundred can keep a gun in his house without being subject to 
a penalty.73
Unlike its predecessor, the Second Amendment’s substantive guarantee and operative 
clause are unrestricted, avoiding such limiting attempts as those described by St. George Tucker 
and advocated by collectivists.
Unsurprisingly, the colonists endured many of the same experiences under the reign of 
George III. In the decades leading up to the revolution, the Crown sought to disarm colonists 
residing in the most rebellious areas, provoking invocations of the English Bill of Rights the 
common law legacy growing out of it. Justice Scalia, quoting a 1769 New York publication 
explains, “it is a natural right which the people have reserved to themselves, confirmed by the 
Bill of Rights, to keep arms for their own defence.”74 This interpretation was not abandoned as 
the revolution culminated in independence. Such an individualist understanding of the arms- 
bearing right was adopted by Thomas Jefferson proposing the following amendment in his draft 
constitution for the state of Virginia. It reads, “No freeman shall be debarred the use of arms 
within his own lands.”75 Though not adopted, this provision not only offers insight as to the 
individual nature of the Second Amendment right, but also into the obvious fact that this right, as 
all others, is not unlimited.
Therefore, the holding of the Court in United States v. Miller -  that only weapons 
suitable for militia use are protected by the Second Amendment -  is hereby overruled. That case 
was unable, and indeed, did not seek to undertake a thorough examination of the scope of the 
Second Amendment. The respondent in that case made no appearance; the Government relied 
solely on obscure English legal sources; and no one, including the Court, explored or even 
mentioned the text or history of the Second Amendment.76 As such, and given the body of 
evidence provided above, confining citizens’ arms-bearing right to be solely connected with 
participation in a militia is unsupported by text, history, and traditional canons of statutory 
interpretation. Instead, it is clear that the Amendment protects, at its core, the right of an 
individual to personally own and use a firearm in the furtherance of one’s natural right of self 
preservation.
This right, like many other liberties, is at its zenith in the home. Our jurisprudence has 
consistently affirmed the privileged position accorded a person’s actions in their home, be it 
regarding reproductive liberty, sexual intimacy, freedom from unwarranted searches, or merely a 
general expectation of privacy. Explaining this fundamental importance of the domestic, the 
Court, in Boyd v. United States, held that:
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The principles laid down in this opinion affect the very essence of 
constitutional liberty and security.. .they apply to all invasions on the part of the 
government and its employees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies 
of life. It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that 
constitutes the essence of the offence, but it is the invasion of his indefeasible 
right of personal security, personal liberty, and private property, where that right 
has never been forfeited.77
Therefore, the relationship between personal security and the sanctity of the home is 
firmly rooted in this Court’s precedent and tradition. Indeed, it stretches back even farther than 
that, finding its inception in the common law. Again, James Wilson explains, “every man’s 
house is deemed, by the law, to be his castle, and the law, while it invests him with the power, 
enjoins him the duty, of the commanding officer. ‘Every man’s house is his castle,’ says my 
Lord Coke in one of his reports, ‘and he ought to keep and defend it at his peril’... For this 
reason, one may assemble people together in order to protect and defend his house.”78 This 
British common law heritage confirms the central location of the natural right of self 
preservation as in the home, in defense of one’s hearth, family, and self.
Hence, while the individual’s interest is at its apex in the home, the State’s corresponding 
interest is substantially weaker. As Justice explains in his dissent in McDonald v. Chicago, “The 
State generally has a lesser basis for regulating private compared to public acts, and firearms 
kept inside the home generally pose a lesser threat to public welfare as compared to firearms 
taken outside.”79 This is not to say that the State has no interest in passing certain safety 
regulations whose reach extends to the home; it simply suggests that those policies must be 
narrower in scope than they otherwise would be in public. The converse is also true: as 
individuals are farther removed from their private sphere in the home, the State’s interest in 
enacting reasonable regulation to safeguard the public welfare increases significantly.
C
However, our current jurisprudence has yet to articulate a clear standard of review to 
determine the constitutionality of any gun regulation. Despite statements in Heller and 
McDonald as to certain regulations’ constitutionality, both opinions have not sought to delineate 
any sort of bright-line to differentiate acceptable legislation from the unacceptable. As a result, 
judges sitting on lower courts have been sent on a kind of “mission impossible,” required to 
divine the constitutionality of rules from blanket statements as to the types of regulations this 
Court believes to be sensible. Justice Stevens explains that those decisions, “invite an avalanche 
of litigation that could mire the federal courts in fine-grained determinations about which state 
and local regulations comport with the Heller ... under a standard of review we have not even 
established.”80
Strict scrutiny seems ill-suited to address Second Amendment inquiries as the 
Government’s interest in protecting the lives of its citizens will always prove compelling.
Indeed, as Justice Breyer rightly points out, the approval of a broad set of regulations -  waiting 
periods, licensing requirements, prohibitions of possession of firearms by the metally ill -  
implicitly rejects the applicability of strict scrutiny, as such policies are not narrowly 
tailored.”81 Indeed, any attempt to apply strict scrutiny merely devolves into an interest balancing 
inquiry in terms of weighing the individual’s interest in self defense against the government’s
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interest in public safety. Such an approach, however, is inappropriate and constitutes a marked 
divergence from tradition. Justice Scalia explains, “We know of no other enumerated 
constitutional right whose core protection has been subjected to a freestanding “interest­
balancing” approach. The very enumeration of the right takes out of the hands of government -  
even the Third Branch of Government -  the power to decide on a case-by-case basis whether the 
right is really worth insisting upon.”82 Such a method is a a judge-empowering one, likely to 
yield, not constitutional interpretation, but the enactment of preferred policy positions.
The test we adopt, therefore, in assessing the challenged Miami ordinance is an undue 
burden analysis holding that given state regulations: (1) may not unduly burden the fundamental 
right, that is, severely, capriciously or arbitrarily, restrict the core of a given right; and (2) must r 
reasonably relate to a legitimate government interest. Justice O’Connor explains in Akron v. 
Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc. that, “If the particular regulation does not ‘unduly 
burden’ the fundamental right, then our evaluation is limited to our determination that the 
regulation rationally relates to a legitimate state purpose.” Such a test strikes an effective 
balance between protecting the heart of a given right on the one hand, and the legitimate interests 
associated with State legislation on the other. Nowhere is such a test more appropriate than in the 
area of gun regulation.
As we have said, the disputed ordinance completely bans the possession of any firearm in 
the home. The City, seeking to reduce gun violence and prevent accidental injury, asks us to 
confirm that a policy as this is reasonably related to the legitimate government interest of 
protecting the safety of the citizenry. This we cannot do. Few regulations in the 200 history of 
this country approach the extremity of the one we consider today. Far from imposing reasonable 
or due restrictions on the right in question, the City’s ban on firearms wholly precludes any 
exercise of the right itself. To uphold the constitutionality of a uniform ban on the personal 
possession of any firearm for any purpose whatsoever is to effectively deny the constitutionality 
of the Second Amendment and, in so doing, read that guarantee out of the Constitution. And 
given that the inherent right of self defense has been revealed as the central guarantee of the 
Second Amendment, we cannot accept an absolute ban on the possession of firearms, especially 
given the availability of less-intrusive but nearly equally effective policy alternatives.
Such a position does not deny the fact that the right to keep and bear arms, like all other 
rights, is not unlimited. As with speech, religion, and assembly, reasonable time, manner, and 
place restrictions may be levied on our arms-bearing right. Put another way, “the right was not a 
right to keep and carry any weapon whatsoever in any manner whatsoever for whatever 
purpose.”84 In fact, the historical record confirms prohibitions on certain classes of weapons in 
pursuance of public safety objectives. James Wilson, drawing on Blackstone, explains, “Affrays 
are crimes against the personal safety of the citizens; for in their personal safety, their personal 
security and peace and undoubtedly comprehended...In some cases, they may be an affray where 
there is no actual violence; as where a man arms himself with dangerous and unusual weapons, 
in such a manner, as will naturally diffuse a terrour among the people.”85 As such, the inherent 
right to self defense does not comprise a right to defend oneself with any weapon of choice, but 
rather, as the Court explained in Miller, those weapons “in common use at the time.”86
As such, we find that the Second Amendment guarantees a personal right to possess a 
handgun, rifle, or shotgun for self defense in the home. Such a list is not arbitrary; rather, it is 
informed by those weapons overwhelmingly preferred by Americans as instruments of self 
defense. Regarding handguns, Justice Scalia explains, “There are many reasons that a citizen 
may prefer a handgun for home defense: It is easier to store in a location that is readily accessible
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in an emergency; it cannot be easily redirected or wrestled away by an attacker; it is easier to use 
for those without the upper-body strength to lift and aim a long gun; it can be pointed at a burglar 
with one hand while the other hand dials the police.”87 Similarly, the shotgun was entirely 
devised as a self defense weapon as it is easier to aim than a pistol and delivers more force, thus 
making it more likely to stop an intruder. Finally, the rifle, a descendent of the musket while not 
necessarily the ideal instrument of self defense in urban settings, may be entirely preferable in 
rural communities. And given that the right is exercised primarily in one’s home, as most choose 
not to walk the streets toting their rifle, deference ought be given to the individual’s choice of 
weapon since the State’s interest is at its lowest. Thus, our analysis makes three critical 
distinctions: first, between the purposes of sought arms (ie- self defense versus hunting); second, 
between the classes of weapons most suited for those different purposes; and third the location 
where the natural right of self preservation is at its height.
Consequently, in furthering the state interest of public safety, be it through decreasing the 
number of weapons in circulation or prohibiting especially dangerous weapons, bans on the 
private possession of certain classes of arms in the home are entirely warranted. The schema we 
propose is a three-tiered one. The first tier, those weapons, places, and purposes least subject to 
regulation is described above. As Justice Stevens explains:
The decision to keep a loaded [gun] in the house is often motivated by the 
desire to protect life, liberty, and property. It is comparable, in some ways, to 
decision about education and upbringing of one’s children... heads of household 
must ask themselves whether the desired safety benefits outweigh the risks of 
deliberate or accidental misuse that may result in death or serious 
injury... Millions of Americans have answered this question in the affirmative, not 
infrequently because they believe they have an inalienable right to do so -  
because they consider it an aspect of ‘the supreme human dignity of being master 
of one’s fate rather than a ward of the state. 8
The second tier comprises arms desired for hunting, sport, and other non-defense related 
objectives. Such weapons, automatics, sniper rifles, and others may kept, but not necessarily in 
the home. It would be reasonable to require the storage of such weapons in a gun locker at a 
range. The third tier includes military hardware, those weapons which seem peculiar to warfare. 
This class of weapons, given the public safety risks of widespread public ownership of weapons 
as M-16s, bazookas, mortars, and tanks, are most subject to State regulation and indeed may be 
banned outright.
Some, however, may suggest that upholding the constitutionality of bans on military 
hardware entirely detaches the prefatory clause from the operative clause, relegating the former 
to having no bearing whatsoever on the latter. That is not entirely true. One must necessarily 
concede that a person familiar with the maintenance and discharge of a handgun, is likely to be 
more well trained in arms than would be his/her non-arms bearing counterpart. Justice Breyer, 
citing a Military Officers’ Brief explains, “civilians who are familiar with.. .marksmanship and 
safety are more likely to be able to safely and accurately fire a rifle or other firearm with minimal 
training upon entering military service.”89 Furthermore, Justice Scalia, citing State v. Kessler 
explains that, “In the colonial and revolutionary war era, [small arms] weapons used by 
militiamen and weapons used in defense of person and home were one in the same. However, 
these arguments avoid the fundamental point. In colonial times, defense was to be provided by a
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militia composed of the citizenry, who, as in the Revolution, would bring to the battlefield all of 
the lawfully and privately owned arms. Over time, our Nation has moved away from this 
preference, lodging nearly all responsibility for security in the national standing army. With the 
abolishment of conscription, and the establishment of an All-Volunteer Force and National 
Guard, the idea of the citizen-soldier has withered, and it very well could be true that a 
contemporary militia would require highly elaborate and highly dangerous weaponry. However, 
as Justice Scalia puts it, “the fact that modern developments have limited the degree of fit 
between the prefatory and operative clause and the protected right cannot change our 
interpretation of the right.”9
We now consider the second challenged portion of the Miami ordinance: that lawfully 
owned firearms be stored in a locked container, bound by a trigger-lock, or unloaded and 
disassembled. While such a mandate certainly infringes on an individual’s unimpeded right to 
self defense in the home, it does not unduly burden that right given the competing state interest 
in precluding accidental discharge, especially among adolescents and children. As a City Council 
Committee of Washington D.C. recently noted, “for every intruder stopped by a homeowner with 
a firearm, there are 4 gun related accidents within the home.”92 History confirms the historical 
constitutionality and permissibility of such reasonable storage regulations. A number of colonial 
laws from Pennsylvania to New York to Massachusetts required that gunpowder be stored 
separately from arms. For example, a law enacted in Boston imposed a fine on “any Person who 
shall take into any Dwelling-House, Stable, Barn, Out-house, Ware-house, Store, Shop, or other 
Building, within the Town of Boston, any... Fire-Arm, loaded with, or having Gun-Powder.”93 
As such, leaving citizens the choice of acquiring a trigger lock, gun safe, or disassembling the 
weapon and stowing ammunition separately is reasonably related to the compelling 
governmental interest of preventing gun related accidents in the home.
The final piece of the ordinance to be reviewed in the City’s prohibition on concealed 
carrying of firearms. Again, as persons move farther beyond the special protection afforded by 
one’s home, the State’s interest in regulation increases. As such, the State has a reasonable 
interest in requiring that guns be visible be it for enforcement of registration requirements or a 
public safety interest. History confirms this point. According to Justice Scalia, “the majority of 
19th century courts to consider the question held that prohibitions on carrying concealed weapons 
were lawful under the Second Amendment or state analogues.”94 One such law is described by 
Justice Breyer. It reads, “Any free person who shall habitually carry about his person, hidden 
from common observation, any pistol, dirk, bowie knife, or weapon of the like kind, from the use 
of which the death of any person might probably ensue, shall for every offense be punished by a 
fine not exceeding fifty dollars.”95 Thus, regardless of the prudence of the policy, the ordinance’s 
restriction on concealed carrying must stand.
Seen in this light, it becomes clear that an affirmation of an inherent right of self defense, 
coupled with the judicious application of an undue burden analysis does not, in one fell swoop 
call into question time-honored restricts on gun ownership. Registration requirements, 
prohibitions on possession of firearms by felons, and laws banning the possession of firearms in 
sensitive areas as government buildings, airports, schools, and the like remain good law, law 
directed at the very real problems posed by gun violence in the United States.
Ill
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But before squaring the above protection with the disputed regulations we are asked to 
review today, we must determine whether the right of self preservation guaranteed by the Second 
Amendment is incorporated via the Fourteenth Amendment against the States. One theory of 
incorporation -  total incorporation -  was espoused by Justice Black. He maintained that the 
entirety of the Bill of Rights was applicable to the States through Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment. Though never adopted, the Court has consistently moved in that direction, 
energetically applying nearly all protections contained in the first eight amendments through a 
process known as “selective incorporation.” Aside from guarantees of fair process, the Due 
Process Clause seeks to provide special protection against government meddling with certain 
fundamental rights and liberties defined by Justice White in Duncan v. Louisiana as those 
“fundamental principles of liberty and justice which lie at the base of all our civil and political 
institution.”96 Or, as Chief Justice Rehnquist says, “We have regularly observed that the Due 
Process Clause specially protects those fundamental rights and liberties, which are, objectively, 
‘deeply rooted in this Nation’s history and tradition’... and ‘implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,’ such that, ‘neither liberty nor justice would exist if they were sacrificed.’”97
Second, this Court has required that substantive due process cases articulate a precise 
description of the asserted liberty or right. Such a standard serves as a check on judicial activism. 
As Justice Scalia writes in Reno v. Flores, “‘Substantive due process’ analysis must begin with a 
careful description of the asserted right, for ‘the doctrine of judicial self restraint requires us to 
exercise the utmost care whenever we are asked to break new ground in this field.’” 8 Absent 
such a requirement, it would be difficult to conceptualize due process rights as anything other 
than the Justices’ personal preferences read into the Constitution. Laurence Tribe, though 
speaking of the Ninth Amendment, illustrates the general point effectively. He writes, “the Ninth 
Amendment,” and indeed we would submit the Fourteenth, “might plausibly come to be seen as 
the well from which courts could draw.. .rights of all sorts.. .I would find it hard to convince 
myself that they were truly being drawn from the well rather than being poured into it.”99 As 
such, the specific contours of the right ought be clearly identified and rooted in the Anglo- 
American scheme of liberty.
Balanced against these rights is a longstanding tradition of respect for broad exercise of 
States’ police power. Justice Stevens, dissenting in McDonald, explains the enactment of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, “‘did not unstitch the basic federalist pattern woven into our 
constitutional fabric’...The Constitution still envisions a system of divided sovereignty, still 
‘establishes a federal republic where local differences are to be cherished as elements of liberty’ 
in the vast run of cases, still allows a general ‘police power.. .to the States and the States 
alone.’”100 Generally included under police power is regulation of a population’s health, safety, 
welfare, and morals. A particular articulation of this police power is described by Justice Breyer 
to include, “the power to ‘protect.. .the lives limbs, health, comfort, and quiet of all persons, and 
the protection of all property within the State,’ by enacting ‘all kinds ot restraints and burdens on 
both persons and property.’”101 Identified as important areas of state concern, the Constitution 
has long afforded States special deference in enacting legislation in these areas.
The reason for such a privileging of state power is found in the general preference for 
democratic solutions to empirical problems. Indeed in a system of representative democracy, the 
majority is empowered to enact desired legislation so long as it passes constitutional muster. The 
ultimate desirability of that legislation is decided by the people who have the power to hold their 
• elected representatives, unlike unelected judges, accountable for those decisions. Furthermore, 
legislators are simply better equipped to amass the data and empirical evidence or proposed
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 84
policy prescriptions and draw accurate conclusions from them. Courts, by contrast, “cannot 
easily make empirically based predictions; they have no way to gather and evaluate the data 
required to see if such predictions are accurate... nor can judges rely upon local community
views and values when reaching judgments in circumstances where prediction is difficult
102because the basic facts are unclear or unknown.”
Thus, State flexibility and adaptability may be desirable. The above disadvantage of 
judicial solutions to empirical problems suggests that State legislatures are the best stewards of 
policy regarding local preferences and conditions, both key virtues of federalism. The pitfalls, 
then, of imposing top-down judicial solutions upon state and local officials precludes States from 
acting as “laboratories of experimentation” whose process of trial-and-error often benefits the 
entire American community. Concerning nonprocedural rules of the Bill of Rights, however, 
some suggest that “it is not clear that greater liberty results from the jot-for-jot application of a 
provision of the Bill of Rights to the States,” because, “precedents require perfect state/federal 
congruence only on matters, ‘at the core’ of the relevant constitutional guarantee.”103 Thus, the 
States are left with more legislative tools at their disposal to address concerns lying at the heart 
of their police powers.
Yet the rationale for explicitly codifying a Bill of Rights was to enshrine forever those 
rights which are beyond the reach of the sovereign, be they King or Congress. The Federal 
Farmer explains, “People, ad very wisely too, like to be express and explicit about their essential 
rights, and not to be forced to claim them on the precarious and unascertained tenure of 
inferences and general principles, knowing that in any controversy between them and their 
rulers, concerning those rights, disputes may be endless, and nothing certain.”104 Accordingly, 
this Court has eschewed doctrines applying only a diluted version of an incorporated right to the 
States. Justice Brennan in Malloy v. Hogan explains, “The Court.. .has rejected the notion that 
the Fourteenth Amendment applies to the States only a watered-down, subjective version of the 
individual guarantees of the Bill of Rights.”105 Truly it would bizarre to have protean rights, 
morphing according to the actor attempting to infringe it. Applying divergent standards of review 
depending on whether a claim was made in federal or state court would be wholly inconsistent. 
Consequently rights guarantees “are all to be enforced against the States under the Fourteenth 
Amendment according to the same standards that protect those federal rights against federal 
encroachment.”106 So too here -  the undue burden analysis proscribed above is the minimum 
threshold of protection to be applied to the Second Amendment’s protection of the natural law of 
self preservation.
As previously explained, it cannot be denied that the State has a legitimate interest in the 
regulation of guns. Similarly, proposed incorporation of the Second Amendment involves 
substantially different protections than do standards of review for other rights -  the protection of 
insular minorities through identification of suspect classifications, protecting participation in the 
democratic process, and protection of individuals who may suffer unequal treatment at the hands 
of the majority. Yet, to suggest that the fundamental right protected by the Second Amendment 
is any less essential to liberty is equally wrongheaded.
The historical and textual analysis undertaken above conclusively establishes self-defense 
as the central guarantee of the Second Amendment. The history of the English common law, 
demonstrated most visibly in the English Bill of Rights as well as the commentaries of both Sir 
Edward Coke and Sir William Blackstone, confirms the right to keep and bear arms in defense of 
oneself, one’s family, and one’s home. This legacy is unmistakably a part of the jurisprudential 
DNA of the American colonists who invoked their right to bear arms in reaction to George Ill’s
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attempts to disarm them. This profound fear of general disarmament is enshrined in the advocacy 
of the Antifederalists who argue, “we should have fine times indeed, if to punish tyrants, it were 
only sufficient to assemble the people. Your arms wherewith you could defend yourselves, are 
gone ... Will your Mace-bearer be a match for a disciplined regiment? ... Of what service would 
militia be to you, when most probably you will not have a single musket in the State.”107 It was 
in response to these fears and in a desire to affirm a number of critically important English 
common law rights that the Bill of Rights was demanded. The Federal Farmer writes, “we 
discern certain rights ... which the people of England and America of course believe to be 
sacred, and essential to their political happiness.”108 Such an individual conception of the right is 
supported by the implicit congruence between state analogues ratified in that very same time 
period and the federal guarantee.
Perhaps the best evidence of 18th century Americans’ belief that the Second Amendment 
right is fundamental to the Anglo-American scheme of liberty and justice is found in the 
advocacy of St. George Tucker. Commenting of the Second Amendment, he writes:
This may be considered as the true palladium of liberty. ... The right of 
self defense is the first law of nature: in most governments it has been the study of 
rulers to confine this right within the narrowest limits possible. Wherever standing 
armies are kept up, and the right of the people to keep and bear arms is, under any 
color or pretext whatsoever, prohibited, liberty, if not already annihilated, is on 
the brink of destruction. In England, the people have been disarmed, generally, 
under the specious pretext of preserving game: a never failing lure to bring over 
the landed aristocracy to support any measure, under that mask, though calculated 
for very different purposes (italics added).109
No clearer affirmation of the centrality of that right to our scheme of limited and ordered 
government could be articulated. Moreover, this is not an understanding that faded with time. 
There is substantial evidence indicating the intention of the framers of the Fourteenth 
Amendment to incorporate the Second Amendment against the States. Justice Alito provides the 
words of Representative Stevens concerning the disarmament of freedmen in 1868. He says, 
“Disarm a community and you rob them of the means of defending life. Take away their 
weapons of defense and you take away the inalienable right of defending liberty.” 10
In sum, we are aware of the very serious problem of gun violence in the City of Miami as 
well as the country in general, and sympathize with the concerns claiming that only a ban on 
firearms can ultimately prevent their dissemination and use. The City of Miami has, at its 
disposal, a menu of legislative options for combating gun violence; many are described above. 
However, a blanket prohibition on the possession of any firearms is not among them. While the 
arguments advanced in favor of a blanket ban may well be true, the Constitution cannot condone 
such a sweeping policy which turns the fundamental guarantee of the Second Amendment into 
idle prattle. While the utility of the Second Amendment in a modem area marked by standing 
armies and police forces may be questionable, what cannot be questioned is that it is not the 
province of the Supreme Court to place the right on the endangered species list. The right to keep 
and bear arms has, at its center, a protection of the inherent right of sell defense, a right at the 
very center of our scheme of government which seeks to advance life, liberty, and property.
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VI
Operation Lentil: Soviet Ethnic Cleansing of the Chechens
By Tom Shattuck ‘13
On February 23, 1944, Lavrentii Beria ordered for the NKVD to systemically remove all 
of the Chechen people from their homes in the Caucuses to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in Central 
Asia. Before this cleansing, the Chechens had a history of tension with the Russians. This age- 
old conflict culminated after the Germans retreated when the Soviet Union charged the entire 
Chechen population with treason for aiding the Germans. Despite the fact that several thousand 
Chechen men had volunteered in the Red Army to help fight the Germans, Stalin still used the 
pretext of a German retreat through an area of the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic to 
condemn them all. In reality, Stalin just wanted to finally end the Chechen problem. Because 
the cleansing removed every Chechen from their home, the process proved to be brutal and 
deadly for the Chechens. The NKVD loaded the Chechens on to train cars in a similar way that 
the Nazis loaded the Jews on to trains on their way to concentration camps. After the NKVD 
removed all of the Chechens in the Autonomous Republic, Stalin erased all references and 
memory of these oppressed people. No matter the reason given for the ethnic cleansing of the 
Chechen people, Operation Lentil proved only to be an excuse for Joseph Stalin to remove one 
of the many problems involving the Soviet Union’s minority nationalities.
In order to make the removal of the Chechen people from their homes appear legitimate, 
the Soviet government needed an official reason to give to the public. The official reason given 
for their removal, treason for collaborating with the Germans, made it extremely easy for the 
Soviets to cover up the true reason. The official report said that “many Chechens and Ingush 
were traitors to the homeland, changing over to the side of the fascist occupiers, joining the ranks 
of diversionaries and spies left behind the lines of the Red Army by the Germans. They formed 
armed bands at the behest of the Germans fighting against Soviet Power. 1 This language plays 
to the people’s emotions by claiming that the Chechens worked with the Germans. After the 
brutal battles against the Germans, charging the Chechens with treason was not difficult for the 
people to accept. They charged every Chechen with high treason, and the punishment would be 
forced removal from their homes into Central Asia. However, the Soviets had little, if any, 
evidence to prove Chechen collaboration with the Nazis. In reality, many Chechens fought on 
behalf of the Red Army against the Nazis. “Thousands of Chechens loyally fought for the Soviet
1 Norman M. Naimark, Fires o f Hatred: Ethnic Cleansing in Twentieth-Century Europe (Cambridge. Harvard 
University Press, 2001), 94.
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homeland in the Red Army during the German invasion. Between 18,000 and 40,000 Chechens 
were mobilized to fight in the Soviet ranks and many Chechens received medals and promotions 
for their heroism during the war.”2 During World War II, the Chechens fought against the Nazis, 
but would later be charged with collaboration and treason. The only charge that would have had 
any justification involved Chechens who deserted. Lavrentii Beria, the Minister of Internal 
Affairs, claimed that between 1941 and 1942, 1,500 Chechens deserted.3 However, this small 
number of deserters cannot justify the removal of every Chechen to Central Asia. What the 
Chechens actually did during the war and what the Soviets charged the Chechens with does not 
add up.
While the Soviet government claimed the Chechens committed treason, they really had 
other motives for their removal. Two areas stand out that explain why the Soviet government 
wanted to remove the Chechens from the Northern Caucuses: politics and past issues. The 
Chechens successfully resisted almost all Soviet attempts to propagandize and to install 
Socialism. Despite collectivization, the Chechens consistently resisted socialism by having 
private plots of land.4 The Soviets had a difficult time indoctrinating the Chechen people with 
their propaganda, which caused much discontent. The other area of interest, past issues between 
the Chechens and Soviets, helps to explain Stalin’s motivation to remove the Chechens. Since 
the Bolsheviks took power, the Chechens continuously resisted Soviet interference. Because the 
Chechens resisted successfully, the Soviet government wanted to find a way to get rid of this 
problem. “The attachment of the Chechen and Ingush to their homelands, the difficulty of 
imposing modem state forms on a resilient traditional society, and the ability of the Chechens 
and Ingush to resist both direct pressures from Moscow and the modernization expected from the 
granting of national institutional forms made the Soviet leadership determined to deal with them 
once and for all.”5 These reasons explain why the Soviets falsified charges of treason against the 
Chechen people during World War II. The Soviets used the false pretext of the war to get rid of 
an ongoing problem.
Because the Soviet government wanted to end this problem once and for all, they 
conducted the removal of the entire Chechen population in an efficient and quick manner. 
February 23, 1944 started off with celebrations because it was Red Army Day, but the Soviets 
used this holiday as an excuse to bring in soldiers not for celebration but to remove the 
Chechens: “No one suspected that disaster was at hand. Studebaker trucks rolled up . .. Soldiers 
holding automatics appeared. The Chechens were held at gun point. In every village the decree 
of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet was read, announcing the total deportation of the 
Chechens and Ingush for treason and for collaboration with the enemy.”6 The Soviets tricked the 
Chechens into thinking that the soldiers wanted to partake in the celebrations on this special day. 
However, they would later find out that the Red Army came to take them away to Central Asia. 
The Studebakers came from the United States to help with the war effort against Germany, but 
the Soviets used them round up its own people. In total, they moved 603,193 people in
2 Brian Glyn Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya: The Role of Memorialization 
and Collective Memory in the 1994-1996 and 1999-2000 Russo-Chechen Wars,” History and Memory 12, no. 1 
(2000): 6.
3 Lavrentii Beria, “From the Report of the NKVD Department of Special Settlements. September 5, 1944,” from 
www.soviethistory.org
4 Ibid.
5 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 95.
6 Aleksandr M. Nekrich, “The Punished Peoples,” from http://vip.latnet.lv/LPRA/Punished.htm.
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Operation Lentil, and 496,460 of those were of Chechens and Ingush descent. These statistics 
came from the official Soviet report by Beria, but the numbers differ greatly between sources. 
Due to the number of deaths in the process, it is impossible to know the exact number of people 
transported. The Soviets removed every Chechen from the Autonomous Republic and began to 
remove Chechens living in other areas in the Soviet Union. The Red Army loaded up the 
Chechens on to trains and sent them to Kazakhstan and Kirghizia in Central Asia.
In the process of moving over half a million people, the NKVD demonstrated brutal 
tactics to make the people obey their orders. The Soviet forces claimed the removal occurred 
smoothly and only 50 Chechens died in the process,8 but in reality, thousands of Chechens died 
during Operation Lentil. In one instance, the NKVD killed an entire village of Chechens: “The 
most glaring example of numerous reports of Soviet excesses was the Soviet annihilation of the 
Chechen mountain village Khaibakh, in Shatoi raion, where more than 700 Chechens were 
locked in a [barn] and burned alive.”9 This one massacre alone exceeds the original Soviet 
number of 50 deaths. The troops made sure that anyone who attempted to escape was shot, so no 
one could get away. Similar experiences occurred in other villages: they gunned down people in 
their homes and in the streets and killed the young and the old alike with grenades.10 In addition 
to these brutal methods, Lavrentii Beria gave orders to eliminate any person that a soldier 
considered “untransportable.” This category included the young, old, and diseased. They killed 
these people on the spot and did not even take them to the trains for transportation.11 The mass 
killings of people considered “untransportable” demonstrates the brutal nature of Operation 
Lentil.
The Chechens and other minority nationalities that the Soviets transported into Central 
Asia faced terrible conditions during Operation Lentil, and many died as a result. The number of 
deaths in the process will never be known because so many people died at different stages in the 
Operation. Many died from attacks in the villages, but many more died during the journey to 
Central Asia. “Some 3,000 perished even before being deported . . .  One can extrapolate from 
these separate figures that roughly 10,000 died from disease, hunger, and cold.”12 Those 
numbers are only estimates because the Soviets attempted to cover up Operation Lentil and to 
erase the Chechen people from memory. Nevertheless, these numbers provide the best estimate 
because it takes into account the horrid conditions on the railcars: “The Chechens were sealed in 
the guarded carts for two to three weeks as the trains made their way across the Soviet Union . . .  
The people were mowed down by typhus, they were not able to bury those who died. On the 
rare stops on the empty steppes, soldiers walked through the wagon taking off bodies.”13 These 
conditions are very similar to those that the Jews faced during their transportation to 
concentration camps during the same time period. The Nazis rounded up the Jews and put them 
on railcars just like the Soviets did to the Chechens. Even more Chechens died during re­
settlement, but it is impossible to know exactly how many died during their time in Central Asia. 
One estimate claims around 25% of all minority nationalities in Operation Lentil died from 1944
7 Lavrentii Beria, "From the Report o f L. B. Beria to I. V. Stalin, V. M. Molotov and A. I. Maienkov. July 1944," From 
www.soviethistory.org. (1992)
8 Jeffrey Burds, “The Soviet Wars against ‘Fifth Columnists:’ The Case of Chechnya, 1942-4,” Journal o f  
Contemporary History 42, no. 2 (2007): 304.
9 Ibid, 305.
10 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,
11 Burds, “The Soviet Wars against ‘Fifth Columnists,” 305.
12 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 97. 
13 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,
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to 1948.14 No one exact number will ever be produced due to the secret nature of Operation 
Lentil, but a large number of Chechens died during the forced removal due to the poor treatment 
by the NKVD and horrid conditions during travel.
In addition to removing the Chechens from the Northern Caucuses, the Soviets 
unsuccessfully attempted to remove any memory or knowledge of the Chechens from the 
records. Stalin used two methods to try to remove the Chechens from memory: dissolving the 
Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic and trying to remove Chechen culture. Once the NKVD 
completed Operation Lentil, Stalin allowed for Georgia, northern Ossetia, Daghestan, and 
Stavropol to absorb the Chechen-Ingush Autonomous Republic.13 Georgia received most of the 
land, but the people of all of the regions moved into the abandoned Chechen villages. After 
moving into the areas, Stalin wanted to remove all traces of the Chechens from the villages. He 
removed anything that could go back to a Chechen origin: “Mosques were demolished, literature 
in the Chechen language burned, signs in Chechen destroyed and, most importantly, the revered 
graveyards of the Chechens were plowed over. The expunging of the memory of the Chechens 
extended to town and topographical names”16 By removing anything Chechen, it seemed like 
they never even existed, let alone lived in the area. No one in the Soviet Union dared to mention 
them or what happened to them. In Kazakhstan and Kirghizia, the Soviets refused to allow the 
Chechens to speak their native tongue and did not allow public displays of their culture. 
Everything Chechen became either forgotten or outlawed.17 In order to ensure the lasting 
success of Operation Lentil, Stalin attempted to remove all aspects of Chechen culture from 
memory.
Despite Stalin’s efforts to eliminate any memory of the Chechen people, they continued 
to endure in Kazakhstan and Kirghizia until 1957 when they returned to their native home. They 
initially returned home slowly, but by “the end of 1957, the Chechen and Ingush Autonomous 
Republic was reestablished, and all the Chechens and Ingush were allowed to return to their 
homes.”18 Some violence did occur when the Chechens tried to regain their former territory and 
homes. Despite Stalin’s best efforts, the Chechen people carried on in Kazakhstan and 
Kirghizia. Their resilience allowed for them to survive: “Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn wrote of the 
Chechens: ‘Only one nation refused to accept the psychology of submission.’ And this applied 
‘not to individuals, nor to insurgents, but to the nation as a whole...no Chechen ever tried to be of 
service or to please the authorities. Their attitude towards them was proud and even hostile.’”19 
They realized what Stalin wanted to happen, but they refused to allow him that convenience by 
living on. The Chechens not only survived in Central Asia, but they also thrived in a sense. 
During their exile, they had the highest birthrate in all of the Soviet Union in an attempt to keep 
their people alive. “The number of Chechens who returned to their homeland after their release 
from exile in 1956- 1957 was almost as high as that deported [in 1944].”20 Despite their major 
losses in Operation Lentil, the Chechen people lived on.
In Operation Lentil, Stalin ordered the systemic removal of the Chechen people from the 
Northern Caucuses to rid the Soviet Union of the historic Chechen problem. Under the guise of 
the high treason by collaborating with the Nazis, the Soviets removed the Chechens to Central
14 Ibid.
15 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 98.
16 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,” 11.
17 Naimark, Fires o f Hatred, 98.
18 Ibid, 99.
19 Williams, “Commemorating "The Deportation" in Post-Soviet Chechnya,” 11.
20 Ibid, 10.
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Asia. However, in reality, the true motivations behind their removal go back before World War 
II. The Chechens resisted Soviet Socialist practices and culture/propaganda. Therefore, the 
Soviet government forcibly removed the entire Chechen population in late February 1944. This 
removal led to the death of thousands and thousands of Chechens by Soviet hands in the streets 
of their villages. Even more died en route to Central Asia on packed railcars. Their situation and 
Operation Lentil have many similarities to the German treatment of the Jews in the same time 
period. Both populations were murdered in their homes, brutally assaulted, packed in railcars, 
and transported to a foreign land not meant to survive. In the end, the Chechen people survived 
and returned home from exile in 1957.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 97
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Book Review I
Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953 
By Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk
Reviewed by Michael McCabe ‘12
Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953, by Yoram Gorlizki 
and Oleg Khlevniuk, is a monograph of Stalin’s reign after the end of World War II until 
the death of the dictator in 1953. While not the first book to examine Stalin’s relationship 
to his inner-circle, Cold Peace breaks substantially with existing historiography on the 
subject in two major ways. First, Gorlizki and Khlevniuk had access to a significantly 
greater amount of primary sources than previous historians. Previous books primarily 
relied on newspaper articles and a very small amount of leaked reports; however, Cold 
Peace notably builds upon the existing source material through “a rich vein of archival, 
memoir, and publish materials that were unavailable to earlier authors” (11). In addition, 
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk were able to gain access to several unpublished Central 
Committee resolutions.
Second, the thesis Khlevniuk and Gorlizki put forth differs drastically from other 
historians on the end of the Stalinist era. Cold Peace dispels any notion that Stalin was 
not in complete control of major policies enacted by the Soviet Union or that there were 
rivals to Stalin’s leadership. As the authors state “in contrast to recent accounts, which 
discern a general radicalization of policies and perceptions in the postwar period, our 
book suggests that in terms of governmental practices and procedures, as well as of some 
substantive policy discussions, the postwar period was one of relative equilibrium and 
institutional consolidation” (12). The authors would reject any argument suggesting 
Stalin’s actions did not follow a political logical and solely stemmed from his paranoia 
and insecurities.
The two authors are both highly qualified to undertake such a work. Yoram 
Gorlizki is a professor at the University of Manchester (UK) and has authored two other 
books—both of which were initially published in Russian. Some of his other work 
includes “Stalin and His Circle” (a journal article coauthored with Khlevniuk), “The 
Political (Dis)Orders of Stalinism and National Socialism, and Ordinary Stalinism: The 
Council of Ministers in Stalin’s last years”—along with many other articles published in
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both English and Russian.1 Oleg Khlevniuk is a senior researcher at the State Archive of 
the Russian Federation, Moscow. In addition to the several pieces he has coauthored 
with Gorlizki, he wrote The History o f the Gulag, which was originally published in 
Russian and later translated to English.2 Both authors specialize in the reign of Stalin and 
Cold Peace builds upon their previous work.
In the book Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Stalin created a monopoly of 
political power. There was no dissent by his lieutenants and rarely did any of his 
entourage push forward a major-policy initiative. While Stalin ‘reformed’ the Politburo, 
it was always “entirely obedient to Stalin’s whims” (45). Unlike previous historians, the 
authors do not contribute Stalin’s power politics solely to his suspicious, paranoid, or 
vindictive nature. Gorlizki and Khlevniuk believe that every action undertaken by Stalin 
after the war followed a certain political logic. Stalin’s reign was marked by 
contradictions, and his final years are no exception. At times contrary to his monopoly 
on power, post-war Stalinism was marked by dedication to creating and maintaining an 
efficient economy.
The authors separate Cold Peace into three sections to breakdown Stalin’s final 
years in power— 1945-1948, 1949-1951, and 1952-1953. Each of these sections is 
covered in two chapters. The first section details Stalin’s efforts in recreating the Soviet 
hierarchy after the allies’ victory. During this time Stalin undertook a campaign to 
discredit every member of his inner circle. While some historians have seen Stalin’s 
actions being derived from paranoid fear of his followers, Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue 
that these actions were carefully planned by Stalin. The attacks on his entire inner-circle, 
but specifically Malenkov and Beria, “were part of a broader action by Stalin to destroy 
the system of leadership that had emerged in wartime. Stalin sought to nip in the bud any 
signs of autonomy within the ruling group and to restore the Politburo to the norms of the 
immediate post-purge period” (29). Stalin simultaneously reorganized the high-level 
political structure and subjugated the Politburo. Still the authors admit there was an 
element of randomness to Stalin’s methods of governance, simultaneously moving 
between different elements (64).
The second portion of the book details the last of Stalin’ s purges from 1949-1951. 
The authors argue that there were growing challenges confronting Soviet authority both 
internationally and within the Bloc. The United States and its allies formed NATO as a 
military alliance to challenge the Soviet Union in Europe. Additionally, Germany was 
partitioned in 1949, giving the allies a foothold in Central Europe. As tension increased 
with the west so too did the challenge within the Bloc, as relations with Yugoslavia 
became strained after a personal dispute between Stalin and Tito. The authors argue that 
in response to these external disputes of Stalin’s power, Stalin ordered his last purges “to 
prevent disobedience and to harden official discipline” (70). Stemming from these 
international challenges purges in nearly all of the Bloc states governments occurred, 
replacing the former leaders with new ones who were more compliant to Stalin’s will. 
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Stalin’s purges fit in with his post-war attitude because 
they carried a political logic.
1 University of Manchester, “Prof Yoram Gorlizki—publications,” Accessed online April 25, 2012,
http://www.manchester.ac.uk/research/yoram.gorlizki/publications
2 Yale University Press, “The History of the Gulag,” Accessed online April 25, 2012, 
http://yalepress.yale.edu/vupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300092844
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The final piece of Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s argument surrounds Stalin’s final 
years and his legacy. The authors argue that the end of Stalin’s reign was significantly 
marked by two features: the Gulag and lack of food (124). In the case of the labor camps, 
almost five million individuals at the beginning of 1953 were imprisoned, required to 
move into special settlements, or forced to labor for the Soviet state. The authors argue 
that Stalin’s devotion to the penal labor system never trickled down to the members of his 
inner-circle. In fact, immediately after Stalin’s death, Beria launched a major offensive 
aimed at dismantling the Gulag (131). However, given Stalin’s monopoly on power and 
his dedicated to his Gulag no one in his inner circle dared to speak out against him.
Gorlizki and Khlevniuk counter Stalin’s unrelenting control of the Gulag with the 
Soviet crisis in agricultural product following the end of World War II. Unlike the 
Gulag, discussions over agricultural reform between Stalin and his lieutenants occurred 
before Stalin’s death. Despite these dialogues the authors argued that Stalin continued to 
view “any challenges to his long-cherished policy principles with extreme suspicion and 
hostility” (141). Despite Stalin’s stubborn unyielding nature, he continued to protect his 
power with extreme energy until the day he died. The authors argue that Stalin followed 
Lenin’s blueprint when he denounced Molotov and Mikoian, and flooded the Soviet 
leadership with relatively unknown individuals (144). Despite his failing health Stalin 
continued to push the “apparatus of repression and ideological discipline into one final 
offensive” (163).
Skeptics of Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s work might point out that when hooves are 
heard in Central Park think horses, not zebras—meaning the Stalin’s actions in the post­
war years derived simply from paranoia, not from a grand political scheme. It is very 
hard to assess the psychological motivations of historical characters because primary 
sources may not give complete insight into the thought process of those characters; 
moreover, modem psychologists have a difficult time placing motives behind people’s 
actions during a psychological interview, let alone when assessing someone who lived 
over half a century ago. What has made it so difficult to derive a motive from Stalin’s 
actions has stemmed from how contradictory his actions were. The authors admit that 
there was a random element to many of Stalin’s decisions; however, Gorlizki and 
Khlevniuk effectively respond to this claim in Cold Peace by justifying every major 
decision by Stalin by stating the political ramifications of that decision. For example, the 
authors justify Stalin’s discrediting of several members of the Politburo in 1951 due to 
the fact the created a balance of power between Stalin’s inner-circle that suited Stalin’s 
political game (113).
One of the most impressive elements of the book is that the monograph draws 
from a substantial amount of archival sources—sources that were previously not open to 
the public. Earlier historians on the inner workings of the Stalin era have been accused of 
creating a patchwork story. Historian T.H. Rigby states that Gorlizki and Khlevniuk’s 
account not only supplements these previous works, but supplants them through the 
authors’ use of archival sources, and newly published and unpublished materials to create 
a “comprehensive analytical narrative.”3 It is a short, compact work with a giant impact 
for the historiography of the post-War Stalin years.
3 T.H. Rigby, “Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1952 by Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg 
Khlevniuk,” in Russian Review 64.1, January 2005, 159.
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Historians have widely accepted and promoted the thesis of Gorlizki and 
Khlevniuk; however, there have been some criticisms. Historian Norman Naimark 
correctly criticizes the title of the work. Naimark claims that Cold Peace deceives the 
reader into believing the work would detail the beginning years of the Cold War from an 
international perspective, not from the inner workings of the Soviet States (and not 
mentioning the United States in any significant detail).4 Additionally Naimark correctly 
points out at times Gorlizki and Khlevniuk argue that Cold War events are pretexts for 
Stalin’s domestic agenda and at other times that they are causes.5 Gorlizki and 
Khlevniuk might have been better served either avoiding completely the international 
politics of the Cold War or lengthening their work to give a broader history from an 
international perspective. That criticism aside, Cold Peace is an excellent addition to the 
historiography of the final years of Stalinism.
Publisher: Oxford University Press 
Number of Pages: 248.
Year: 2004 
Genre: Soviet History 
Price: $28.95
4 Norman M. Naimark, Reviewed work(s): Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1953. 
By Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk, in The Journal o f Modern History 78.1, March 2006, 285.
5 Ibid.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 102
Bibliography
Naimark, Norman M. “Reviewed work(s): Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling
Circle, 1945-1953. By Yoram Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk.” In The Journal o f 
Modern History 78.1. March 2006. 283-285.”
Rigby, T.H. "Cold Peace: Stalin and the Soviet Ruling Circle, 1945-1952 by Yoram 
Gorlizki and Oleg Khlevniuk.” In Russian Review 64.1. January 2005. 158-159. 
University of Manchester. “Prof Yoram Gorlizki—publications.” Accessed online April 
25, 2012. http://www.manchester.ac.uk/research/voram.gorlizki/publications 
Yale University Press. “The History of the Gulag.” Accessed online April 25, 2012. 
http://yalepress.vale.edu/vupbooks/book.asp?isbn=9780300092844




Reviewed by John Prendergast ‘13
As evident by the thousands of works detailing his life, Napoleon is one of the 
most intriguing characters in modern history. Authors spend years trying to uncover the 
very core of Napoleon’s character, and he is seen as anywhere from good to evil, 
conqueror to unifier, et cetera. Pieter Geyl has called Napoleon “the debate without end,” 
as a consensus to Napoleon’s character will likely never be reached.1 An Associate 
Professor of History at the University of Victoria in Canada, R.S. Alexander avoids the 
trap of a blow-by-blow, chronological account of Napoleon’s life. Instead, Alexander 
takes a unique approach by analyzing the many reputations associated with Napoleon and 
how these reputations have evolved over time.
Alexander uses the first chapter to highlight the critical parts of Napoleon’s life as 
well as France’s condition during the time period. This is the first and only occasion in 
the book where such a chronological setup is employed. Napoleon was bom in Corsica in 
1769 to Carlo and Letizia Buonaparte. His father was never really around much, typically 
off on business—both professional and adulterous.2 This left Letizia to care for Napoleon 
and his siblings, but even Napoleon was soon off to military school. He entered the 
military school of Brienne in 1779 at age 10; nine years later he was commissioned as a 
lieutenant, still a mere teenager. Soon, France fell prey to turmoil. Louis XVI was 
executed in 1793, the extremists initiated the Reign of Terror, and many members of the 
nobility fled the country. This paved the way for people like Napoleon, who used his 
training coupled with success in the field to gain recognition. He was so promising that 
he landed himself in prison for much of August 1794 by Saliceti due to a feared takeover. 
The very next year in October, Napoleon was charged by Paul Barras to suppress a
1 R.S. Alexander, Napoleon, London: Oxford University Press (2001), 6.
2 Ibid, 11.
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royalist uprising—from which we derive his famous phrase that he had cleared the streets 
with a “whiff of grapeshot.”3
Napoleon really got his first taste of rule in Italy, where his success ultimately led 
to an “oriental complex”4 of sorts: he wanted a piece of the Middle East. He landed in 
Egypt in June 1798, but he departed the next year after defeat as well as news of French 
losses in the European theater. His return to France in August 1799 signaled the 
establishment of the Consulate which some might have saw as a precursor to dictatorship, 
but this is not clear.5 What is clear is that Napoleon formed a significant power base 
within the army and public, he made himself First Consul, the Church became a puppet 
of the state, and criticism of the state was put down—this was the so-called price of 
effective government.6 Ultimately, Napoleon crowned himself Emperor on December 2nd 
1804. Key government posts were given to his family members in France and abroad as it 
became clear that France sought to expand her limits. He divorced Josephine in 1809 and 
married Marie-Louise, mostly because Josephine could not provide him with an heir. 
Napoleon continued his look outward with wars of liberation in 1813-1814, but the 
Empire eventually fell because “Napoleon failed to extricate himself from Spain prior to 
taking the Grand Army deep into Russia.”7 Alexander provides some analysis in that 
Napoleon was unwilling to settle for anything less than victory.
Unfortunately for Napoleon, defeat led to an exile to Elba where he was under 
close watch from Francis I of Austria who held Marie-Louise and Napoleon’s son to 
ensure good behavior. This did not deter Napoleon, and Napoleon returned to Paris in 
March 1815 amid potential plots against the regime. He essentially declared that he was 
the revolution, and he threatened to “hang priests and nobles from the lampposts if they 
did not desist in attacking the rights of the nation.”8 The following period, known as the 
Hundred Days, led to a movement of Napoleon’s followers to take back the government 
but, ultimately, they were defeated at Waterloo on June 18th 1815, and Napoleon was 
transferred to St. Helena where he would remain until his death.
Alexander next shifts the focus to the post-Napoleon period of the nineteenth 
century, particularly how his character and leadership shaped those after him, as well as 
the adoption of Napoleonic principles from both the Left and Right, also known as 
Bonapartism. When Louis-Napoleon rose to power, he tried to emulate his uncle’s 
philosophy—“liberal division of powers combined with a strong executive led by an 
Emperor who would implement the will of the people.”9 He also understood the idea of 
“France first” when advancing the military into conflicts for expansionist reasons. His 
defeat at Sedan damaged Bonapartism until the 3rd Republic and the New Right but, even 
then, patriotism became exclusive to “France only” and there lost a sense of “bringing 
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Napoleon as the Great Commander and Man on Horseback also came to fruition 
in the nineteenth century. The latter image refers to the leader whose power originates 
from a military position but then soon broadens to encompass the social and political 
arena. Alexander notes that Napoleon certainly had his fair share of defeats in battle, but 
“[his] failures were more than balanced by his victories.”11 He often employed a high-risk 
strategy, one which saw casualties as essentially irrelevant. Most European commanders 
were hesitant about this, but there are elements of this philosophy in World War I and 
II—this notion of “seizing the initiative and imposing [your] will on [your] opponents”12 
was appealing but, generally, casualties were not as liberally accepted as Napoleon would 
have it. Napoleon, after all, is viewed as the first modem dictator by many and, thus, 
there comes with that a certain role which does not always bring out the most humane 
qualities that one would typically look for in a leader today.
In this vein, there developed what Alexander describes as the Black Legend, an 
attempt to demonize Napoleon during the nineteenth century. These portrayals originated 
abroad, usually from German, Italian, and Russian writers which leads one to suspect that 
they were simply jealous of France’s success against their own people. These authors 
paint Napoleon as “scheming, ungrateful, cruel, and a physical coward”13 who turned his 
back on those loyal to him. They also invoked powerful language, such that Napoleon 
was “the source of all evil and the end of all good...a patricidal demon spawned by 
Hell...” et al. Some of the darker tales speak of Napoleon’s poisoning of his own troops 
at Jaffa, and his slaughter of Turkish prisoners at El Arish.15 Many people took all this for 
what it was, rhetoric, but the French government actually incurred some criticism, so this 
technique did work to an extent. After all, most Europeans viewed Napoleon as a 
conqueror.
Despite this, there are many commanders who use Napoleon’s style as a model 
for their own undertakings—and rightfully so given Napoleon’s undeniable talent and 
success in the military realm. Alexander points out the four Haitian Men on Horseback, 
specifically Henry Christophe and Faustin Soulouque as drawing the closest comparison 
to Napoleon. Alexander also invokes General Santa Anna of Mexico for comparison, 
noting how both he and Napoleon used plebiscites to keep the hoi polloi involved, they 
recognized the importance of propaganda, and the “prevention of alternative accounts [of 
propaganda] when they had the power to do so.”16 Santa Anna’s flight in the face of 
American invaders also boasts a similarity to Napoleon’s retreat from Moscow, although 
Napoleon has an entire overture to show for his failing, Santa Anna does not.17 
Alexander keeps the topic still slightly on character comparison in Chapter 4 but, instead, 
entertains the question: was Napoleon the precursor to fascism? This analysis is simply 
the result of circumstance. In other words, Napoleon would not be studied in this light 
had it not been for the European hegemony movement of the twentieth century by the 







171 am alluding to Pyotr Ilyich Tchaikovsky’s 1812 Overture, musically depicting Napoleon’s retreat from 
the Russian capital after yielding to “Mother Winter’s” fury.
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defined, but Alexander does his best to situate Napoleon within the general, broad 
interpretation of fascism: “[Napoleon] exploited disillusionment with parliamentary 
government to establish the authoritarian regime that emerged as the Empire” and he 
“likened himself to famous forerunners... [and associated himself] with a seemingly 
incongruous variety of heroes.” Moreover, Napoleonic Rule was that of one person, not 
one party, and his government repressed “all political and social organization, not just 
opposing associations”18—plebiscites were really only there to be used at his 
convenience. While it is true Napoleon was concerned about public opinion, “the ethos of 
the regime was less to represent than to direct opinion.”19
On the other hand, Alexander answers his own assertions. First, France’s police 
state was too benign when compared to the fascist regimes of Hitler and Mussolini. 
Additionally, Napoleon’s renewal of social hierarchy has more in common with 
conservative ideology than a fascist one. It is also interesting to point out that Napoleon 
never made claims for land as the Nazis had done through lebensraum policy, but yet the 
French Empire was obviously rooted in a desire to conquer and expand. Alexander does 
not take a concrete position here in regards to Napoleon and fascism, but he does note 
that “the image of Hitler and Mussolini are sufficiently powerful that they do not need 
any association with Napoleon to heighten effect.”20
The focus shifts in the next few chapters to Napoleon as depicted in literature and 
art, as well as how he stands next to the common man. Art renderings almost always 
show Napoleon in a positive, superhuman light. Placing his hand to stomach at an almost 
90 degree angle of his arm is a popular depiction—divine-like, yes, but also a modest 
image. Simplicity was a way of saying that it was the talent beneath which made this man 
special. Jacques-Louis David is probably the most notable Napoleon artist that Alexander 
mentions, and it was always David’s goal to depict Napoleon as “symbolic of France, 
glory, and selfless dedication.”21 Because of such extraordinary portrayals, Alexander 
believes, opponents felt compelled to respond with equally embellished interpretations, 
albeit written, via the Black Legend.
Napoleon has been used by many authors in literature throughout the years, each 
obviously in different ways. In Crime and Punishment, Fyodor Dostoyevsky invokes not 
Napoleon ‘the man,’ but rather Napoleon as a ‘type’ of person. Napoleon had Europe in a 
state of terror right before his retreat and, moreover, he died with the blood of thousands 
on his hands—yet he celebrated and glorified by many. Similarly, the protagonist 
Raskolnikov in the Dostoyevsky work wanted to be glorified after he committed murder, 
thus comes the line: “I wanted to make myself a Napoleon, and that is why I killed her.”22 
Alexander discusses other authors who reference Napoleon for the ‘type’ of person he 
was, but most notably is Arthur Conan Doyle. In Sherlock Holmes, Doyle’s protagonist 
Detective Holmes describes his rival Professor Moriarty as “the Napoleon of crime!”23 
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Many students are not convinced that Napoleon shared characteristics with the 
common man. After all, pensions in the army were low, he did little to improve medical 
service, and there was certainly a lack of food, clothing, and arms provisions. With that 
said, Alexander notes Napoleon drew his greatest support and loyalty from the rank and 
file because he was friendly towards them: he learned the names of veteran servicemen, 
appeared amongst the men at campfires, and he even rode along through the lines before 
battle. By identifying as the “Little Corporal,” Napoleon made himself more human and 
likeable but, at the same time, he was still the protector of the people.25 This idea changed 
a bit in the twentieth century, especially through movies. No longer was there this image 
of a martyr awaiting his Christ-like death on St. Helena, but rather Napoleon was a 
tyrant—indifferent to the people.26 Able Gance’s 1927 work presents Napoleon as “a 
man of destiny.. .conquering the elements, with no time to waste of crowd adoration.”27 
Alexander concludes that Napoleon was “singularly talented and not truly of the people, 
but there are many aspiring Napoleon’s among the people.”28
Alexander wraps up his study with yet another question: will Napoleon be 
remembered as a conqueror or unifier? It is once again appropriate to invoke Geyl’s “a 
debate without end,” though Alexander attempts to somewhat help along the ‘unifier’ 
advocates. Napoleon promoted the modern state outside of France, which was assisted 
through the exportation of the Napoleonic model. Additionally, the power of the central 
government was extended, and the model enhanced the means through which the state 
could act. With that said, Alexander comes back to the idea of ‘conqueror’—the concept 
of “France first” during the Empire cannot be ignored.
Just as Alexander depicts the good and bad about Napoleon, there are both good 
and bad qualities regarding this work. First off, Alexander utilizes a thematic, topical 
organization which puts him off to a good start. Blow-by-blow chronologies can often be 
boring and too long-winded, losing the attention of the reader. Alexander elects to use the 
thematic setup to analyze how Napoleon’s reputation has evolved throughout the past 
two-hundred years. If there is a particular area the reader wants to explore, they have the 
luxury to do so without reading the entire work (aided by a simple, yet nice table of 
contents). Another big strength of this work is its very diverse, large range of citation. 
Both the chronology table and bibliography are, to phrase it in Latin, mirabile visu. This 
demonstrates a well-researched piece of literature not cheated by lack of preparation. 
Alexander compliments the range of reference with a few photographs throughout to 
illustrate the relevant theme—but they were employed so few and far between that their 
use was of dubious effect.
The major flaw with Alexander’s work is the lack of a clear and concise thesis. 
When there is such a lack of a tangible thesis, the reader is left to assume that the thesis 
lies implicit within the work, but even this does not seem to be the case here. Just about 
every chapter makes a point but then issues a rebuttal to that point. There is nothing 
wrong with rebuttal or playing devil’s advocate—such ability actually adds analytic
25 Ibid, 158.
26 This idea/image of Napoleon lacking virtue reminds me of his statement, They wanted me to be another 
Washington; I could not be a Washington.” Regardless of how he presented himself to the people, he was, 
first and foremost, power-driven. If you impeded this mission, you were expendable.
27 Alexander, 167; This reinforces the aforementioned point.
8 Ibid, 173.
The Histories, Volume 10, Number 2 108
depth to such a work. However, the author must come back and rebut the rebuttal, so to 
speak. Only then can conclusions or arguments be put forth. Unfortunately, Alexander 
fails in this regard; for instance, in the conqueror vs. unifier debate, he demonstrates the 
points for each but then does not take a position. The same can be said for the fascism 
debate. He offers very little analysis throughout the work but, when he does, it does not 
advance any argument—it merely contextualizes a minor point. Putting forth all of the 
competing visions of Napoleon without establishing a superior point of view leaves 
nothing more than a confused audience member.
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